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Volume LXXIX *June 1964* *Number 2*

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

THE NEED TO KNOW AND THE RIGHT TO TELL: EMMET JOHN HUGHES, *THE ORDEAL OF POWER*—A DISCUSSION

BOTH scholarship and the exigencies of political life itself have, in recent years, focused attention on the institution of the presidency. "In the United States we like to 'rate' a President," writes Richard E. Neustadt. "We measure him as 'weak' or 'strong' and call what we are measuring his 'leadership.' We do not wait until a man is dead; we rate him from the moment he takes office."

Few books during the past decade have given more of a fillip to the national pastime of president-rating than Emmet John Hughes, *The Ordeal of Power: A Political Memoir of the Eisenhower Years* (New York, Atheneum, 1963; 372 pp. $5.95), and few have added more impressively to our knowledge of the detailed history of a particular administration, of the pressures that bear on the incumbent, or of the influence of personality on the exercise of power. So closely, indeed, has the book accommodated itself to the obsession with rating, that for the most part critical comment has confined itself to a discussion of its purported "revelations" and has neglected serious questions concerned with the office of the presidency itself. For serious questions there are, of both an ethical and political character:

What are the implications of accepting a privileged position on the White House staff with the idea of writing a book revealing information to which one has become privy by virtue of holding that position?

Can the President speak to his staff with the degree of familiarity and confidence required if he suspects that his words will shortly after be used against him?

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Conversely, what are the implications of having on the presidential staff someone whose essential task it is to prepare for posterity the view of the administration that the administration would like the public to have of it?

It was to discuss such questions as these that the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY asked Professor Malcolm Moos and Professor Adolf A. Berle, both of whom have had extensive experience in Republican and Democratic administrations, to state their views of *The Ordeal of Power.*

THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY

Emmet Hughes, brilliant as observer, journalist, and writer, joined General Dwight Eisenhower's staff in the campaign of 1952. He was a principal draftsman of speeches, notably on foreign policy, in that campaign. His qualification for the task was amply proved by his *summa cum laude* from Princeton, by service as press attaché in Madrid, by work in Rome and Berlin for *Time* and *Life* and later as editor of *Fortune,* and by his authorship of a number of excellent books. After Eisenhower's inauguration, he became one of the White House staff, continuing his work as speech writer and draftsman. Two years after the Republican administration ended, using his contemporary memoranda, papers, and journal entries, he wrote a direct and intimate account of the course of White House affairs falling within his observation.

The scope of the account runs from the campaign of 1952 through 1958 and the depth likewise—neither private conferences nor Cabinet meetings escape disclosure. Though Hughes' primary interest obviously lies in foreign affairs, there is a careful account of Eisenhower's policy when the Little Rock riots broke out over school segregation. Hughes is clear that the President fundamentally dissented from the Supreme Court decision requiring desegregation, and was fundamentally insensitive to the civil rights struggle. In the main, however, the drama of government in the cold war from Korea to the communist seizure of Cuba, furnishes the great theme. Hughes does not find in Eisenhower the

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heroic figure he would have desired, though "The want and weakness . . . was not a mere matter of indecision. The man—and the President—was never more decisive than when he held to a steely resolve *not* to do something that he sincerely believed wrong in itself or alien to his office" (pp. 349–50). The figure in the administration who displayed greatest commitment to a theme was "not the President but his Secretary of State" (John Foster Dulles) and even Dulles' zeal Hughes finds neither creative nor impassioned, "offering ice instead of fire." Justly, Hughes gives Eisenhower his moments of great penetration—for instance, his castigation of Senator Bricker of Ohio as a man "determined to save the United States from Eleanor Roosevelt"; or, again, the President's excoriation of the House of Representatives when they slashed appropriations for the Office of Education. Yet the concluding estimate is unfavorable. The best he can say is that President Eisenhower left the Republican party—politically and intellectually—where he found it, while his policy amounted to "a host of dissident intents, generous gestures and dramatic acts of peace," spent when the moral climate was least appropriate and "their political value was least impressive."

As might have been expected, the book is fascinating as revelation. It includes a great body of firsthand data, about policy formation and decision-making, about relations between the President and members of his Cabinet and among the members themselves, and concerning the estimates President Eisenhower put on them (sometimes lower than was apparent to the public). These, along with Hughes' own opinions of the Cabinet members, of the President, and of policy in general, offer firsthand historical information of a high order.

I

They also offer a source of top-flight controversy. Publication of such a book raises a number of questions. Chiefest among them is whether Hughes should have published it at all at this time. One remembers the old Victorian-English rule. Good taste and loyalty forbade publication of any equivalently intimate records until everyone concerned in them was dead. Victorian statesmen frequently left their personal records and papers sealed until a specified number

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of years after their own demise. The custom was intended partly to protect living men whose reputations and friendships might be harmed; partly also to protect a process of government. The first is a matter of taste and high manners which I do not here discuss. American practice (regrettably) does not give these a high factor of importance. The second consideration—protecting the process of government—does raise a very real issue.

A President must talk to his staff. He can get the best from them—and they can best function—only when exchange is wholly candid. In this reviewer's experience, great decision-making usually boils down to a tired chief of state on one side of the desk and a trusted friend or aide on the other. If at that point the chief of state must consider not only the decision involved but also the possible effect of revelation of himself, his emotions and his thinking—concerning men, political effects of possible measures, his personal hopes and fears—frankness will necessarily be inhibited. After all, when a decision is made, it must stand on its own bottom. History deals with the result; judgment of the man is secondary in importance. British reticence protects the governing individual from invasion of privacy by indiscretion of his associates.

American practice tends to consider the man as well as the result fair quarry for contemporary judgment. Many Americans urge (as this reviewer sees it, to an extreme degree) the right of the public to "know." Mr. Hughes indeed in his "word of introduction" makes the argument for this, believing it an imperative of history—it is "neither courtesy nor courage to hoard all testimony about the leaders of a nation until all of them are dead" (p. 16). This, as he considers it, overrides a chief of state's right to privacy. His argument suggests that the imperative even overrides the interest in giving a President widest freedom to think, to discuss, and to decide, unclouded by consideration of later publicity, since the sum of knowledge of a free people must not be reduced. The argument has force. Hughes thus came to the conclusion that the material should be published—now. A good many of President Eisenhower's friends, reading the book, came to a quite opposite conclusion—present publication of intimate memoirs was rank disloyalty.

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II

Controversy thus set off continues vivid, with an arguable case on both sides. With old friendship and great respect for Mr. Hughes, this reviewer (having had somewhat similar experience) would have decided differently. The presidency is a lonely post at best. In crisis, the loneliness becomes almost unbearable. When, in hot war (like Korea) or in cold war (like the meeting at Camp David) lives of many, many men and women are at stake, the tenderest and most loving guard of a President's mental and governmental activities seems indicated. I therefore would have withheld publication for some years. Obviously there is no absolute test. One can conceive situations in which a current of thought and of probable decision may seem so disastrous to an aide that duty to the nation requires disclosure. But such situations, though readily imaginable, must nevertheless be extremely rare. The interest in protecting the presidential process is extremely high; it can justifiably be overriden where the greater interest of national safety is at stake; but that situation scarcely seems to have arisen in the Eisenhower administration. I do not presume to criticize the decision Mr. Hughes made. I merely observe that I should have decided it differently—and indeed have done so in the case of my own somewhat analogous record of the Roosevelt years.

A second observation is perhaps more in order. How important are records and memoranda like these as sources of history?

They are, of course, valuable—no question. They are also subject to certain qualifications, which Mr. Hughes would, I think, be the first to recognize. During a presidential campaign, all lines of decision center in the candidate. His staff mauls material into shape, thinks up lines of policy, embodies them in draft speeches, serves them up to the chief. He in turn mauls drafts to fit his own ideas, makes selections and, according to his taste, accepts their drafts or redrafts himself. Woodrow Wilson, for example, did his own drafting, using aides only as editorial assistants. Roosevelt redrafted endlessly, the ultimate product being distinctly his, though one can trace the source of particular paragraphs or suggestions of policy. During the campaign period, the

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intimate staff sees the whole picture—at least from the candidate's point of view. Especially when there is likely to be a change of party, policies are fluid and causative power of suggestion can be high. Hughes himself, I think, is fairly responsible for the pledge Eisenhower made—and redeemed—to seek a prompt end to the Korean fighting, dramatized by his promise to visit Korea and his later trip to the Korean front. It is easy in campaign time for a brain truster to overrate his causative capacity—but there is no question that at this point he is more causative than he is ever likely to be again.

Comes the election. The President moves into the White House. The pick of his campaign staff enter with him. All the ponderous organization of the United States government is now involved. During the campaign the brain truster did not have to consider the views of a Secretary of State. Now the Secretary of State has a valid quarrel if a White House assistant makes policy behind his back or contrary to his thinking. From having been a chief intellectual conduit, he suddenly becomes suspect—a rival or threat to the Cabinet officers who, not unnaturally, consider their official position and responsibility more important than the personal or intellectual relations of the President with low-echelon assistants. The aide's factor of causation necessarily drops—and continues to do so—until he either retires from Washington altogether or accepts the very limited ambit of an official job delimited by the bureaucratic hierarchy. From then on, his observations become more important than his suggestions—he is observing the course of power. His causative activity becomes less, as perhaps it should in a government of bureaucracy and laws rather than of personal relationships and men. He is still important. But he is no longer dealing with the intellectual operation of getting elected, but with the governmental operation of making power-decisions and implementing them through administration.

All this process is apparent in Mr. Hughes' book—and indeed of any similar record written by an honest man. An exactly similar evolution is traceable in Bernard Sternsher's recent chronicle, *Rexford Tugwell and the New Deal* (New Brunswick, N. J., 1964). I am sure it would be evident if

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my own papers were published. Not so subtly and not so slowly (and not without help from columnists and news hawks), the relationship changes. Necessarily it becomes less a story of the results of intellectual influence and shifts into a chronicle of events from a singularly intimate stance.

III

If this distinction is understood, the historical value of a chronicle like *The Ordeal of Power* can be appraised. It does furnish critical material—for example, fact basis for appraising whether Eisenhower delegated too much authority in foreign affairs to John Foster Dulles. The difference between appraising a President's place in history—that is, how far he was responsible for what happened—and analyzing the problem of who caused what is obvious. Hughes comes out with a lower appraisal of President Eisenhower than is held by many, perhaps most, of President Eisenhower's colleagues in government. (In defense of Mr. Hughes it must be noted that they have not published their papers—though these also will probably come to light in a decade or so.) Equally, according to Hughes President Eisenhower's own estimate of some of his colleagues was not always flattering. It is a fair question how much these intimate personal estimates of each other really do mean when the history of the time is finally written, but historians have always been interested in them.

One other distinction deserves comment. The brain trusters during the campaign, the aides in government, necessarily write as they see the course of events. A volume of this kind is thus in part biography (in this case of President Eisenhower) and in part autobiography (in this case of Mr. Hughes). From the point of view of importance, this is perhaps one horse and one rabbit. The aide would be insignificant were he not attached to a towering chief. What the chief thinks and does is immensely important; what the aide thinks about it, though material to ultimate historical judgment, is (to put it mildly) not of equivalent significance. Being a scholar as well as a brilliant journalist, Mr. Hughes very honorably draws the distinction. The reader always knows when he is writing about himself and what he thought, and when he is writing about the President and his

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colleagues in high government office and what they thought. Manifestly as the brain truster drops from his campaign position of causation to his governmental position as observer with an occasional chance to insert ideas into the machine, the autobiographical element grows. So it does with Mr. Hughes, but he is careful to inform his reader when he is writing, quoting, or narrating the processes of government and when he is explaining what he thought about them, and about himself, and about the strange, terrible, and lonely business of government and its effect on the men who support its *peine forte et dure*.

Hughes' introductory argument on the historical imperative—the right to know—deserves wide consideration and discussion. The argument has two good sides. Obviously President Eisenhower and his associates will not forget and probably will not forgive the revelations of the book. Equally obviously their personal desires for protection are not wholly determinative. The great issue is the extent to which the intimate, agonizing, and frequently terrible responsibility of the President is entitled to contemporary protection of privacy. That issue does not depend on personalities. It is a problem in the process of democratic government.

ADOLF A. BERLE

NEW YORK CITY

THE NATIONAL INTEREST: DISCLOSURE OR DISCRETION

Shortly before the fifty-eighth Secretary of State left office early in 1953, he is said to have asked his staff to divide his papers into three categories: (1) clearly official; (2) clearly personal; and (3) gray—all papers that were not easy to classify as "official" or "personal." When the exhaustive chore was completed, Dean Acheson was shown the results. Nodding quizzically toward a huge pile, he waited for an explanation. "Gray," said his staff. Without batting an eye, he snapped: "They're all official."

If Mr. Acheson gives us one measure for guarding the exchanges and confidences of men in privileged positions of

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government, Emmet John Hughes shows us the other extreme. His *The Ordeal of Power* is a political memoir that is bound to send chills down into the lower dorsal regions of all future presidents, cabinet officials, and White House staffers.

The muscle of the Hughes volume is built around material gathered during three short periods that he worked in the White House and during two presidential campaigns as an aid to Dwight D. Eisenhower. All told, the time added up to about a year. During these brief periods, Hughes worked on speeches, attended Cabinet meetings, staff sessions, obviously cocked a sensitive ear to record what was said by many high level officials, including the President, and kept a diary. One is compelled to conclude that the participants in the high councils to which Mr. Hughes was privy must certainly have assumed that their remarks and exchanges were to be confidential.

Since its publication early in 1963, *The Ordeal of Power* has been widely acclaimed for its eloquence, the immense spirit with which Mr. Hughes writes, and for its salty revelations. It has also been sharply slapped on ethical and political grounds. Two distinguished journalists have spoken forcefully to the ethical issue. Eric Sevareid insists that Mr. Hughes did a terrible disservice to the presidency in exposing such intimate reminiscences of political men in their "unguarded moments." Richard Rovere called it a work of "highly questionable taste and propriety. It is a kiss and tell book." [1]

I

The task of faithfully reflecting the inner mysteries and workings of an administration, or indeed any organization, is becoming increasingly complex. Harrowing uncertainties and difficulties confront the social science investigator today. At first glance he would seem to have an embarrassment of riches—literally mountains of materials to mine, sift,

[1] Mr. Rovere, in an extended review article, wrote: Hughes "joined the Eisenhower Administration with no sympathy for most of its aims and expecting no good from most of its members. He did not declare his point of view while he sat in its counsels. He worked, he says, with 'silent reservations.' The reservations were numerous and substantial." See *The New Yorker*, March 16, 1963, 195.

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and finally pick up all the fine filings that will enable him to tell the true story. The Roosevelt archives at Hyde Park, the Truman Library at Independence, the sight of huge Army trucks lumbering off one by one into the darkness toward the Abilene Library in the closing days of the Eisenhower administration, and now the vigorous start to erect the library for the Kennedy papers on the banks of the Charles—are all reminders of the vast treasure trove that awaits the eager historian and political scientist.

But with it all and with the vast periodical, newspaper, and fugitive literature that supplements the presidential papers, the modern social scientist is still in a bit of a fix. Alexander Graham Bell played an ironic trick on him. Today many high moments in the presidential day are conducted on the telephone. For the President the use of the instrument has many advantages: speed and the fact that telephone conversations quickly fade from history's slate—unless, of course, one party elects to tell.

The telephone, the press of life's urgencies which have all but made extinct the keeping of careful diaries and the writing of long perceptive letters as in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, have combined to make the accessibility of high grade ore to the social scientist far more difficult. In recognition of this difficulty, Columbia University began a project in 1948 to put on tape the remarks and observations of notable writers, artists, and public figures. Because of these special problems in acquiring information, it might be argued that the social scientist really has to be a participant in the drama, if he is to write the full story with all its nuances, half-tints, and semi-tones carefully portrayed.

One further difficulty needs to be remarked that haunts the social scientist personally (at least some of them) and threatens to keep some information in the shadows: the protection of his sources. After obtaining an interview and particularly after breaking bread with his subject, he may feel an obligation to protect his sources. Here is another dilemma for the true investigator—one that pits the need for full and faithful disclosure against a sense of moral obligation to protect those who have been helpful in discovering the truth.

Yet, whatever the frustrations and twinges of conscience

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that hinder the discovery and presentation of truth, the question remains: What happens to life at the top in government when it functions under the uneasy suspicion that confidences and opinions freely exchanged are to be gathered and scattered like dust on a windy street? What effect does such a threat have upon decision-making—upon the vital need to have advisers speak unmuzzled and give their testimony according to the lights they follow? Clearly the need to protect the brainstorming process in the highest councils of government is in the transcendent national interest and imposes some standards of propriety and obligation upon those who occupy privileged positions.

II

The necessity for maintaining strict confidence in high councils of government is a firmly fixed tradition in all three branches of American government. In the Judiciary it is the Supreme Court "conference," in the Congress it is the "conference committee," and in the Executive it is the time-tested doctrine of executive privilege. In Congress, of course, as every school boy knows, the conference committee proceedings to reconcile differences between the House and Senate are closed affairs.

"The heart of the decision-making process," in the Supreme Court, Jerome Frank tells us, "has always been the conference." It is so secret that no one other than justices is ever allowed in the room. To keep it that way a messenger is stationed outside the door so that he can retrieve additional materials if needed, and the junior justice answers the door.

> Because it is secret, little is known about the operation. Of some moment (whether for better or worse) in this regard are Mason's biography of Chief Justice Stone and Bickel's publication of certain papers of Justice Brandeis. It has long been known that many justices have kept copious notes. Both Mason and Bickel used some of these, and thus revealed what had hitherto been kept wholly secret. It happens that the revelations are of no great consequence. Nonetheless, if they should start a pattern, we may learn a great deal more than we have ever known about past events. *But the free give and take of a secret conference may dry*

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> *up if the justices feel that what may be highly biased accounts by some of their brothers are going to find their way into the history books.* The use of confidential notes may make it extremely unlikely that there will be any more confidential notes left around for biographers.[2]

Elsewhere—in the executive branch—it is well established that the President can, at his discretion, withhold information of the executive departments. The power has been invoked where (1) the information was deemed to be confidential; (2) disclosure would be incompatible with the public interest; or (3) disclosure might seriously imperil the national safety.

Washington set the stage in 1796 when he refused to "lay before the House" or disclose to Congress a copy of the instructions to the United States Minister who negotiated a treaty with Great Britain. More recently, May 16, 1951, General Omar Bradley refused to divulge to Congress private conversations between the President and his advisers to the combined Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees. This incident, involving the crisis over the dismissal of General MacArthur was defended by President Truman on the grounds that disclosure of such confidences might undermine the Joint Chiefs of Staff with some members of Congress.

Two years later—May 17, 1954—in the midst of the clamorous Army-McCarthy hearings, President Eisenhower instructed Defense Secretary Wilson that neither he nor his subordinates were to disclose any confidential discussions relating to the hearings. In a letter to Wilson, he said:

> Because it is essential to efficient and effective administration that employees of the executive branch be in a position to be completely candid in advising with each other in official matters, and because it is not in the public interest that any of their conversations or communications be disclosed, you will instruct employees of your Department that in all of their appearances before the subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Government Operations regarding the inquiry before it they are not to testify to any such conversations or communications or to produce any such documents

[2] Jerome P. Frank, *Marble Palace: The Supreme Court in American Life* (New York, 1958), 110–11. (Italics added.)

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> or reproductions. This principle must be maintained regardless of who would be benefited by such disclosures.[3]

Eisenhower's letter was cited as legal authority for nineteen departments to restrict or withhold information.

The scope of executive privilege, of course, continues to be a matter of debatable dimension. Invoked under circumstances where the President is involved personally in relationships with his staff, Cabinet, or through conferences specifically held at the White House, executive privilege ought to be an indestructible instrument of executive power. It is in such a context that reference to the doctrine is intended here. But resorting to executive privilege too broadly is, and ought to be, a disturbing paradox for the political scientist. All administrations are tempted to turn to this doctrine in seeking to steer through the tight places. Its justification in given situations and its legality have become immovably fixed in our moral and constitutional tradition. Yet we know that it can be abused, and that the doctrine must be resorted to sparingly. Certainly since World War II, it would be fair to say that in matters of national defense, except for the Congress, the American people would have had no way of knowing the vital facts for decision-making. No amount of brilliant brainstorming in the executive branch can make the country safe or the world safe without ample opportunity to probe, to question, and to have the voice of dissent heard. Secrecy in government is the evil genie lurking in every bureaucratic drawer, top or lower, and if we would help purge it of its pernicious poison, no administration should fall back upon the doctrine of executive privilege except under rigorously defined conditions.

That such conditions will arise, however, is certain. That executive privilege be available for precisely such uneasy moments is urgently desirable. But in these stressful moments when the chief executive feels called upon to invoke executive privilege as a constitutional duty, who is most immediately affected?

The presidential adviser, of course, whether a member of the White House staff or the great federal departments. It is the presidential adviser who has every reason to be grateful

[3] *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954* (Washington, D.C., U.S. Gov't. Printing Office, 1955), 483–84.

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for the protection executive privilege affords him as he performs his duties, often under the baleful eye of a legislator thirsting for a political coup at any price.

But the presidential adviser cannot have it both ways.

He cannot piously uphold the right of the Executive to refuse information to Congress or to the public on the ground that it would be prejudicial to the national interest, and then turn around and say that he has the right to disclose the information to the public, either free or for royalties. At the outset of the commissions for presidential advisers are the words: "Reposing special trust and confidence in your Integrity, Prudence, and Ability, I hereby appoint you. . . ." Surely the presidential adviser cannot keep from Congress what he cheerfully can disclose to the public without making a barren mockery of the doctrine of executive privilege.

The nub of the question is, Can a President work a team if the threat of having remarks made in conference thrown back at its members is constantly hanging over all White House deliberations? It is a problem that casts dark shadows over the governmental process at all levels—national and even international.[4] Its curse upon international negotiation was deftly drawn a decade ago by Paul Henri Spaak, former Prime Minister of Belgium and President of the Uniter Nations Assembly:

> I believe that the necessity for continually taking stands publicly on all sorts of questions, and for explaining in every detail to the press and the whole world exactly what one is trying to do, makes the task of diplomacy trying and much more difficult.
>
> Needless to say . . . it is not a question of returning to secret diplomacy; but we must consider whether we could not arrive at a somewhat more moderate system somewhere between secret diplomacy and open diplomacy as we are practicing it today.
>
> In order to explain and defend this idea . . . I have used a comparison drawn from cooking. I understand quite well that we must describe the dish to the public, the menu that we want them to eat, and I am ready to give them this

[4] Outside of government, it also seems well established that in the adjudication of labor-management disputes the record of satisfactory settlement is higher where no stenographic records are kept of the proceedings.

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menu with all the necessary details and descriptions. But is it absolutely necessary that the diplomatic cook should also explain and demonstrate in public how the dish is made?

I wish the public would stay in the dining room and let us retire to the kitchen. They tell me that in the best restaurants one must think twice before going into the kitchen to see how the potatoes and vegetables are pared and the dishes washed. There are always things that it would be better not to see.

Well, diplomacy seems to me a little bit like cooking. The menu is for you. You have the right and we are in duty bound to give an explanation of what we are trying to do and what aims we have set ourselves. But if you let us do the cooking in our own way, and let us do it quietly, perhaps we shall have better results.

III

Quite apart from the wisdom of safeguarding staff confidences and exchanges in high councils of government, is the question raised directly by the Hughes book of the relationship of the President to his staff and Cabinet.

The President needs someone he can talk to. During a harrowing day that swings from immense irritabilities to moments of exalted brooding, the President has frequent need of a decompression chamber. Sometimes it is a staff member he turns to, often it is someone outside the official family. Roosevelt could spill out his thoughts to Harry Hopkins, while President Eisenhower at the end of the day frequently sought the company of Alfred Gruenther or Bedell Smith for a leisurely discourse over a tall drink. (Many of the impressions that Hughes reports in *The Ordeal of Power* were gathered in late afternoon visits with the President after Hughes had left White House employ.)

On the matter of respecting confidences obtained as a result of having a privileged position, Eisenhower, who has never read the book, sizes up the problem this way:

> Are we compelled to insist that a man take an oath that he will never open his mouth? Are we driven to this extreme by the threat of a staff member deliberately leaking statements so that a climate of suspicion is created that undermines confidence and makes it impossible for the President and his advisers to discuss public policy in full candor? Is

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this like a conflict of interest situation only instead of requiring a person to divest himself of his stocks we make him take an oath to keep his mouth shut?[5]

President Kennedy, of course, did just this when he compelled the domestic staff of the White House Mansion to sign statements that they would neither write nor collaborate with writers, on any events or conversations within the White House. It was take it, or leave it. There is evidence to believe, also, that when Kennedy became highly displeased with comments a presidential aide made about his part in drafting a speech, he issued a tart warning that there was to be no more chattering about who wrote what on the cocktail circuit.[6] Later after learning that Kennedy had read the Hughes book, one writer suggested that the President was already regarding "with measured eye the authors on his own staff," and that he might well be constrained to adopt the old motto of the French soldier: "I can defend myself from my enemies; defend me from my speech writers." [7]

There is a certain mawkish quality about the business of microfilming comments made in "unguarded moments" by the men in the highest councils of government. It reminds one of the novelist cultivating confidences for the raw materials of his story—Sinclair Lewis fraternizing with the Methodist clergy for his book, *Elmer Gantry,* splashing bourbon into their glasses with one hand to ripen their conversation, with pen poised in the other to record how they do themselves in with their own words. But the White House is not the stage set for a novel, though it may become one to be sure; its great purpose is to provide the optimum conditions for wise decision-making, and the supreme mission of its staff should be to preserve and protect, not disfigure this image.

Decisions cannot be taken wisely if they are heavily crowded by the fear that the confidences men exchange in an attempt to bring about the correct response to challenge are to be misused to shame them before the bar of public

[5] Personal interview with this author.

[6] The practice of the Kennedy administration of passing along secrets to selected journalists sparked the story that the Ship of State is a natural wonder, since it is the only vessel ever known to leak from the top.

[7] Alan L. Otten, *Wall Street Journal,* March 3, 1963.

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opinion. "The choice of the President is not merely to select or reject, but to invent a course of action out of all the infinite possibilities." [8] And so it is, and so his advisers must be able to explore and invent without fear of reprisal.

The Church invented the Devil's advocate, Parliament the loyal opposition, and John Stuart Mill told us that truth needs error to show it off. But how does this function take place in the White House? Not, surely, as effectively as it should. What the White House needs at all times is an "abominable no man," one who can speak daringly of the new and even scornfully of the old. But it is unthinkable and unconscionable that confidences expressed in this manner should be flung before the public by means of the contrived leak. The betrayal of Adlai Stevenson in the celebrated leak about the "hawks" and the "doves" in the crisis leading to the blockade of Cuba is a gruesome reminder of what ought not to happen to the mutual confidences of the President and his close advisers.

All presidents will develop their own preferences for keeping themselves informed and advised. Eisenhower favored a more rigorously organized system. Kennedy initially preferred "stay loose" methods which later gave way to tighter organization, including the development of the "Crisis Club" which functioned so effectively during the second Cuban crisis. President Johnson seems to favor a tight ship, one that will be run even tighter if he carries out the hint that if re-elected he will re-establish the Operations Coordinating Board to see that the major policy decisions of the President are quickly and efficiently carried out by all government departments and agencies that are involved. But no matter what the organizational pattern and style for life at the top, all presidents who move to the bridge of the vast complex executive branch must have a set of advisers who can stand before each other unmuzzled, confident that a cohesive unity inspired by loyalty to the presidency will keep their comments from being briskly peddled in the market place.

IV

All books written about the comments of men made un-

[8] See Paul Diesing, "Noneconomic Decision-Making," *Ethics*, LXVII (1955), 19.

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der stressful situations are likely to convey misleading assumptions. Mr. Hughes' is no exception.

The fault in such works is not in misquoting or distorting what was said. The fault lies in passing along the presumption that the person quoted literally meant what he said.

Often the delectably quotable nuggets are horseback comments made in a burst of impatience and not to be taken seriously. In moments or days when he was particularly irked, Eisenhower would sometimes make biting remarks about a favorite staffer or even a cabinet appointee. Yet a half hour later he would exalt him to the skies and really mean it.

When working over a speech President Eisenhower showed a remarkable recall for remembering earlier drafts and spotting changes. If they displeased him and he demanded why the change, I was often able to counter by saying that Treasury, State, or some other agency had advised the specific language. At this point after some testy remarks about the individual quoted, I might be ordered to get him on the phone, and during the next few minutes I often wondered why I ever left the joys of the classroom and the academic pastures. The crisis past, however, it was at once apparent that no significance was attached to the words he had thrown in the heat of the moment.

Mr. Hughes' quotation of Eisenhower on the TVA ("By God, if ever we could do it, before we leave here, I'd like to see us *sell* the whole thing, but I suppose we can't go that far") brings to mind another comment which if repeated verbatim would not faithfully reflect the true turn of the presidential mind.

While President Eisenhower was going over a final draft of his speech to the United Nations in September of 1960, his appointment secretary, Tom Stephens, came in with an urgent note that the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Home, wished to see him at once. The President was already not in the best of moods, having just returned from a two-day annual check-up at Walter Reed. As Lord Home entered he strode about the oval office, eyes blazing, and suddenly said: "Sometimes I wish that — — would fall out of a canoe backwards and get swallowed up by crocodiles." Whereupon Lord Home with a gracious bow replied in an almost

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wistful voice: "Unfortunately, Mr. President, those time-honored, tried, true methods of British diplomacy are no longer available to us."

The dangers of misleading attribution are forcefully recalled by Chief Justice Parsons of Massachusetts in his comments on a quotation often cited to tarnish the reputation of Alexander Hamilton.

At a dinner party in New York, soon after the adoption of the Federal Constitution, the conversation centered on what the future prospects of the country might be. Quite a spell later one guest delivered a tiresome harangue on the great blessing that would flow from "the purity and intelligence of the people, their freedom from interest or prejudice, their enlightened love of liberty."

Hamilton, his patience exhausted, replied with great vehemence, striking the table with his hand as he spoke: "Your people, sir—your people is a great beast." The recent research of Harold Chase suggests Hamilton may never have said this, and Clinton Rossiter's biography of Hamilton states he definitely never made the remark. But even if he did, which Chief Justice Parsons' memoirs assumes, the comment must be weighed in the context in which it was given. "After dinner utterances have little value," writes Parsons,

> unless perhaps their very levity makes them good indicators of the wind. We do not know the qualifying words which may have followed, or the tone and manner of that which was, perhaps, in part or in whole, a jest. And it is fair to suppose that the remark if it had any serious meaning, meant only that people might be corrupted by prosperity and adulation, until they would lose all wisdom, and all principles of right, and all guidance of reason.[9]

V

In deciding to hide his dissents and return to President Eisenhower's side to help the Eisenhower administration return to power, Mr. Hughes turns a handspring that baffles even his friendly critics. Many said he should have known better. Whatever one's private thoughts on Hughes' ambivalence there would seem to be only two relevant courses for the scholar or writer who finds himself in a state of dis-

[9] *Memoirs of Theophilus Parsons with Notes of Some of His Contemporaries* (Boston, 1859), 110.

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enchantment while holding down a high position in public life. If the state of disillusionment is serious, the scholar or writer, like anyone else, should get out and stay out. Of course, decision-making on such a matter is often a question of protracted torment. The scholar, the writer, used to fine distinctions and precision, is frequently pained by the compromises that emerge from the boisterous currents of political combat. For a case in point I recall being depressed by use of a term in a speech that I intensely dislike and I was particularly disturbed that my confreres in the academic vineyard would accuse me of paternity of the phrase. My rescuer was Scotty Reston of the New York *Times* who said: "Forget it, Mac! You're a political scientist. You're not Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary, in a tizzy over whether to resign when Hitler remilitarizes the Rhineland. You're a scholar sitting on the 50-yard line where most of your academic colleagues would give their right arm to sit as observers and your post gives the finest opportunity to enrich your teaching and contribute better understanding to the processes of the presidency."

While the writer or scholar involved in a drama that becomes too unconscionable differs not at all from the businessman in the duty to phase out of his government post, there is a distinction to be drawn between the relative responsibilities of the two. It is not in the area described by the author of *The Ordeal of Power*.

Mr. Hughes returned to help out in the campaign of 1956, after leaving because of deep disenchantment in 1952, largely at the urgings of "some astute and conscientious friends."

> Their concern centered strictly on the duration of the campaign ahead, for they assumed that its outcome—wanted or not—would be an Eisenhower victory. But the din and the stress of the campaign, in their reasoned fears, might easily tempt the Administration to elaborate boasting of its fancied attainment of world peace. And they argued persuasively that months of unchecked self-congratulation might not only leave the governments of other free nations aghast at such unrealism; it might also leave the embattled Administration believing, at least a little, its own domestic political propaganda. For these reasons—and as some check against these hazards—my Democratic friends urged me to

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> return to work with the President for the duration of the campaign (pp. 171–2).

Now this justification, which could hardly "amuse the Republican National Committee," applies, if at all, with equal force to a writer like Hughes or anyone else in a responsible position. For the real test, however, any public servant weighing the pros and cons of staying on in a post he finds increasingly offensive to his moral conscience, is constrained to balance two questions: (1) will his departure speed the way toward acceptance of policies he opposes? (2) will his continuance help moderate or reverse policies he finds distasteful?

These two considerations apply to anyone who finds himself in the uneasy situation of deciding whether to stay or leave. But for the writer or the scholar there is yet another element to trouble his distraught state of mind in making a final decision: What is his obligation to the future, to the as yet unfurled scrolls of history? And closely related—perhaps even more important—What are his obligations by way of promoting better understanding of the process of decision-making in government that can flow from the infinite opportunities to be an intimate observer? Surely since Mr. Hughes did return to the administration about which he had such grave misgivings, and did write a book about the unusual experiences he was privileged to observe, we might expect to have more than we have been given.

Yet in overview this is a signally disappointing feature of *The Ordeal of Power*. Nowhere in Mr. Hughes' story, gleaming with insights into the great problems of our times, do we discover anything that really helps us comprehend the joining of process and policy in the great office of the presidency. We can smell the fumes of controversy, but cannot see the forces at work. Somehow the public floggings throughout its pages create a bright buzz of excitement in which the whole idea of a team of men struggling with frightening responsibilities never comes into focus. Even the staff system that Eisenhower employed and which left its imprint on White House organization never draws distinctly into sight.

The lack of illumination on the decision-making process

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and administration itself is matched by a failure to define alternatives. If Eisenhower failed to remake the Republican party and retread it with more progressive policies, Mr. Hughes does not tell us how it was to be done. If his gravest error was to leave too much of the conduct of foreign policy to his Secretary of State, Mr. Hughes does not clearly state the alternatives.

Many of the characters in *The Ordeal of Power* come through as faceless zombies. The President himself emerges as a portrait only half-drawn. Eisenhower is a complex figure. At times he showed an incandescence of mind that those who worked with him for protracted periods came to know, understand, and admire. Part of the difficulty is that the Hughes prose for all of its elegance, its ability to cast shadows and delicate tones, somehow has a cosmetic quality that masks the real Eisenhower. He simply doesn't emerge in all of his iridescence.

Presumably the compass of the Hughes narrative takes in two full presidential terms. Yet in blinking across these eight years he leaves big gaps. He also pushes down hard on the stumbles; has very little to say about the recoveries.

Even modest men, of course, have a tendency to enlarge their own role in their memoirs, and as one White House correspondent put it, "Mr. Hughes has never been accused of unseemly humility." He singles out for praise an Eisenhower speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors —an impressive address which he worked on; but makes no mention of Eisenhower's Farewell Address on the military-industrial complex, which this presidential assistant for understandable reasons believes history may well feel differently about.

But Mr. Hughes has not elected to wait upon history. His concluding pronouncement disposes of the Eisenhower administration as a failure, and the mention of Neville Chamberlain on the last page of his book could hardly be contrived to make his intention clearer of delivering a stern rebuke.

It is fruitless to speculate on President Eisenhower's place in history by literary lottery. For we know that the measurement of men and leaders is always undergoing change. When I was in college in the thirties, Theodore Roosevelt

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was not highly esteemed by many historians. But in the past decade his reputation has been climbing.

Woodrow Wilson, however, has undergone some reassessment that tends to revise his stature slightly downward. But the most spectacular shift has been that of Herbert Hoover. In 1947, Professor Authur Schlesinger Sr.'s poll of leading historians put Hoover almost at the bottom. Only two presidents were below him—Grant and Harding, both ranked as "failures." But in July 1962, Professor Schlesinger's poll of seventy-five leading historians rated Hoover a more successful president than a dozen others who have held the office. Quite a leap in fifteen years. I did not participate in this poll for reasons similar in part to those advanced by another member of our guild who was asked but declined. This scholar—a distinguished one, a Democrat and one who has conducted seminars at Hickory Hill—has said, however, that he would have ranked Eisenhower high had he participated in the Schlesinger poll.

Eisenhower must be judged against the time he served. He served more than twice as long as any chief executive with Congress under the control of the opposition party. Moreover, with the world shivering under the bomb, there were no precedents to guide him. Yet as we look about the world today, we now know that as the nation moved crisis by crisis through a sea of fierce international and domestic conflicts, he maintained a steady course and kept a firm hand on the tiller.

What the final judgment will be on the Eisenhower era will have to await the flight of years. But however the tides of history may shift in taking the measure of the thirty-fourth President, it is certain to be said that here was a man who wielded supreme power successfully, at times brilliantly, and laid it aside gracefully.

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THE GERMAN ROMAN CATHOLIC HIERARCHY AND THE SAAR PLEBISCITE OF 1935 *

AFTER the overwhelming vote of the people of the Saar on January 13, 1935, for return to Germany, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Trier, Franz Rudolf Bornewasser, declared that this huge majority was in no small measure due to the patriotic stand of the German episcopate. "This fact will be acknowledged more fully by future historians than it is appreciated by today's public." [1] The capture of large quantities of German state and party records after World War II and the accessibility of some church archives make it possible today fully to substantiate Bishop Bornewasser's claim. The present article aims at describing and documenting the decisive role of the German Catholic hierarchy in effecting an outcome of the plebiscite favorable to Nazi Germany.

An annex to the Versailles Treaty had put the Saar territory under rule of a commission representing the League of Nations. It had also provided that fifteen years after the coming into force of the treaty the population of the Saar should indicate their desires for the future in a plebiscite. There were to be three alternatives: (a) maintainance of the status quo; (b) union with France; (c) union with Germany. The League of Nations would then decide the sovereignty under which the territory would be placed, taking the wishes of the inhabitants into account. The population of the Saar was almost all German. In the Prussian census of 1910, the last census giving language statistics, 99.36 per cent of the inhabitants of the Prussian part had given German as their mother tongue. Most of the population—72.6 per cent in

* This article is based on a chapter of a book, *The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany*, to be published in 1964. Research in Germany was made possible by a grant of the Social Science Research Council, which is gratefully acknowledged.

1 Bornewasser before a meeting of Catholic men at Saarbrücken, March 10, 1935, *Badischer Beobachter*, No. 72, March 13, 1935.

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1927—was Catholic. Despite the territory's formally independent status, the ties to Germany remained strong.

The fact that the Saar Catholics remained under the jurisdiction of the Bishops of Trier and Speyer strengthened the emotional links with the Reich.[2] In order to eliminate the influence of the two German bishops, the French occupation authorities in 1919 and the Commission of the League of Nations in 1921 had attempted to obtain the consent of the Holy See to the establishment of a separate bishopric for the Saar. These efforts had been continued in 1923 by the French and in 1925 by the Governing Commission. The French paper *Le Matin* in 1922 asserted that for the Bishop of Speyer "the love of Germany was a hundred times more important than the love of God." [3] Exaggerated as this comment no doubt was, it included a good deal of truth, for the German bishops were ardent nationalists and actively propagated pro-German sentiments. The Vatican had refused to accede to these repeated demands and had declared itself, at the most, prepared to appoint an Apostolic Administrator for the territory, who would function, however, under the tutelage of the Bishops of Trier and Speyer. This compromise was rejected; the two bishops continued to take an active part in Saar affairs.[4]

As the plebiscite approached, political agitation assumed new intensity. In July 1933 the National Socialists organized the *Deutsche Front* which, using threats and strong-arm methods and generously financed by Germany, soon emerged as the dominant political force in the territory. In October of the same year, the Catholic Center party of the Saar, yielding to threats of what would happen after the day of reckoning in 1935, declared itself dissolved and merged in the new pro-German front. Hitler was determined to score a great propaganda victory by securing a huge vote for the return of the Saar to the fatherland, and no effort was spared to bring about this result. That the people of the territory would

[2] Sarah Wambaugh, *The Saar Plebiscite* (Cambridge, Mass., 1940), 12, 15, 60–61. Miss Wambaugh was a member of the Plebiscite Commission and her account of the vote and its background is the best available.

[3] *Le Matin*, November 10, 1922, quoted in *Münchener Katholische Kirchenzeitung*, No. 51, December 17, 1933, 549.

[4] Wambaugh, 83–84; "Die Katholische Kirche und die Saarabstimmung," *Ecclesiastica*, XV (1935), 210–11.

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opt for this choice had really never been in doubt until the Nazis' accession to power in 1933. Now, however, the number of those desiring retention of the status quo grew and the harassment of the Catholic Church in the Reich provided good argument for them. The position that the Catholic hierarchy would assume clearly could prove decisive.

In the fall of 1933, the French renewed their pressure for the appointment of a fully empowered Apostolic Administrator, and this time the Vatican promised redress.[5] On November 7, the German ambassador to the Holy See, Diego von Bergen, reported that the Pope had appointed Monsignor Gustavo Testa to visit the Saar.[6] At the same time, it appears, Monsignor Ludwig Kaas, the former head of the German Center party, who had been in Rome since April 1933, met Bergen to plan strategy for counteracting the French complaints. Kaas, then, got in touch with Bishop Bornewasser of Trier and suggested that he submit countercharges. Bornewasser thereupon hurried to Rome. He told Bergen that whereas the year before no more than two per cent of the Saar people would have voted for the status quo, he now estimated that twenty-five per cent would.[7] On November 18, Bornewasser met with Papal Secretary of State Pacelli and Kaas. He urged Pacelli to avoid anything that might be interpreted by the Catholics of the Saar as a partisan measure. Pacelli replied that the appointment of an Apostolic Administrator and a concomitant suspension of the jurisdiction of the two German bishops was out of the question, but that the Pope had felt constrained to order the dispatch of a Visitor. The French had complained not only about the pro-German activity of certain members of the clergy but had argued that the propaganda of the National Socialists seriously threatened a free vote. The Apostolic Visitor, thus, had the additional task of informing the Holy See about general conditions in the territory. For similar reasons the Vatican earlier had sent special legates to observe the plebiscites in Silesia and East Prussia. The combined

[5] François Charles-Roux, *Huit Ans au Vatican: 1932–1940* (Paris, 1947), 100.

[6] Telegram, Bergen to the Foreign Ministry, November 7, 1933, National Archives (hereafter cited as NA), Washington, D. C., T-120, roll 3296, frame E574730 (II, Vat., Pol. 24, Saargebiet).

[7] Bergen to Foreign Ministry, November 22, 1933, *ibid.*, E574741.

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pleading of Bornewasser and Kaas finally could only obtain Pacelli's promise not to stress publicly the official character of Testa's mission.[8]

On November 27, Monsignor Testa arrived in Saarbrücken. Already before his departure from Rome he had declared himself willing to meet Vice-Chancellor Papen, the German government's plenipotentiary for Saar questions. This talk took place on December 7 in Trier with Bishop Bornewasser also in attendance. Testa told Papen that according to his impressions the Saar was thoroughly German; he acknowledged that his trip was mainly a courtesy gesture toward the French government. The papal legate regretted that certain incidents in Germany had had a harmful effect upon the atmosphere in the Saar and Papen replied that the government was anxious to conduct talks with the Curia in order to dispose of these troublesome matters as soon as possible. The Vice-Chancellor noted, "[Testa] doubtless has sympathies for Germany and the National Socialist regime."[9] The German press, too, stressed Testa's pro-German attitudes which he was said to have shown as early as 1923 on a similar mission to the Ruhr.[10]

Bishop Bornewasser kept in touch with Papen. In the spring of 1934 he wrote the Vice-Chancellor that in the last few months he had become a pessimist. He had welcomed the formation of the *Deutsche Front* and just last week had ordered all monasteries to join it *en bloc*. He also still felt confident that a majority of the Saar inhabitants would vote for return to the fatherland. But he was depressed on account of the threats to the religious and moral well-being of the Reich.

> It goes without saying, that apart from a small circle of confidants I never express this pessimism in front of the clergy (especially not the Saar clergy) or the people. In all my speeches and sermons I try to comfort the people and to

[8] Report of Bornewasser to Bergen about his negotiations in Rome, November 20, 1933, Auswärtiges Amt, *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945* (Washington, D. C., U. S. Gov't. Printing Office, 1949–62), Series C, Vol. II, doc. 96, pp. 167–71.

[9] Memo of Papen (December 8, 1933) on his talk with Testa on December 7, 1933, *ibid.*, doc. 114, pp. 195–96.

[10] *Germania*, No. 326, November 26, 1933, quoted in *Ecclesiastica*, XV (1935), 211.

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> encourage them with a view to the divine providence which is always at work, even in our time, and by pointing out that which is thoroughly good in the new Reich.

He also was worried whether the League of Nations would consent to the return of the Saar to Germany. Much hate and discord could be avoided if Germany could find a way to achieve the return of the Saar without a plebiscite.[11] In view of the rumors circulating in the Saar about an impending coup d'état by the *Deutsche Front*, this was a rather ominous statement.

The Bishop did not keep his partisanship a secret. After having received Franz Reichert, the head of the pro-Nazi *Arbeitsgemeinschaft Katholischer Deutscher* (AKD) in the Saar, Bornewasser in early April of 1934 authorized Reichert to issue a news release according to which the Bishop had confirmed "that for the clergy of the diocese it went without saying that they would do their utmost for the return of the Saar to the German Reich." [12]

I

The situation changed sharply after Hitler's blood purge of June 30 which, along with several hundred other victims, claimed the lives of two prominent Catholic leaders, Dr. Klausener, head of Catholic Action of Berlin, and Adalbert Probst, a high ranking Catholic Youth leader. While Catholics in the Reich heard of the extent of the massacre only gradually, the impact on the Catholics of the Saar, who still had access to an anti-Nazi press, was immediate and drastic. A requiem mass for Klausener and Probst drew crowds overflowing the churches, including many leaders of the *Deutsche Front*. The recently founded *Neue Saar Post*, a Catholic newspaper edited by Father Johannes Hoffmann and strongly opposed to the Saar's return to a Nazi-ruled Germany, now gained many new adherents. It was widely believed, Miss Wambaugh recalls, "that the odds were now even, that the Church held the balance, and that unless Hitler should suc-

[11] Bornewasser to Papen, March 30, 1934, copy in Diocesan Archives Trier, BIII2, 13, Bd. 1 (Diocesan Archives hereafter abbreviated as DA).

[12] Bornewasser to Reichert, April 3, 1934, copy in DA Trier, BIII2, 13, Bd. 2. The release was published a few days later. See, e.g., *Westdeutscher Beobachter*, No. 152, April 9, 1934.

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ceed in rehabilitating himself and should placate the Church, or unless the Nazi regime should be overthrown before January [the plebiscite had been scheduled for January 13, 1935], the Territory might be indefinitely lost to the Reich." [13]

When on July 29 the Catholic Youth organizations of the Saar met in Saarbrücken for their "Day of Confession of Faith," a mass meeting to be attended also by the Bishops of Trier and Speyer, attention was fixed on what position the church now would assume. But for the two bishops nothing had changed. Bishop Bornewasser in his address attacked (without naming it) the *Neue Saar Post,* and both he and Bishop Sebastian signed a telegram to President Hindenburg which read, "50,000 Catholic *Jungmänner* and *Jungmädchen* of the Saar territory assembled in Saarbrücken to demonstrate their loyalty to their spiritual leaders, the Bishops of Trier and Speyer, from the Western border-country of Germany send their greetings and assurances of unwavering fidelity to the sovereign of the German Reich." [14] The Plebiscite Commission appointed by the League of Nations regarded this telegram as a violation of the pledge made by Germany to prevent any of its nationals from exerting direct or indirect pressure likely to affect the freedom of the voting. Permission to hold this meeting, the Commission reported to the League of Nations, had been granted because of its alleged purely religious purpose; the bishops had abused the Commission's indulgence.[15] The League took no action.

After this attack by Bornewasser many priests in the Saar canceled their subscriptions to the *Neue Saar Post.* Others complained to Rome about the political pressure exerted on them by their bishops. On August 4, Ambassador Bergen at the Vatican sent word that Monsignor Testa had returned to Rome and in his report to the Pope and the Papal Secretary of State also had mentioned instances of disciplinary measures against clerics supporting the status quo. The French ambassador was renewing his demand for a papal legate with greater powers.[16]

[13] Wambaugh, 207.

[14] *Ecclesiastica,* XV (1935), 214.

[15] Note of the Plebiscite Commission to the Secretariat of the League of Nations, August 24, 1934, *ibid.,* 214–15.

[16] Bergen to Foreign Ministry, August 4, 1934, NA Washington, T-120, roll 3296, frame E574773.

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Bishop Bornewasser, it appears, was aware of these complaints; on August 22 he addressed a lengthy letter to Pacelli in which he tried to justify his conduct. "During my almost 13 years as bishop," he wrote, "I have never interfered in the political affairs of the Saar, though in private talks I have never made it a secret that I regarded the return of the purely German Saar to its German fatherland as a foregone conclusion." He had been forced publicly to disown support of the *Neue Saar Post* and its espousal of the status quo because of recurring rumors that he sympathized with its views but was not allowed to express them. Any other reaction would have cost him the trust of those hundreds of thousands of Saar Catholics who longed to return to Germany. He also had to counter the ever more widespread assertion that if the Saar were to be lost to Germany, the Catholic clergy would have to shoulder the blame. For this reason he had also written to the German Chancellor, Hitler. He understood fully, Bornewasser continued, if some priests were embittered on account of the unfortunate events in Germany, but they should be more farsighted. He was convinced that his position was one best calculated to further the future interests of the Catholics in the Saar.[17]

Bornewasser had written his letter to Hitler after a long talk with the *Gauleiter* (regional leader of the NSDAP) of the Palatinate, Josef Bürckel. The latter on August 7 had become Hitler's plenipotentiary for the Saar in the place of Papen, who had been relieved of this post and made German Minister to Vienna. On August 27 Bürckel personally delivered Bornewasser's letter to Hitler. In it the Bishop expressed his grave concern over the future of the Saar. "I do so in order that all possible hindrances can still be removed at this late hour that might impede the return of the people of the Saar to the fatherland." The conduct of the Nazis in the territory and the treatment of the church in Germany caused serious misgivings among the Catholics of the Saar. He requested that Hitler take all appropriate measures that "for the immediate time ahead would prevent these dangerous and painful effects." [18]

Bornewasser sent copies of this letter to the German For-

[17] Bornewasser to Pacelli, August 22, 1934, copy in DA Trier, 59/48.

[18] Bornewasser to Hitler, August 27, 1934, Bundesarchiv Koblenz, R43II/175.

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eign Ministry, the Bishop of Speyer, Cardinal Bertram (the senior of the German episcopate) and Monsignor Kaas in Rome. In a covering note addressed to the latter, Bornewasser pointed out that Cardinal Schulte of Cologne had been very glad about this letter to Hitler, "also in the interest of the bishops." [19]

On September 11, the Vatican sent a new papal legate and observer to the Saar, Monsignor Giovanni Panico, a former chargé d'affaires of the apostolic nunciature at Prague. Monsignor Testa had been appointed apostolic delegate for Palestine. Rumors had it that the French had pressed for the dispatch of a less pro-German papal representative. But the new delegate was to prove no different in this respect. Counsellor Braun von Stumm of the Foreign Ministry's press department characterized the new emissary's political outlook, after talking to Panico at a social function in his home, in these words, "Very much impressed by the good qualities of Italian Fascism, he openly acknowledged that he personally also wished success to National Socialism (Hitler)." Panico mentioned to von Stumm that the Bishops of Trier and Speyer would probably issue orders forbidding their clergy to make political speeches in public. The main reason for this step was their aim to deprive supporters of the status quo among the clergy of chances for publicity. Priests friendly to Germany did not require the opportunity for public appearances since the pro-German position of the two bishops had repeatedly been clearly expressed. Special speeches to prove the church's patriotic stand therefore were no longer necessary.[20]

Bishop Bornewasser up to this point had merely counseled the clergy not to interfere in political matters. But this was not enough in the eyes of the Nazis. On October 17, Saar plenipotentiary Bürckel attacked the church's formal neutrality in a lengthy letter to Foreign Minister Neurath. He suggested that the Curia be warned of the dangerous consequences of such a policy for the interests of the church and its privileged position under the Concordat. "The loyalty of man to his national community as part of the order of

[19] Bornewasser to Kaas, August 27, 1934, copy in DA Trier, 59/48.

[20] Memo of Braun von Stumm, October 12, 1934, NA Washington, T-120, roll 3295, frames E574707–710.

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creation, in which man is integrated by his birth and kind, has been ordained by God, and the Church has therefore always acknowledged the duty of holding Christians to their loyalty in relation to this Divine order of Creation." As long as the church demanded this loyalty, she did not violate the neutrality imposed by the rules of the plebiscite which merely forbade the use of coercion. "But should the Church now go so far as to refrain from demanding such loyalty to the national community in the Saar, then this would constitute a violation of the prescribed neutrality, since it would be taking a biased attitude in favour of those who deny the moral and religious importance of the validity of the national community. . . ." The German Reich did not demand that the church canvass for National Socialism as such. But neither could the government tolerate that the church surrender any of her spiritual claims.

> The Saar question is for us no political question in the usual French liberal sense; it is a question of nationality. We have the right, therefore, to demand professions of allegiance by our *Volksgenossen* to their national community; we have also the right to demand this of the Catholic Clergy who belong to our people. The Curia has no right to demand neutrality, that is to say, to oblige the Clergy to refrain from openly and publicly professing allegiance to their own people.[21]

A copy of Bürckel's letter was sent by the Foreign Ministry to Ambassador Bergen at the Holy See with the suggestion to employ the arguments contained therein in oral communications with the Curia. Bergen was told to emphasize that unless the line of neutrality was changed, the church after the vote would be in real danger.[22] Bergen replied on October 31 that even though he had made these points many times before, the Curia insisted on its strict neutrality. He had been told that if the Holy See took even the smallest measure which could be construed as being one-sidedly in Germany's favor, France would come forward with counterclaims and again ask for the establishment of an autonomous ecclesiastical jurisdiction for the Saar. The Curia agreed

[21] Bürckel to Neurath, October 17, 1934, *Documents on German Foreign Policy*, C, III, doc. 255, pp. 495–98.

[22] Köpke to Bergen, October 23, 1934, NA Washington, T-120, roll 3296, frames E574814–820.

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that the Saar was German land and belonged to Germany. It was therefore "not only natural and legitimate but even obligatory for the outcome of the Plebiscite to be in favor of Germany." But as long as the present tensions and difficulties, which the church encountered in the Reich, prevailed, it would have to be left to the conscience of every individual Catholic whether he should vote for Germany.[23]

II

Another attempt to dissuade the Vatican from its neutrality was undertaken a few days later when three Catholic members of the *Deutsche Front,* led by an assistant of Bürckel, Max Müller, called on Pacelli at the Vatican. The audience, which took place on November 7, was arranged by the German Legation. Müller reported in detail about his unsuccessful attempts to get the Bishops of Trier and Speyer to issue an order that would silence the clergy defending the status quo. Pacelli replied that the German bishops and clergy had complete freedom of action.[24] Anxious to use this statement of the Papal Secretary of State, Müller, upon his return from Rome, asked to be received by the two Bishops. Bornewasser, piqued by the idea of receiving instructions from the Vatican through an official of the German government, at first refused to see Müller. He finally consented when Müller informed him that in addition to news from the Vatican he also had to deliver a message from Hitler. This meeting took place in Trier on November 17.[25] Perhaps to spare themselves the embarrassment of acting under orders, the bishops of Trier and Speyer, before they received Müller, issued the ruling which the Nazis had been waiting for. Dated November 12, the order forbade the clergy of the two dioceses to speak in public at political meetings held in the Saar. "The same restraint is to be exercised on the pulpit and in meetings of Catholic organizations." Priests should refrain from recommending news-

23 Bergen to Köpke, October 31, 1934, *Documents on German Foreign Policy,* C, III, doc. 286, pp. 552–54.

24 Report of Müller, November 7, 1934, NA Washington, T-120, roll 3296, frames E574830–840.

25 Summary report on meeting between Bornewasser and Müller, November 17, 1934, DA Trier, 59/48.

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papers, periodicals, and books from the pulpit. Any contribution to a newspaper or periodical required permission of the chanceries. "We want and must prevent by means of this order that politics be carried into the Church and pastoral care. Our order does not touch the moral duty to love the ancestral nationality and to be faithful to the fatherland. According to Catholic teaching the fulfillment of these two duties is a moral virtue." [26]

The Nazi organ *Deutsche Front* made explicit what the bishops had of course already implied. It wrote, "Whoever on January 13 votes against Germany and for the status quo, violates, according to Catholic teaching, the moral virtues of love and fidelity to the ancestral nationality." The *Neue Saar Post,* making the best of a bad situation, reacted with a vague statement of acknowledgment.[27] Efforts to rally the Catholics against return to Nazi Germany continued. After a meeting on November 30 a new Catholic party for the status quo came into being, the *Deutscher Volksbund für Christlichsoziale Gemeinschaft* (German People's League for Christian-social Community). It was said to include among its founders over seventy Catholic priests.[28] The bishops now acted more forcefully. A new order dated December 3 reminded the clergy that the instructions of November 12 had admittedly spoken only of public appearances at political meetings, "but we regard it as political activity of far greater extent, if clerics participate in a meeting which has the declared purpose of creating a new political organization." [29] The *Neue Saar Post,* in order not "to undermine the authority of the Church" further, refrained from comment. But the status quo paper *Generalanzeiger* showed less restraint and wrote under the headline "Bishops as Agents of Goebbels," "If the Bishops of Trier and Speyer do

[26] *Kirchlicher Amtsanzeiger für die Diözese Trier,* No. 21, November 15, 1934; full text also in *Ecclesiastica,* XV (1935), 215, and Hans Müller, *Kirche und Nationalsozialismus: Dokumente 1930–1935* (Munich, 1963), doc. 163, p. 314.

[27] *Deutsche Front,* No. 206, November 17, 1934; *Neue Saar Post,* No. 192, November 17, 1934, both quoted in *Ecclesiastica,* XV (1935), 215.

[28] Wambaugh, 271–72.

[29] *Kirchlicher Amtsanzeiger für die Diözese Trier,* No. 23, December 5, 1934; full text also in *Ecclesiastica,* XV (1935), 215, and Müller, doc. 164, p. 315.

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not want to become martyrs for the freedom of the Catholic Church and instead rather wish to live as civil servants of the Third Reich, they will have to bear responsibility for this before their conscience." [30]

In order not to leave any ambiguity, Bishop Bornewasser on December 5 sent a confidential follow-up communication to all deans (senior priests) in the Saar territory. The names of the priests associated with the newly founded *Volksbund* would soon become public knowledge, Bornewasser wrote. How will these priests then, and especially after January 13, be able to continue to minister to their parishes where a big majority will surely vote for return to Germany? The support given by seventy priests to the highly questionable and false aims of the new party was a serious blow not only to the well-being of the Catholics of the Saar but to that of German Catholicism as a whole. "In agreement with the Bishop of Speyer, I must say that the 30th of November was one of the bitterest days of our episcopate." [31]

Max Müller, the assistant to Saar plenipotentiary Bürckel, in November had relayed an invitation of Hitler to Bornewasser and Sebastian to meet with the Chancellor in order to talk over their complaints regarding the treatment of the church. Both had declined. Bornewasser had told Müller that he had nothing to add to his letter of August 27 that had never even been answered. Moreover, such a visit could not be kept secret and could be exploited by those opposed to a return of the Saar.[32] Thereupon, Minister of the Interior Frick, in the name of Hitler, finally replied to Bornewasser's letter. He thanked him for his patriotic stand on the Saar question and added:

> If the German episcopate were to succeed as Your Excellency has succeeded in the Saar territory, to win so many brave and courageous clergymen, convinced of their duty to Germany, for the support of the Third Reich and for participation in the work of rebuilding, then soon even the last possibilities of friction would be eliminated. . . .[33]

[30] *Generalanzeiger,* No. 327, December 4, 1934, quoted in *Ecclesiastica,* XV (1935), 215.

[31] Bornewasser to the *Dechanten* (deans) of the Saar, December 5, 1934, copy in DA Trier, 59/48; printed in Müller, doc. 165, pp. 315–16.

[32] See n. 25, *supra.*

[33] Frick to Bornewasser, December 16, 1934, DA Trier, 59/48.

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Tension between church and state, indeed, had recently abated. On account of the great importance attributed by the Nazis to an overwhelming vote of the Saar population for return, the church in Germany in the last months of 1934 had been treated somewhat more gently. The ground thus was prepared, and the Nazis now could pressure the bishops for additional help. On December 14, Müller asked Bornewasser to designate a Catholic priest for a Christmas celebration to be broadcast over the German radio during which Saar plenipotentiary Bürckel would make an address. The Bishop of Trier declined, on the grounds that such an appearance of a priest would be inconsistent with his November order to the clergy.[34] A few days later Müller proposed that the entire German episcopate issue a declaration, perhaps in the form of a New Year's message to the people of the Saar, in which it was made clear that their criticism of neo-paganism was not aimed at National Socialism. This suggestion, repeated on December 27, was turned down by Bornewasser who argued that such a proclamation might jeopardize the confirmation of the results of the plebiscite by the League of Nations.[35]

But some of the German bishops apparently were of a different opinion. At the all-German Bishops' Conference held at Fulda in June 1934 it had been decided not to issue a joint declaration for the Saar plebiscite and to leave it to the discretion of the Bishops of Trier and Speyer whether they wanted to take a public stand. Cardinal Schulte of Cologne now decided to reopen this question; he did so by putting a *fait accompli* before the German episcopate: On December 26 the six bishops of the Cologne church province (Schulte, Berning, Bornewasser, Hilfrich, Vogt, Galen) issued a proclamation that was to be read from all the pulpits in their dioceses on January 6, 1935, one week before the plebiscite.

It seems that the idea of issuing such a declaration was suggested to Cardinal Schulte by Bishop Galen of Münster.[36]

[34] Müller to Bornewasser, December 14, 1934; Bornewasser to Müller, December 19, 1934, copy in DA Trier, 59/48.

[35] Müller to Bornewasser, December 19, 1934; Bornewasser to Müller, December 24, 1934, DA Trier, 59/48.

[36] Josef Himmelreich to Bornewasser, January 10, 1935, DA Trier, 59/48.

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In a letter to Bürckel, Bornewasser went out of his way to point out that the proclamation was in no way connected with Müller's requests [37] and there is no reason to doubt his word. The declaration is quite in keeping with the patriotic sentiments of both Galen and Schulte, expressed on other occasions, and might have been published even if the Nazis had not requested it. It read:

> On Sunday, January 13, a plebiscite will be held in the Saar Territory on the question whether this German land and its people shall remain under the separation from the German Reich forced upon them by the dictated peace of Versailles [*Versailler Gewaltfrieden*]. This decision, to be made in a few days at the Saar and fraught with fateful consequences for the future of our fatherland, no true German can face with indifference. As German Catholics we are duty-bound to stand up for the greatness, welfare and peace of our fatherland. Our most effective help is prayer. We, therefore, order that on said Sunday in all Churches three Lord's Prayers and Ave Marias be recited with the faithful after the general prayer in order to implore for a result of the Saar plebiscite that will bring blessings for our German people.[38]

Cardinal Schulte sent a copy of this proclamation to the other German bishops and asked them to concur. All of them agreed and published the declaration, though we do not know how enthusiastic they were about Schulte's tactics. We have it on record that Cardinal Faulhaber of Munich was somewhat annoyed. In a letter to Schulte, Faulhaber reminded the Cardinal that it was he who at the Fulda conference in June had raised the question of issuing such a statement. Following the negative response he had practiced strict restraint in this political question. He had also assured himself that this course of conduct had the approval of the Bishop of Trier and the Apostolic Delegate. "Since the Holy Father has expressed himself on the Saar Plebiscite in the only general form possible by stating that the Catholics of the Saar could not be prevented by qualms of conscience from voting for return to Germany, I felt even more

[37] Bornewasser to Bürckel, December 31, 1934, copy in DA Trier, 59/48.

[38] *Kirchlicher Anzeiger für die Erzdiözese Köln,* No. 1, January 1, 1935, 1, reprinted in Müller, doc. 168, p. 328.

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reason to adhere to the decision of the Fulda Conference." In any event, if this decision were to be reversed, it had to be done by a joint declaration of the entire episcopate. "Otherwise, the schism among the German bishops would be revealed of which so much is spoken in Germany as well as abroad. And what a spectacle would it be, if now the French episcopate, too, would order prayers for their congregations!" But since the Cologne statement was a fact, he would inquire from the Bavarian bishops whether they wished to follow suit and publish the declaration.[39]

Seven of the eight bishops of Bavaria voted for going along with the Cologne statement. The identity of the lone dissenter is not known. Faulhaber, as he informed the bishops two days later, had also approved on condition that the entire German episcopate publish the declaration. One bishop, he reported, had voiced misgivings and asked whether the bishops could oblige the state as long as their pastoral letter (of June 1934) was forbidden to be published. Would people not consider such a proclamation work done to order? Why should the bishops use the provocative phrase "dictated peace" if even the German government in recent months spoke only of peace and reconciliation? But for the sake of preserving unanimity, Faulhaber concluded in his letter, the Bavarian bishops would accept the Cologne draft.[40] The declaration of the Bavarian episcopate, as finally published, in fact revealed two minor changes. The reference to the "dictated peace of Versailles" was omitted, and the entire pronouncement was preceded by a short preamble. Here it was mentioned that the Province of Cologne had originated this call for prayer and that the Bavarian bishops had special reason for it since one of their fellow ordinaries, the Bishop of Speyer, and his diocese were directly affected by it.[41]

III

In the Saar territory, meanwhile, a heated electoral cam-

[39] Faulhaber to Schulte, December 28, 1934, copy in DA Passau (documents in Passau are not yet ordered or filed, hence no more precise citation is possible).

[40] Faulhaber to the Bavarian bishops, December 30, 1934, DA Passau.

[41] *Amtsblatt für die Erzdiözese München und Freising*, No. 1, January 4, 1935, 2.

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paign was reaching a climax. The Nazis, sure of victory, were threatening retribution to all those who on January 13 might dare to vote against return to the fatherland. A special effort was made to neutralize Catholic fears of the Nazi's anticlericalism by describing in glowing colors the condition of the Catholic Church in the Reich. For this purpose, the AKD from October 1 on distributed a new weekly newspaper, *Der Deutsche Katholik an der Saar.* The paper dwelt on the ideological similarities between Catholicism and National Socialism while an illustrated supplement, *Der Kampfruf wider den Antichrist,* printed horror pictures of atrocities from Bolshevik-ruled Russia that were contrasted with the peace and prosperity of Hitler's Germany. After the AKD had unsuccessfully tried to obtain Bornewasser's endorsement for this paper, the Bishop informed the deans of the Saar that "he wanted nothing to do with this enterprise since *in the interest of Germany and of the Church* he had the duty to practice the utmost restraint" (Bornewasser's italics).[42] This paper's propaganda was in such bad taste that Bornewasser on December 1 felt constrained to draw Bürckel's attention to the damage it was causing.[43]

From the other side the Catholics of the Saar were being wooed by the *Volksbund.* Meetings were held every Sunday under the mottoes "For return to Germany, but not to Hitler Germany" and "Christ is our leader, not Hitler." From the extremely bitter attacks of the *Deutsche Front* press on the *Volksbund,* it is clear that the Nazis considered this organization a real menace to an overwhelming vote for the Third Reich.[44] But in pro-German Catholic circles, too, worry began to develop over the *Volksbund*'s agitation. On January 3 the twelve deans of the territory issued a public statement aimed at refuting the claims of the *Volksbund* that a great majority of the Saar clergy supported the status quo. In actual fact, the deans maintained, quite the contrary was true. "In conformity with the order of the right reverend Bishops of Trier and Speyer of November 12 we priests regard love and fidelity to our German people and fatherland

42 Bornewasser to the *Dechanten* of the Saar, September 27, 1934, copy in DA Trier, BIII, 4, 35.

43 Bornewasser to Bürckel, December 1, 1934, copy in DA Trier, 59/48.

44 See Wambaugh, 272–73.

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as a moral virtue imposed upon us and our faithful and we shall act according to our duty." The deans expressed the hope and wish that after the return of the Saar the last difficulties in the relations between church and state would be eliminated. "This wish is based on the repeated declarations of the Führer and Chancellor and of other ministers that the German Reich will stand and be built on the foundation of positive Christianity." [45]

The *Neue Saar Post,* which until now had exhibited remarkable restraint, at this went over to the offensive. The following day it gave a report on how, according to trustworthy information, the declaration of the deans had come about. Monsignor Schlich of Saarbrücken, who had drawn up the statement in accordance with "instructions of higher authority," had called up each dean individually by telephone and had claimed already to have the signature of all the others. Reminded of their obligation to be obedient, all had eventually signed. The article asserted again that most of the clergy supported the program of the *Volksbund.* The party had four priests in its executive committee, including one dean. Mentioning the murder of Klausener and Probst, the *Neue Saar Post* predicted that after "the removal of the last difficulties" in the relations between the church and the Third Reich there would emerge not a peace with the church but the peace of the graveyard. Concerning the pastoral letter of the Cologne Church province that had just been released, the paper insisted that by voting for the status quo Catholics would do just what the bishops had exhorted them to do, "to stand up for the greatness, welfare, and peace of our fatherland." The best and only true way to serve Germany was to block the return of the Saar to the "un-German National Socialist dictatorship." [46]

But behind this optimism displayed for the benefit of the public lay deep concern over the effects of the pressures exerted by the hierarchy. Would the Catholics of the Saar dare flout the instructions of their superiors who so clearly

[45] The declaration was published by the *Saarbrücker Landes-Zeitung* on January 3, 1935. I have used a clipping in DA Trier, 59/48. The German text is also reprinted by Wambaugh, 289, n. 200, and by Müller, doc. 170, p. 329.

[46] "Feststellungen!" *Neue Saar Post,* No. 3, January 4, 1935, clipping in DA Trier, 59/48.

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asked them to vote for a return to Germany? On January 9 the *Neue Saar Post* reported that the *Volksbund* had sent a telegram to the Papal Secretary of State. This urgent message drew the attention of Pacelli to the use made by the Nazis of the prayer declaration of the German bishops and pleaded with him to take immediate steps to remove the moral constraint now threatening a free vote.[47] At the same time Ambassador Bergen at the Vatican sent word that he had just heard of a French protest to the Holy See against the pronouncement of the German bishops and that Pacelli was beginning to be concerned.[48] The Plebiscite Commission on January 5 lodged their objections with the Bishops of Trier and Speyer against the statement of the deans and the prayer proclamation. As far as these concerned the churches in the territory, the Commission contended, both of these statements had to be regarded as partisan acts in favor of the Saar's return to Germany and thus were likely to endanger the freedom of voting. This protest was handed to the Saar press for publication simultaneous with its delivery.[49]

However, the Bishops of Trier and Speyer were not to be deflected from their course. The protest of the Plebiscite Commission was ignored [50] and the prayer proclamation was read from the pulpits on January 6 as originally ordered. The bishops were heartened in their stand by the absence of any action on the part of the Vatican. An editorial in the semi-official *Osservatore Romano* on January 7–8 again emphasized the neutrality and impartiality of the Holy See in the Saar Plebiscite. "The Holy See . . . wishes only that every faithful son of the Church should conduct himself in accordance with the dictates of an upright Catholic con-

[47] *Neue Saar Post,* No. 8, January 9, 1935, quoted in *Ecclesiastica,* XV (1935), 212. The exact date of this telegram is not known.

[48] Bergen to Foreign Ministry, January 6, 1935, NA Washington, T-120, roll 3296, frame E574844.

[49] Alan E. Rodhe (President of the Plebiscite Commission) to Bornewasser, January 5, 1935, DA Trier, 59/48. The identical note was sent to the Bishop of Speyer (Wambaugh, 289–90). It was published in the *Völkischer Beobachter* on January 8, 1935, and is reprinted from there by Müller, doc. 171, p. 330.

[50] The letter of President Rodhe in the files of DA Trier bears the handwritten notation "Not answered."

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science."[51] During an audience granted to the French Foreign Minister Pierre Laval on January 7, Pope Pius XI was said to have expressed the view that the prayer proclamation of the German bishops had prejudiced the outcome of the plebiscite and that the Holy See would reprimand them for their mistake. This report was made by the special correspondent of the *Petit Journal* in Rome, but it was quickly declared a fabrication by Ambassador Bergen. The latter suggested that the Bishops of Trier and Speyer declare publicly the falsity of any rumors about the Holy See's criticism of their conduct in the Saar question. Bishop Bornewasser complied promptly with this request,[52] and his denial of a reprimand drew no comment from the Vatican.

On January 9 *Osservatore Romano* criticized a particularly clumsy article in the Nazi paper *Der Deutsche Katholik an der Saar* that had been written by a Catholic priest. When the jubilant *Neue Saar Post* featured this story under the headline "The Holy See condemns Nazi Catholicism," *L'Osservatore Romano* hurried to deny that its editorial had had any political implications and stressed again the absolute neutrality of the Holy See.[53] That this neutrality played straight into the hands of the two pro-German bishops was as clear at the time as it became in the light of the outcome of the plebiscite. The duty, proclaimed by the Holy See, to follow the "dictates of an upright Catholic conscience" to most Catholics implied the duty to follow the leadership of their bishops. For, as one priest, protesting against the letter of the Plebiscite Commission to the bishops, wrote to the *Saarbrücker Zeitung*, "The Pope and the bishops united with him have the power, as the teaching Church, called by God, to form and lead our Catholic conscience."[54]

IV

The day of the Plebiscite arrived amid solemn exhorta-

[51] *Osservatore Romano*, No. 6, January 7–8, 1935, quoted in Wambaugh, 292.

[52] Bornewasser's statement, "In Sachen der Saarabstimmung," was dated January 11, 1935 (DA Trier, BIII2, 13, Bd. 2). It was published by the press on January 12, just one day before the plebiscite.

[53] *Osservatore Romano*, No. 7, January 9, 1935 and No. 11, January 13, 1935, quoted in *Ecclesiastica*, XV (1935), 212–13.

[54] Father Anton Fontain in the *Saarbrücker Zeitung*, January 8, 1935, cited by Wambaugh, 292.

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tions to the Saar population from all sides to remain calm. Across the German border, an organ of the Catholic youth organizations, *Junge Front,* printed a last minute reminder to the Catholics of the Saar to heed their duty as Germans and Catholics. Signed by the spiritual leaders of the Catholic youth organizations, Monsignor Ludwig Wolker and Father Ludwig Esch, the appeal asked the Catholics to rejoin their brothers as "the unity of blood and language, law and history" demanded.[55] But the extent to which the Saar people followed the combined counsel of the German church and state came as a complete surprise to all parties. When by the early morning hours of January 15 all the ballots had been counted, the results showed that practically all registered voters had actually voted and that over ninety per cent of them had opted for union with Germany. Only 46,613 votes were cast for the status quo, less than nine per cent. The vote for Germany did not fall below eighty-three per cent in any single voting district.[56] Within four days of the plebiscite the Council of the League of Nations decided upon the union of the Saar territory and Germany, the official transfer of sovereignty to take place on March 1, 1935.

As soon as January 15, when the Plebiscite Commission had announced the outcome of the vote, Hitler went on the air and celebrated the great victory for Germany. The Bishops of Trier and Speyer, too, relieved of the need to equivocate, gave vent to expressions of joy. Bornewasser sent a telegram of congratulations to Bürckel in which he expressed his "great pleasure at the splendid victory" that the fatherland had achieved.[57] Bishop Sebastian the same day issued a special pastoral letter to his diocesans in the Saar. He thanked them for the fidelity they had kept to the German fatherland over fifteen years, and he praised God for having bestowed upon them such a marvelous mentality. "Your loyalty on January 13 is the newest and most shining proof that the Catholic Church and German nationality are not opposites as today it is often maintained. No—Catholicism inspires its followers with love and fidelity also to the earthly

[55] "Aufruf an die katholische Saarjugend," *Junge Front,* No. 2, January 13, 1935, complete text in Müller, doc. 173, pp. 331–32.

[56] Detailed electoral statistics are given by Wambaugh, 469–72.

[57] *Saarbrücker Zeitung,* No. 16, January 17, 1935, quoted in *Ecclesiastica,* XV (1935), 217–18.

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fatherland that manifests itself in joyful readiness to bring sacrifices at all times." [58] Special services of thanks were held in the entire dioceses of Trier and Speyer on the Sunday following the plebiscite. And on January 26, Sebastian declared in a sermon at St. Ingbert (Saar) that the results of the plebiscite could not be explained by natural factors alone. God himself had spoken and had dealt a devastating reply to those who considered the Catholics patriotically unreliable.[59]

The other German bishops were relieved and happy, too. A large vote for the status quo, even if it had not resulted in the loss of the territory to Germany, undoubtedly would have caused new charges that the church was untrustworthy and, being an international organization, lacking in sympathy for the special problems of the German people. Cardinal Schulte telegraphed Bornewasser, "Congratulations and expressions of happiness at the happy conclusion of a difficult time." [60] The Bishop of Paderborn, Kaspar Klein, gave orders on January 14 that on the following day, after the announcement of a favorable outcome of the plebiscite, the bells be rung in all the churches of the archdiocese.[61] The same instruction was handed down by the Vicar General of the diocese of Passau,[62] and there is reason to assume that the remaining dioceses acted likewise. Cardinal Bertram in a circular letter of January 3 had suggested that since the summons to a joint public prayer had provided such a powerful prelude to the plebiscite, one should also ring the bells after the favorable results had become definitely known.[63] On March 1, the day of the official return of the Saar to Germany, the churches again participated in the celebrations. The bells rang out, flags were displayed, and special prayers of thanks said.[64]

58 *Saarbrücker Zeitung*, No. 21, January 21, 1935, quoted *ibid.*

59 Reported in *Augsburger Postzeitung*, No. 24, January 29, 1935, quoted *ibid.*

60 *Saarbrücker Landes-Zeitung*, No. 16, January 17, 1935, quoted *ibid.*

61 *Kirchliches Amtsblatt für die Erzdiözese Paderborn*, No. 2, quoted in Müller, doc. 174, p. 333.

62 Order of January 10, 1935, DA Passau.

63 Circular letter of Bertram to all German bishops, January 3, 1935, DA Limburg, 561/22.

64 See the corresponding orders, e.g., in *Kirchliches Amtsblatt der Diözese*

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V

How decisive was the intervention of the Catholic hierarchy in the plebiscite? According to the often repeated claims of the bishops themselves, the role of the Catholic episcopate in the attainment of this overwhelming victory was crucial. A solid majority for the return to Germany, Bishop Bornewasser declared on January 27, had always existed. "But the fact that this majority became so strong that it surprised the whole world is due, next to the loyal attitude of the people of the Saar themselves, to the strong words of the German episcopate. As the bishop most involved, I do not state this in order to reap appreciation and thanks. The German episcopate, in a serious hour, did its patriotic duty and whoever does his duty does not need thanks or appreciation. His fulfilled duty represents his compensation. I have mentioned it only in order that the historical truth will attain its due." [65] In later years it was especially Bornewasser who, in order to strengthen his standing with the authorities, often invoked the service he had rendered the German cause. In 1937, for example, the Bishop in a letter to Minister of Justice Gürtner recalled that in the long years of separation he had always helped to keep the link with Germany alive and that in the end his word and authority had substantially contributed to the splendid electoral victory.[66]

The Nazis, for their part, tried to minimize the role of the Catholic bishops in order to prevent the church from gaining in prestige. But even they had, if grudgingly, to acknowledge the help of the episcopate. A week before the plebiscite, Goebbels declared at the opening of the Saar exhibition in Berlin that the church had taken "a positive German position" on the Saar question. It was due in part to the efforts of the Bishop of Trier, he went on to say, that the Saar had not been made into an independent bishopric, separate from Germany.[67] Goebbels was quite right. The fact that the

Münster, No. 5, March 1, 1935, 31; *Amtsblatt des Bistums Limburg*, No. 5, March 21, 1935, 25.

65 Bornewasser at the "Papstfeier" in Trier, January 27, 1935, *Germania*, No. 32, January 31, 1935, quoted in *Ecclesiastica*, XV (1935), 218.

66 Bornewasser to Gürtner, May 22, 1937, copy in DA Passau.

67 Goebbels in the Kroll Opera House, Berlin, January 6, 1935, *Kölnische*

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Saar remained part of the German Church and thus under the influence of a German clergy no doubt was an important reason for the prevalence of a strong pro-German sentiment. There was a time in 1934, moreover, when the fate of the Saar hung in the balance. After the blood purge of June 30, sentiment for deferring a return to Germany was very strong and an anti-Nazi church might well have made a difference. Had the Bishops of Trier and Speyer not curbed the status quo movement with their disciplinary measures it is possible that the outcome on January 13 might indeed have been different.

The reasons for the bishops' stand will have to be sought primarily in their strong personal patriotism. The Saar was German territory and they saw no reason to give it up, even temporarily, just because Germany now was ruled by the National Socialists. The Nazi regime was regarded by them as just another staunchly anti-communist and authoritarian system that would soon outgrow its youthful anti-Catholic aberrations. The episcopate had always assailed the "dictated peace of Versailles" and they had supported those calling for its revision. Feeling for Germany in the Saar, moreover, had always run high and the bishops thus thought to be on the winning side. When sentiment for postponing a return to the fatherland began to grow, they moved to suppress it because they were afraid of the harmful consequences for the church in Germany of a big status quo vote. Finally, they probably hoped that their patriotic stand would redeem them in the eyes of the Nazis and would pave the way for a settlement of all outstanding difficulties. The Catholics of the Saar had remained loyal to the fatherland for fifteen difficult years, a Catholic paper wrote after the plebiscite; on voting day they had known how to distinguish between history and ephemeral politics. "Such loyalty produces its compensation—it will not be disappointed and discouraged. All of German Catholicism from now on will be able to invoke with happiness and gratitude the results of the plebiscite brought about by the Catholics of the Saar." [68] But this expectation of reward, probably shared by many of the bishops, was to be thoroughly disappointed.

Volkszeitung, No. 7, January 7, 1935, quoted in *Ecclesiastica*, XV (1935), 216.

[68] *Sonntagsblatt für die Diözese Speyer*, No. 3, n.d., quoted in *Münchener Katholische Kirchenzeitung*, No. 4, January 27, 1935, 58.

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The return of the Saar merely meant that the Nazis could relinquish their temporary soft line and go on with the job of destroying the church's influence in public life. In the Saar itself the smooth cooperation established during the campaign preceding the plebiscite soon gave way to harassment and outright repression of Catholic organizations. If anything, the situation here was worse than in the Reich, since the government did not recognize for the Saar the validity of the Concordat of 1933 with the Holy See. Lengthy negotiations between Bürckel and the Bishops of Trier and Speyer about working out a new *modus vivendi* ended in failure. Monsignor Schlich of Saarbrücken, earlier an enthusiastic supporter of return to the fatherland, eventually had to flee abroad in order to escape arrest.

When the Bishop of Speyer in the spring of 1935 complained to Rome about the difficulties the church was encountering in the Saar, the Papal Secretary of State replied that he had not expected anything else. The news merely confirmed the fears which the Holy See had had even at the time when the public pronouncements of the Bishops of Trier and Speyer contained nothing but hopes and expectations of a different attitude on the part of the authorities. "The Holy See," Pacelli went on,

> made it its business to show as much understanding as possible for the position taken by the right reverend bishops. Endeavoring to prevent any shadow being cast upon its neutrality in a political question, the Holy See, beyond some instructions and counsel, refrains from impeding the freedom of action and the sincerely held estimates of the right reverend ordinaries. Of course, the Holy See has not been free of serious misgivings about certain particulars of the episcopal pronouncements, especially as it concerned the early creation of safeguards for the time after the plebiscite.[69]

This was a politely phrased rebuke. Had it been administered more forcefully and before the plebiscite, such an action might have had an important bearing on the results. Unfortunately, what irked the Vatican most, it appears, was not the decision of the bishops to make common cause with the Nazis, but the failure to make their support conditional upon definite promises and the tactical blunder of not de-

[69] Pacelli to Sebastian, April 22, 1935, copy in DA Trier, 59/49.

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riving benefits for the church from their services to the Reich. Such an attitude hardly revealed any more awareness of the wider political significance of the plebiscite or any more profound moral concern than that of the German episcopate itself.

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NOTES ON "POLITICAL SCIENCE"

I

SOME years ago Harold Lasswell published a book that he titled *The Language of Politics* and on it in these pages I made some extended comments.[1] I roamed somewhat beyond Mr. Lasswell's confines and discussed a George Bernard Shaw proposal that the British Government appoint a select committee "to settle our political nomenclature": confusion in the use of words, he said, "was heading straight for a war which none of the powers can afford and nobody desires." Negotiations are doomed to failure "unless parties use the same words for the same things and understand what the words mean," Mr. Shaw said: "Democracy," "aggression"—the list could be a long one. When the great powers talked with each other, in yesteryear, I recalled, there had been a tradition of diplomatic understatement: "view with alarm"; "cannot remain unconcerned," etc. Now Soviet spokesmen were not content with calling a spade a spade; it was a bloody shovel. (This was before Nikita Khrushchev had pounded his United Nations desk with his shoe and before he had insisted so frequently that he would "bury" us.) I conceded that statutory language was necessarily of a special sort, but I saw no excuse for the "gobbledegook" of many bureaucrats.

Nor did I see any excuse for the academic writers on political science (including Mr. Lasswell) who, all too frequently, seemed to me to be guilty of using inspissated jargon. I gave some examples which could remind readers of what Hazlitt said of Jeremy Bentham: "He uses a language that *darkens* knowledge." Apparently the theory was that if scholarly writers were easily understood some readers might think them lacking in scholarship. That there has been insufficient improvement since my last notes on Mr. Lasswell is suggested by the fact that Washington University in St. Louis is launching a program ($135,000 a year) to translate "social science into English on the ground that 'many valu-

[1] "Notes on the Language of Politics," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXIV (1949), 481–506.

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able research discoveries' are now lost to uncomprehending laymen." To be sure, "the editors will face the puzzle of picking material that will turn out to be worth utilizing," but it is assumed that this can be done.[2]

In his most recent book [3] on which I proceed to offer some comments, Mr. Lasswell is remarkably successful in eschewing jargon; he writes nothing that the Washington University team will consider translating. But one of Mr. Lasswell's readers was frequently reminded of Dr. Johnson's complaint about Poll Carmichael: "I could never persuade her to be categorical." I suggest that Mr. Lasswell is not as categorical as he should be—that is, if he wishes to be freely understood—and I explain what I mean by quoting a Yale philosopher, Brand Blanshard, who, ten years ago, gave his fellow philosophers some sound advice. I do not know whether they have followed it, but I am sure that many writers on political science have not; indeed in our literature there has been little mention of Mr. Blanshard's admonition.[4]

He begins with Macaulay's familiar complaint about an essay by Kant: the only thing Macaulay was really sure he understood was a Latin quotation. Mr. Blanshard maintained that a philosopher (and this goes for the political scientist as well) should put all his cards on the table and keep nothing back, "even to the point of writing clearly enough to be found out." How, he asks, would certain writers deal with the demise of Major André? "Swift, Macaulay, and Shaw would say that André was hanged. Bradley would say that he was killed. Bosanquet would say that he died. Kant would say that his mortal existence achieved its termi-

[2] *Time,* August 9, 1963. A recent issue of the *Washington University Magazine* makes me think that the entrepreneurs at the University can be depended upon. A writer in the *Magazine* imagines courses that will soon be listed in the University catalogue. I have space for only two: "*The Psychopathology of Important Political Nonentities.* 1. Mme. de Pompadour's Maid, Anna; 2. Hitler's Uncle, Max Schickelgruber; 3. J. V. Stalin's Aunt, Anna Dzhugashvili; 4. Karl Marx's Landlord, Max Nichts. (2) I, II" and "*The Configurative Approach to French Politics and Institutions:* De Gaulle, Les Halles Centrales, The Flea Market, and Legalized Prostitution. (3) I, II."

[3] *The Future of Political Science.* New York, Atherton Press, 1963.—x, 256 pp. $6.50.

[4] *On Philosophical Style* (Manchester, 1954). I dealt with this lecture in "Political Philosophy in the Twentieth Century," Roland Young (ed.), *Approaches to the Study of Politics* (Evanston, Ill., 1958).

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nation. Hegel would say that a finite determination of infinity had been further determined by its own negation." (Hazlitt could have said of Hegel what he said of Bentham: "He might wrap up high treason in one of his inextricable periods and it would never find its way into Westminster Hall.") On the demise of Major André I prefer the verdict of Swift *et al.*

But of equal importance, Mr. Blanshard tells us, is the fact "most men's minds are so constituted that," when confronted by generalizations, "they have to think by means of examples," so that "if you do not supply them they will supply them for themselves, and if you leave it wholly to them they will do it badly"; or, I add, they may not be able to do it at all. Frederick William Maitland told us that "people cannot understand old law unless you give a few concrete illustrations: at least I can't," and Maitland was a "royal intellect" of the Victorian era. I cannot understand the future of the political science that Mr. Lasswell has in mind without having "a few concrete illustrations." Indeed Mr. Lasswell never tells us how he defines "science" and why he uses the term "political science" rather than some other term, say, "the art of politics."

II

In the United States the term political science came to be used not to describe any growing body of knowledge but to label courses or schools that were to deal with an old subject matter now separated from history and law. "Political science grew not by virtue of an intellectual principle germane to the field," says Hans J. Morgenthau, "but in response to pressures from the outside. What could not be defined in terms of a traditional academic discipline was defined as political science. This inorganic growth and haphazard character of political science is strikingly reflected in the curriculums in the early departments of political science such as those at Michigan, Columbia and Harvard" [5] (and, I add, is even more strikingly reflected in the scores of different courses now being offered).

At Columbia University, around the turn of the century, John W. Burgess, when lecturing, was accustomed to say,

[5] *Dilemmas of Politics* (Chicago, 1958), 12.

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"Now sound political science teaches that" (so far as I know he never put this in print), but had he been taxed with what the words meant, he would only have replied that he had studied available materials rather carefully and that his judgment was probably sounder than the judgments of many of his contemporaries, and certainly sounder than the judgments of most of his listeners. He and the early generations of professors thought of political "science" as no more than "knowledge acquired by study" or "directed curiosity."

In Great Britain "political science" was late in gaining recognition as an independent discipline for university study: Oxford, 1909 ("Political Institutions"); the London School of Economics, 1926 ("Public Administration"); and Cambridge, 1928 ("Political Science"). Ernest Barker (Cambridge) was not happy about the description of the chair which he was to occupy. In his inaugural lecture he said that the term science "has been vindicated so largely, and almost exclusively, for the exact and experimental study of natural phenomena, that its application to politics may convey suggestions, and excite anticipations that cannot be justified." He wished "to avoid the appearance of any excessive claim to exactitude" and looked upon his inquiries "as simply a 'speculation' about a group of facts in the field of social conduct, a speculation intended to result in a general scheme which connects the facts systematically with one another and thus gives an explanation of their significance." [6]

The creation of the Social Science Research Council in the early thirties probably encouraged some American anthropologists, economists, historians, political scientists, psychologists, sociologists, and statisticians to conclude that they actually were, or to hope that they might become, "scientists" which the physicists and chemists certainly were. Political scientists of this persuasion (I say nothing about workers in the other disciplines) never bothered to define what they meant by science. Why should they? Money was available for the social "sciences" but not for social "studies." Had they thought of their science in terms of the old French Academy definition, "The certain and evident knowledge of things by their causes," and continued to believe, they would

[6] *The Study of Political Science and Its Relation to Cognate Studies* (Cambridge, 1928), 4.

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have had to accept the definition of Faith as a grace given us by God to enable us to believe things we know to be untrue.

Only faith of this sort would have allowed them to accept Aldous Huxley's definition of science "as the reduction of multiplicity to unity"; as seeking "to explain the endlessly diverse phenomena of nature by ignoring the uniqueness of particular events, concentrating on what they have in common, and finally abstracting some kind of 'law' in terms of which they make sense and can be effectively dealt with." Laws of political science? "Politics are so complex," Lord Acton has told us, "that almost every act may honestly be seen in very different lights." [7] Moreover, those of us who as students of politics wish to be "scientists" must deliberately ignore the fact that we are part of what we attempt to analyze scientifically. The chemist is outside his test tube and the physicist never has to guard against any of his recollections or prejudices suggesting elements to include or to leave out of the equations that he puts down. As Alfred Cobban (the University of London) said in these pages ten years ago:

> Political science is a body of knowledge, which must be taught and learned like any other body of knowledge. What this definition neglects is the fact that the degree of moral disinterestedness possible in natural science is impossible in the field of political theory. The political scientist, in so far as he wishes to remain a scientist, is limited to the study of techniques. His subject may be compared to eighteenth-century German cameralism, which was a political theory of bureaucrats, about bureaucrats, for bureaucrats. Mostly, what is called political science, I must confess, seems to be a device, invented by university teachers, for avoiding that dangerous subject politics, without achieving science. . . . In the last resort political science, like history, leaves us, as Ortega y Gasset put it, to drift: we have a magnificent technical equipment for going somewhere, without anywhere to go.[8]

[7] Huxley was in substantial agreement with Alfred North Whitehead: "Science has a two fold aim, (1) the production of theory which agrees with experience; and (2) the explanation of common sense concepts of nature, at least in their main outlines. This explanation consists in the preservation of the concepts in a scientific theory of harmonized thought."

[8] "The Decline of Political Theory," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXVIII (1953), 335.

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Manifestly, as the title of his book indicates, Mr. Lasswell disagrees, but before I get to his hopes for the future a word about the "science of history."

III

In his inaugural lecture as Regius Professor of Modern History at the University of Oxford, Edward A. Freeman restated his famous maxim: "History is past politics and politics are present history." To many historians, history is much more than past politics. What of the past—and of his present—did Herodotus, the "father" of history, not try to record for us? Countries, peoples, migrations, colonies, commerce, natural resources, arts, religious beliefs, climate, diet—these were among his subjects. But the second part of Freeman's maxim is unchallengeable: politics are present history and save when the writer on politics attempts to peer into a crystal ball, he is a historian.

The student of politics—the political scientist—sits in the gallery of the House of Commons and listens to a debate on the breakup of Britain's African Empire. Each sentence that he hears is no less history than the events that led to the Crimean War. The Munich Conference was history before Neville Chamberlain stepped into his plane to return to London, naively believing that he was bringing back "peace with honor." Each step in the decisions that led to our intervention in Korea instantaneously became history before the next step was taken.

> The Moving Finger writes; and, having writ,
> Moves on: nor all thy Piety nor Wit
> Shall lure it back to cancel half a Line,
> Nor all thy Tears wash out a Word of it.

True enough is Sir John Seeley's couplet that used to be quoted frequently:

> History without Political Science has no fruit;
> Political Science without History has no root,

but when, to repeat, the political scientist writes on what President Lyndon Johnson and President Charles de Gaulle have just done, he writes as a historian. And if he ventures to prescribe for the body politic, his materia medica or his

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suggested surgery has its roots in history. Hence it is puzzling that Mr. Lasswell and those of his persuasion show scant interest in the debates that the historians have had on whether history is a science.

The debates began long ago [9] and were carried on in many quarters. In Part II of his great novel, *War and Peace,* Tolstoy devoted thirty-odd pages to explaining his idea of what history is: "the life of peoples and of humanity. To catch and pin down in words—that is, to describe directly the life, not only of humanity, but even of a single people, appears to be impossible." Recently the concept of power has intrigued a number of American political scientists (Mr. Lasswell gives it due attention), but in none of the discussions I have seen is there any reference to the author of *War and Peace* who defines power as "the combined wills of the masses vested in one person" and goes on: "On what conditions are the wills of the masses vested in one person? On condition of that person's expressing the will of all men. That is, power is power. That is, power is a word the meaning of which is beyond our comprehension."

Debates among the historians have recently been renewed in Great Britain.[10] E. H. Carr, Isaiah Berlin, C. V. Wedgwood (abler than all but a very few historians of the opposite sex), H. R. Trevor-Roper and others have been writing books, articles in *Encounter,* and have sent a spate of letters to the London *Times Literary Supplement.* Our learned journals of political science paid no attention, and it was left to Ved Mehta in some brilliant articles in *The New Yorker* (December 1962) [11] to bring these discussions to the notice of interested readers who had not followed the British debate. Someone once said that ofttimes "the insignificance of the issues debated is matched by the intemperateness with which they are maintained or rebutted." The recent British debaters occasionally showed intemperateness,

9 See Fritz Stern (ed.), *The Varieties of History* (New York, 1956).

10 For an American contribution to the debate, see J. H. Hexter's brilliant essays, *Reappraisals in History* (London, 1961). The first, unforgettable essay, "The Historian and His Day," appeared in the *Political Science Quarterly,* LXIX (1954), 219–33.

11 Later a book: *Fly and the Fly-Bottle. Encounters with British Intellectuals* (London, 1963).

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but the issues they dealt with were not insignificant. How far can the historian explain the "why" as well as the "how" of the events he discusses?

Here I cite only Mr. Carr and two or three historians of yesteryear who would be in cordial agreement with him. "Study the historian before you begin to study the facts," wrote Mr. Carr.

> This is, after all, not very abstruse. It is what is already done by the intelligent undergraduate who, when recommended to read a work by that great scholar Jones, of St. Jude's, goes round to a friend at St. Jude's to ask what sort of chap Jones is, and what bees he has in his bonnet. When you read a work of history, always listen out for the buzzing. If you can detect none, either you are tone deaf or your historian is a dull dog.[12]

There is always a bias, Carl Becker once said, "if in no other sense than the determination not to have any."

Mr. Carr was doing hardly more than re-echoing Lord Acton: "A historian has to fight against temptations special to his mode of life, temptations from Country, Class, Church, College, Party, Authors of talents, solicitation of friends." He adds that "the most respectable of these influences are the most dangerous." At another time Lord Acton called history "the generalised account of the personal actions of men united in bodies for any public purposes whatever." Science he defined as "the combination of a great mass of similar facts into the unity of a generalisation, a principle or a law, which principle or law will enable us to predict with certainty the recurrence of like events under given conditions." And then, he asks, how there could be "a science of history"?

Some years ago the Social Science Research Council (in a fit of absent-mindedness, I always supposed) set up a committee (Charles A. Beard was its leading spirit) which was similarly skeptical. When they read the committee's report,[13] which was widely acclaimed, the Council's orthodox members must have felt much as the members of a Eucharistic

[12] E. H. Carr, *What Is History?* (London, 1961), 7.

[13] *Theory and Practice in Historical Study: A Report of the Committee on Historiography* (New York, 1946).

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Congress would have felt had one of its committees reported that there was nothing in the doctrine of the Virgin Birth. But at least Charles A. Beard *et al.* were not as intemperate as Lytton Strachey once was:

> It is obvious that history is not a science: it is obvious that history is not the accumulation of facts, but the relation of them. Only the pedantry of academic persons could have given birth to such a monstrous supposition. Facts relating to the past, when they are collected without art, are compilations; and compilations, no doubt, may be useful; but they are no more History than butter, eggs, salt and herbs are an omelette.

A greater historian than Mr. Strachey, although not so sprightly a writer, put the same thought this way: "The discussion whether history is an art or a science seems futile." Thus Sir Lewis Namier. "It is like medical diagnosis; a great deal of previous experience and knowledge, and the scientific approach of the trained mind, are required, yet the final conclusions to be re-examined in the light of evidence are intuitive: an art." [14] Some political scientists use this metaphor in the opposite way; they think (or at least express the hope) that they will soon be able to prescribe for the body politic as expertly as physicians prescribe for their patients. These political scientists forget the fact that an intelligent patient says nothing on whether he shall get a quarter or a half grain of morphia; or which wonder drug shall be used to treat his pneumonia, or on how big a segment of intestine is to be removed. The body politic tells its would-be political physician what it will and will not stand for.[15]

IV

In dealing with his subject Mr. Lasswell uses little meta-

[14] *Avenues of History* (London, 1952), 8.

[15] The political scientists who use the analogy must have failed to read Molière's *Le Médicin malgré lui:* "I find it the best of trades," says Sganarelle, "for whether we are right or wrong, we are paid equally well. We are never responsible for the bad work, and we cut away as we please in the stuff that we work on. A shoemaker can't spoil a scrap of leather without paying for it, but we can spoil a man without paying a farthing for the damage done. The blunders are not ours and the fault is always that of the dead man. He can't protest." The body politic does protest.

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phorical language and, as I have said, the jargon is scanty, but ofttimes one is uncertain as to what Mr. Lasswell has in his mind. He says, for example, that the future of political science depends on the "mastering" of "five intellectual tasks relating to goal, trend, condition, projection and alternative." But I find few specifics on what these five words mean and cannot supply myself with any examples of goals, trends, etc.

Hundreds of footnotes cite authors who presumably have contributed to the development of political science in the past. Many of these political scientists have searched for "theory" and have sought new "approaches." They have professed themselves "behaviorialists," analysts of "decision-making," or "measurers" of things political and judicial. But as a reviewer in *The Economist* once said, too frequently the results consist "either of attempts to denature the subject so that it ceases to be an affair of individual men or communities making agonising choices, and becomes instead a meaningless minuet of abstract concepts; or, on the other hand, particularly in America, a set of mathematical or quasi-mathematical formulae that obliterate the distinctions between one set of concrete circumstances and another." The reviewer might have borrowed one of Peter de Vries' atrocious but wonderful puns. It is all a "welter mitty" in their heads.

When Kingsley Amis' "Lucky Jim" re-read his work on *The Economic Influence of the Development in Shipbuilding Technique, 1450 to 1485,* he was disgusted to find that he had attempted to throw "pseudo-light" upon "non-problems." Surely some of the authors whom Mr. Lasswell cites must feel the same way about their earlier works and would now not object to devastating criticism. Mr. Lasswell himself ventures no criticism. Thus it will seem to the outsider that "political scientists" live in a mutual admiration society and that this may hinder them in becoming more scientific. When we were children we learned that the Walrus always admired the work of the Carpenter, and when we grew older some of us read Dr. Johnson: "The reciprocal servility of authors is the most risible scene in the whole farce of life." As Lady Mary Wortley Montague once put it: "Servility costs nothing, but buys everything." (I prefer

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the word civility.) In the reign of Queen Victoria it was said of two Oxford historians:

> While ladling butter from alternate tubs
> Stubbs butters Freeman and Freeman butters Stubbs,

but at least these two historians were ones who were known to and read by the laity and each had something of a career outside pursuing his historical interests. In *When William Came,* Saki wrote of "the exaggerated enthusiasm of the fairly numerous art-satellites who are unstinted in their praise for anything that they are certain they cannot understand." Or as Junius once put it, if a man is determined to believe, the very absurdity of the doctrine confirms him in his faith.

Only occasionally is a skeptical voice heard. For example, David B. Truman has written of, without specifying them, "behavioral scientists," who "leap with irresponsible—one is tempted to say fraudulent—disregard for inconvenient and complicating problems from a set of observations about child rearing practices to the most bewilderingly complex concerns of men and nations."[16] Perhaps Mr. Truman had in mind a suggestion made by a man connected with the Rand Corporation that the deterrents he used in dealing with his children might be appropriate in determining what deterrents to try vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. I am not saying that some suggestive work has not been done; I am familiar with outstanding studies of voting behavior,[17] but I regret that a po-

[16] "The Impact on Political Science of the Revolution in the Behavioral Sciences," *Research Frontiers in Politics and Government,* Brookings Lectures (Washington, D. C., 1955), 203.

[17] Any candidate for office now looks upon his pollster as something of a "political scientist" and relies upon him more than he does upon his confessor or his physician. But very occasionally I am reminded of the *reductio ad absurdum* of arguments from the percentages of undisclosed totals. A British advertising agency once announced that of the British Army officers arriving to serve in India, seventy-five per cent of those who did not drink were dead before they had been in India for a year—information of great interest to India's Madison Avenue. It transpired, however, that at the time the British Army did contain four officers who were teetotalers and three out of the four had died during the first year: one had drowned while bathing; one had been mauled by a tiger, and the third had been killed by an irate husband. I am uneasy also when studies of voting behavior go beyond percentages and express judgments. The Roper organization made a careful survey of voting behavior in 1952 and Louis Harris (President Kennedy's pollster) said: "Korea grated and gnawed. Somehow it summed up all the

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litical scientist like Mr. Lasswell has not told us what he considers the notable achievements or non-achievements in different fields and, for example, whether he thinks it worthwhile to undertake generalized discussions that are completely divorced from politics, that is, in the sense that Tolstoy defined it.

On the first page of the New York *Times Book Review* a few months ago, W. M. Frohock, of Harvard University, discussed academic studies "which, by the close reading of familiar texts, illuminate what is already not badly lighted." Such literary activity, he said, "goes on everywhere—professors writing for other professors in periodicals which other professors edit." This "academic discipline," he added, "has little to do with the literary life of the country as a whole." Does the activity of the academicians to whom Mr. Lasswell gives what William James called "the immortality of footnotes" have much to do with the political life of the country? How many executives, legislators, columnists, or editorial writers take note of it?

Too often those who write about the desirability of studying politics by studying political behavior (apart from voting behavior) are so vague that the reader does not know what they have in mind. Thus a recent volume by Heinz Eulau (whose earlier writings Mr. Lasswell cites), *The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics*[18] (dedicated to "Harold D. Lasswell, *Persuader*") tells us of "Behavioral Approaches," "The Social Matrix," "The Cultural Context," "The Personal Basis," "Behavioral Dilemmas," and not once do we come on anything reasonably concrete. Political behavior is apparently the same in the United States, Great Britain, France, Kenya, and the Philippines. Military despotisms, "self-government," executive agrandizement vis-à-vis the legislature or vice versa seem to be random factors. The political I.Q.'s of those in the seats of the mighty are irrelevant.

One is reminded of Bagehot's feeling when he was reading Guizot's *History of Civilization:* "The principle of Legitimacy, the principle of Feudalism, the principle of Democ-

impatience and protest the people felt." The Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan also investigated the voting in 1952, and flatly said that "no single issue appears to have exerted any specific influence in the defection of 1948 Democrats to the 1952 Republican vote."

[18] New York, 1963.

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racy." One principle grew, another declined, and a third crept slowly on. "The mind is immensely edified," said Bagehot, "when perhaps at the 315th page a proper name occurs, and you mutter, 'Dear me—why, if there were not people in the time of Charlemagne! who would have thought that." Mr. Eulau's readers will not be edified for they will come on to no proper names; apparently those whose political behavior is studied are not people. "The three middle chapters correspond in title to the three undergraduate courses I offered at Stanford University between 1958 and 1961," Mr. Eulau tells us. It is to be hoped that some proper names were mentioned orally. And for a climax (or is it an anti-climax?) Mr. Eulau, following Mr. Lasswell, does not attempt a definition of "political science." [19]

V

The dramatis personae are many in a recent book which Mr. Lasswell cites, of which he is a co-author, and the theme of which is the untruth of a famous and much quoted pronouncement by Lord Acton.[20] In a letter to another eminent historian, Mandell Creighton, the author of the greatest book that was never finished and published—"A History of Liberty"—said that he thought "power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely." Messrs. Rogow and Lasswell "challenge the truth of the unqualified Acton principle." They "also impugn the adequacy of the intellectual technique by which it was put forward as a truth of observation" and "deplore the consequences for democratic politics of the dogmatic acceptance of the Acton principle." Acceptance by whom?

When Acton wrote his letter he did not clearly define what he meant by corruption, but Creighton and he knew what he had in mind: the behavior of some thirteenth- and

[19] "Nor shall I deal with those perennial questions such as what we mean by science when we speak of a science of politics, whether such a science is possible and, if it is, just how it is similar to or different from the other sciences, behavioral or natural. I take it for granted that a science of politics is both possible and desirable, and I shall start from there." I modify Thomas Brown's famous quatrain: "I really love you, Dr. Fell / But why I cannot tell / But this I know full well / I really love you, Dr. Fell."

[20] *Power, Corruption, and Rectitude.* By Arnold A. Rogow and Harold D. Lasswell. Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, 1963.—v, 138 pp. $4.50.

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fourteenth-century popes about whom Creighton had written and who, he thought, had been guilty of misdemeanors rather than felonies. But Acton was saying, according to our present authors, that "those who hold power tend to value it above all other values, including rectitude and responsibility, to abuse it and to justify their immoral acts in terms of their authority and position as if, in Acton's words 'the office sanctifies the holder of it.' " [21] The authors go on to tell us that another meaning of corruption, and "perhaps one more congenial to the American political temperament, refers to behavior in office that is motivated by a desire for personal material gain."

On such behavior by American possessors of political power the authors make some interesting remarks. There is an excellent bibliography of the writings on American "Tapers and Tadpoles"—that is, the bosses who, for the most part, have eschewed public office and exercised their influence on people whom they helped get elected or appointed. The authors say that they have analyzed the careers of thirty of these politicians, suggest that they fall into "two conspicuous types," and deal with each type at some length.

The first type of boss they call the "*game* politician." He was "of early American stock and upper-class background. His father was important in business circles, in the community and active in civic affairs . . . timid, frail and ill a good part of the time, the boy's mother played a relatively minor role in his life." Readers will say, "for example."

Then there is the "*gain* politician." "The eldest of six children of an impoverished Irish family." His marriage is "a happy one"; he avoids any "breath of domestic scandal," etc., etc. The authors say that "It is common to treat the *game* politician and *gain* politician not as cousins and not even as brothers in corruption, but as identical twins. The case histories, however, suggest that the term 'corrupt boss' covers a multitude of sinners whose relations to each other are limited to a common involvement in political *flagrante*

[21] What Acton actually said, as appears a few pages later, was: "There is no worse heresy than that the office sanctifies the holder of it." Who was it (Horace Walpole?) who said: "No state is ever saved by good men because good men may sometimes not be willing to go to the lengths that are necessary"?

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delicto." Readers are left in the dark as to who was a "game" and who a "gain" politician.

The authors make capricious but intriguing choices of characters to star and to keep in the wings. Chester A. Arthur "is of special interest as an example of the possible effects upon the personality of a rather sudden and unexpected increase in power." Martin Van Buren's "history reflects an intimate relationship between power and personality." The careers of both men "support the hypothesis that relatively sudden shifts of power need not be accompanied by corruption. Indeed in the case of Arthur a rapid increase in power was followed by increased rectitude." The political career of Aaron Burr, also starred, "would appear to suggest that the deprivation of power per se can occasion a corrupt response"—that is the so-called Burr "conspiracy."

But the most powerful of American presidents get cursory mention. Woodrow Wilson is only a name even though he, as I pointed out in 1919,[22] determined the amount of food on our tables and the warmth of the heat on our hearths. Can it not be argued that his great power corrupted him intellectually? Power vested in trade union leaders and the corruption that ofttimes results are apparently beyond our authors' terms of reference and also, more surprisingly, is what John Wheeler-Bennett described as *The Nemesis of Power*. This book, as Sir Lewis Namier put it, told "the paradoxical story of maximum ascendancy attained by the army leaders under the Parliamentary Republic, and of gradual decline in status under Hitler; of the way in which they who despised the parliamentary regime and patronized the Nazis brought about their own downfall and humiliation." And as for the Nazis and "The Final Solution"? Stalin? Macaulay wrote of times when "a state trial was merely preceded by the uttering of certain gibberish and the performing of certain mummeries." In *M. de Pourceaugnac* Molière had a character say, "Here in Paris they hang a man first and try him later." In the last decade there have been possessors of well nigh absolute power who have been able to say: "No! no! Sentence first—verdict afterwards." The authors are not interested in the exercise of this kind

[22] "Presidential Dictatorship in the United States," *Quarterly Review*, No. 458 (January 1919), 127–48.

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of power, and, more startlingly, they ignore power so great that its possessors have a direct line between the Kremlin and the White House. But what is said about Chester A. Arthur and Martin Van Buren is really quite interesting.

VI

Mr. Lasswell's range is wide and properly so and some of his *obiter dicta* and interpolations are interesting. He says that "one searches the *Congressional Record* in vain for other than an occasional matter of fact or derisive reference to the political scientist." He gives no illustrations of either kind of reference. The output of the newspaper columnists is frequently reprinted in the *Congressional Record* but this, presumably, is because they have something to say, and say it better than some of us do. It may be that Congress ignores emanations from most of the persons who figure in Mr. Lasswell's footnotes, but Congress does pay a good deal of attention to, and ask for assistance from, men and women whose doctorates have been taken in Public Law, Government, Politics, and Political Science as Burgess thought of it. Without bothering to undertake any confusing research I give some random recollections that come to mind.

Congressional committees repeatedly pay attention to the opinions of academic persons on the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of legislation that is proposed. When, a few years ago, Congress decided on additional staffing and some reorganizing of its committee structures a number of professors were cited and consulted. Three Columbia Ph.D.'s are in the top echelons of the staffs of important congressional committees. In 1958 the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (which frequently has professors as witnesses and consultants) commissioned a dozen monographs on "Conditions and Trends in the World and the Policies and Programs of the United States with Respect Thereto." Universities and research institutes shared an appropriation that ran into six figures; numerous political scientists contributed to the reports that resulted. The late Senator Estes Kefauver's Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments heard testimony on possible improvement of electoral procedure and on "presidential inability" from a score of political scientists and published their views in the hearings. Since the most shocking event of our times (November 22,

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1963) congressional committees have invited opinions from the same sources on desirable amendments to the "Presidential Succession Act." In 1950 a member of the American Political Science Association wrote several articles on the British Tribunals of Inquiry. Senator Irving M. Ives had them reprinted in the *Congressional Record* and he and Senator Elbert Thomas (a professor of political science from 1917 to 1933) introduced a bill in the Senate.[23] Modesty keeps me from being more specific about "references" which have been neither "matter of fact" nor "derisive." A monograph could be written on materials which Mr. Lasswell apparently thinks are non-existent.

But Mr. Lasswell's most interesting interpolation is one which, whether or not it has much to do with the future of political science, raises issues which (perhaps because of my sheltered life) seem to me rather novel. Mr. Lasswell cites instances of political scientists so dedicated to their science that they found themselves in unusual predicaments. As I read Mr. Lasswell's account I was reminded (rightly so?) of Gibbon on the Emperor Severus: "His conscience, obsequious to his interest, always released him from inconvenient obligations." I refer briefly to two "case studies."

Mr. Lasswell tells of one social scientist studying organized crime in an American city who

> got in touch with criminal gangs and eventually established himself so successfully that he was tipped off in advance of robberies and even of gang skirmishes. He met the problem by giving the police no information, arguing that his relations to the world of organized crime were unique and would produce knowledge of much more lasting importance to public order than could possibly result from a few tips.

We are not told how much loot the robbers got away with, how many murders the gangs committed, or whether knowledge "of more lasting importance" did result.

A second "political scientist" was a man who "did not regard himself as an area specialist on Western Europe or on any Western European country" and who

> learned of a political conspiracy engineered by Communists

[23] 81st Congress, 2d Session, S.3775. A bill to provide for the establishing of congressional investigating commissions.

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> to overthrow the government of a small, friendly country. The disclosure had come only accidentally in the course of a research trip that had nothing directly to do with Communism. He felt entirely free to make his unexpectedly detailed foreknowledge available to the responsible authorities.

The reader is not told whether the *Putsch* was put down and is left to speculate on whether the information would have been made available if the research trip had had something to do with Communism. I confess that I have never before been made aware that "political scientists" found themselves in such dilemmas; those who do so can derive comfort from remembering Sir Richard Livingston's dictum: We are lacking in the knowledge of the "science of good and evil."

VII

Mr. Lasswell gives special laudatory mention to several political scientists who were not professors writing for other professors. Curiously enough he praises A. Lawrence Lowell only for having had a role "in founding or promoting the League of Nations." The role was minor, but Lowell did some important writing. His treatise, *The Government of England,* was excellent (it should be brought up to date) and on several matters he used a statistical approach. For example, writers had talked about the House of Commons making and unmaking governments and about its freedom to move adjournment in order to call attention "to a matter of urgent public importance." Lowell's figures showed that these things happened very, very rarely.

Woodrow Wilson's *Congressional Government* is called "a classic work of the kind" (Wilson wrote it without bothering to see congressional committees in action). Charles A. Beard's *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution* is a "monument" of its time. I suspect that each of these scholars would have winced if he had been described as a "political scientist," but they all used the scientific method in its best form which, as defined by the Nobel Prize winner, P. W. Bridgman, is nothing more nor less than doing your damnedest "with no holds barred." For these gentlemen were not like Bentham, who, as Sidney Smith once said, loved "method more than its consequences." They agreed with what the physicists tell us: "Methods must wait on in-

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sight; they cannot compell it." [24] Am I wrong when I suggest that too many "political scientists" concentrate on methods before they have insights?

As every informed reader would expect, Mr. Lasswell is most glowing when he writes about Charles E. Merriam and he does so at length and with real affection. He deals hardly at all with what Merriam wrote as a result of the insights that he had; apart from a history of American political theories in two volumes there is little worth recalling.[25] Hence Mr. Lasswell's subject is Merriam; the John the Baptist, and his influence on the students who, under him, majored in political science and of whom Mr. Lasswell is the most prominent. There certainly was a "Chicago School" which, to heretic outsiders, sometimes seemed to love method more than its consequences. And here, following Mr. Lasswell's example, I interpolate.

In 1923 Columbia invited Merriam to become Lieber Professor of Political Philosophy, vice the late William A. Dunning. At that time Merriam was not too satisfied with his academic lot and he quite properly used the offer for negotiations which resulted in an improved Chicago status that made him much happier. But suppose Merriam had come

[24] Charles A. Beard once declared that it was "not the function of the student of politics to praise or condemn institutions or theories but to understand and expound them; and thus for scientific [*sic*] purposes" politics "is separated from theology, ethics and patriotism." *Politics* (New York, 1912), 14. Fortunately Beard soon recanted and ignored the injunction of the Psalmist to "keep his soul as a weaned babe" and "mind not high matters." He ceased trying to be one of the men who, Bagehot has told us, reflected "far apart in a monkish solitude," who were "familiar with the lettuces of the convent garden," but heard "only faint dim murmurs of the great transactions which they slowly jot down in the barren chronicle." In his famous 1935 address before the American Historical Association, "That Noble Dream," Beard said: "The events and personalities of history in their very nature involve ethical and aesthetic considerations. They are not mere events in physics and chemistry inviting neutrality on the part of the 'observer.'"

[25] Merriam once wrote that the outstanding political trend of the age is "(1) toward the rapprochement of the economic and political; . . . and (2) of the economic, the political and scientific. . . . The phase of an assumed separate and independent organization, or of ideologies postulating such a dichotomy, is passing away, and we may look forward to a fusion of these elements in such a manner as to make them indistinguishable, institutionally and as factors in social control." On this Mr. Lewis Gannett remarked: "If that is the way professors of political science talk in the University of Chicago, it is easy to see why President Roosevelt chose most of his Brain Trusters from Columbia." (New York *Herald Tribune*, November 6, 1934.)

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to Morningside Heights? The Faculty of Political Science was then rather closely knit and had intimate connections with the School of Business and the Law School. There was more intellectual fellowship at Columbia than at most American universities—certainly more than I had found at Harvard; and more than, Merriam told me, there then was at Chicago, and more than I found there when I was a Walgreen visiting professor in 1939. Had Merriam migrated to Columbia (where he had taken his doctorate) he would have had colleagues who offered and invited criticism of ideas and writings. The leading sociologist was Franklin H. Giddings who complained that many of the workers in his discipline were endeavoring to make sociology "the science of organized smatter." Charles Beard had left academic life but we still saw a good deal of him. Thomas Reed Powell, managing editor of this QUARTERLY (1914–16), the ablest constitutional lawyer of his generation, was to move to Harvard, but this did not break his intellectual ties with his Columbia friends. As Felix Frankfurter put it, Reed Powell "speared his victims in happy doggerels" [26] which were privately circulated. One example:

Foundations in their financial operations
Won't donate funds to simple mystics
Who get results without statistics
But want a comprehensive plan
Which takes a plenitudinous span
Of time to reach fruition
And meanwhile offers great nutrition
To all research associates
And their conjugal intimates.

Another:

But you ask in great surprise
And with wonder in your eyes,
Can they get sufficient calories
From their academic salaries
Can they pay for their insurance
Or have hope of long endurance
Without paid investigation
Of the nation's situation
Can they live by simply thinking

[26] *Felix Frankfurter Reminisces* (New York, 1960), 292.

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In these days of costly drinking
If they get no outside pay
For researches under way?

If, in 1923, Merriam had moved to Columbia he would have become a different Merriam. His interests might have been the same ones that he was to have at Chicago, but his ways of pursuing them, constantly under criticism, would have been better thought out and more cautious. There might well have been a "Merriam School," but if it had had the identical tuition payers and scholarship holders who went to the "School" at Chicago, they would have emerged from the "Merriam School" at Columbia fashioned quite differently. It is Mr. Lasswell's view that the past and present of "political science" would have been inferior if this had happened. Mr. Lasswell is entitled to his opinion.

VIII

One difficulty with the study of politics, according to Mr. Lasswell, is that we have insufficient information—not that office-holders and governments fail to make full disclosures (which they deliberately do), but that the "political scientist" does not have ready access to information that could be made available. Mr. Lasswell therefore strongly urges the inauguration of "basic data surveys" which will describe "the changes in the distribution of power and in the structure and function of political institutions throughout the arena of world politics." The data would presumably be on all levels: local governments, state capitals, national capitals, sub-summit, and summit gatherings. Political scientists would share the responsibility for undertaking this task "with other specialists—among whom are journalists and undercover agents—who may or may not have political science training and identity." Collection of the data could be entrusted to advanced undergraduates and even to "many secondary school students" who "are capable of excellent research when properly motivated, equipped, and directed." On these hopes I venture two comments by way of quotation.

Not long ago Ortega y Gasset warned us that "if each generation accumulates printed material at the rate of recent ones, the culture which liberated men from the jungle will thrust him anew into a jungle of books." Secondly, Agatha

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Christie's Belgian sleuth may have given us some light and leading. An eminent writer on historiography, R. G. Collingwood, thinks so:

> Scientific historians study problems: they ask questions, and if they are good historians they ask questions which they see their way to answering. It was a correct understanding of the same truth that led Monsieur Hercule Poirot to pour scorn on the "human bloodhound" who crawls about the floor trying to collect everything, no matter what, which might conceivably turn out to be a clue; and to insist that the secret of detection was to use what, with possibly wearisome iteration, he called "the little grey cells." You can't collect your evidence before you begin thinking, he meant: because thinking means asking questions (logicians, please note), and nothing is evidence except in relation to some definite question.[27]

Two chapters call for "the Cultivation of Creativity." There must be more and better adventures like those Merriam launched at the University of Chicago. "It was here that latent tendencies in the American scene came to their most distinctive expression. I refer, of course, to the *p's* and *q's*—the emphases on psychology [28] and quantity." And Mr. Lasswell goes on to make a number of suggestions of his own. One concerns "the paucity of research on the interplay of sex and politics and he calls for "team research bringing political scientists into close working collaboration with child psychologists, physicians and nurses [male and female?]." I am afraid that the results of such research would not even glitter, let alone illumine, but there is something in Mr. Lasswell's desire. I have long thought that an aspirant for the Ph.D. degree could do worse than write a dissertation on "Mistresses and Politics." Parnell and later Dilke were named as corespondents in divorce cases; the Irish question

[27] *The Idea of History* (Oxford, 1946), 281.

[28] ". . . the dominant influence on Thucydides is the influence of Hippocratic medicine. Hippocrates was not only the father of medicine, he was also the father of psychology, and his influence is evident not only in such things as the Thucydidean description of the plague, but in such studies in morbid psychology as the description of war-neurosis in general and the special instances of it in the Corcyrean revolution and the Melian dialogue. Herodotus may be the father of history, but Thucydides is the father of psychological history." *Ibid.*, 29.

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became unanswerable and the Liberal party had to seek elsewhere for leadership. Four years ago Earl Lloyd George of Dwyfor, in a biography of his father, described him as "probably the greatest natural Don Juan in the history of politics" and mentioned a half brother and a half sister as "living evidence to prove this." Recently there has been the Profumo case. Across the Channel, Boulanger, Caillaux, and, at the time of the fall of France, Daladier (the Marquise de Crussol), and Reynaud (Mme. Hélène de Portes)? [29] *Etc., etc.*

Mr. Lasswell also plumps for the establishment of "Centers for Advanced Political Science" on the model of the Institute at Princeton and the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford, where he and Mr. Rogow were fellows. These, and new centers, would

> provide for the participation of individuals whose chief interest and competence was in the clarification of goals. Because of the role played by the concept of responsibility in public policy, this topic is among the most eligible themes for continuing examination. The concept of human dignity, when defined as an overriding goal, includes the ideal of a commonwealth in which all participants act responsibly.

These multi-disciplinary political science centers would "explore standards of authoritative prescription designed to safeguard at least a minimum sphere of responsibility. Which zones of privacy are to be protected against intrusion by official or unofficial persons?" To sum up, "The idea of centers of political science is to consolidate and improve the advances that have been made in integrating frames of reference among scholars and scientists and between them and the responsible decision-makers of government and other social institutions." For example ?

In 1954 the Rockefeller Foundation financed an inquiry to discover how scientific discoveries had been made. The investigation was thorough; scientists, technologists, patent lawyers, historians, inventors, administrators, and businessmen were interviewed.

[29] See Pertinax, *The Gravediggers of France* (New York, 1944).

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> They compared the relative productivity of large research institutes fully equipped with all the most up-to-date equipment with that of individual men of genius working by themselves, often under unfavourable conditions and with exiguous apparatus; and their conclusion was that the flash of genius, the spark of intuition that leads to new discovery and fresh insight, can come to the prepared and receptive mind whether the thinking is done in a big laboratory with colleagues and assistants and facilities of all sorts, whether the work is organized by a public corporation or a private company, or whether the man—like Einstein, a patent examiner in Berne—is alone, reflecting. In fact, there is no approved way of ensuring discovery.[30]

I suggest that the future of "political science" will not depend on the accumulation of more "basic data," or on eloquent exhortations to "cultivate creativity," or on the establishment of additional centers for "advanced political science." I suggest that the future of "political science" will more probably depend on an adequate answer to the supplication of the Bidding Prayer: "And ye shall pray for a due supply of persons fitted to serve God in the Ministry and in the State."

LINDSAY ROGERS

NEW YORK CITY

[30] Magnus Pyke, "Fathers of Discovery," *The Listener*, January 10, 1963.

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ON CUBAN POLITICAL ECONOMY

THE thesis of this paper is that the social revolution in Cuba (1959–61) was inevitable in the sense that it was necessary for the island's further economic and social development. The nationalization and consolidation of industry, the collectivization of more than one third of Cuba's farm land, the complete reorganization of the labor unions and the banking and commercial systems, and thoroughgoing economic planning, rescued the island from permanent economic stagnation.[1] For this reason, Cuban socialism can be explained and understood in the context of the social structure of the old society—not as the sour fruit of some "abnormality" or "conspiracy."

A corollary of this thesis is that any ruling group which failed fundamentally to modify or replace Cuba's old economic institutions could not count on a long and stable tenure. It also follows that the political orientation of any political leader of "liberal" or conservative persuasion who wished to retain power would have to shift more or less rapidly to the Left to correspond with social reality.

The argument may be summarized as follows:

(1) From a very early date the Cuban economy developed along capitalist lines. Pre-capitalist forms of economic organization—traditional, feudal, or mercantile—were in no way important features of the old society. During the twentieth century, the island's economy acquired the significant characteristics of monopoly capitalism, chief among which was the cartelization of markets. Monopoly controls

[1] The shift of the great part of Cuba's trade from the United States to the socialist countries, and the reorientation of Cuba's foreign policy, do not directly concern us here. They are questions related to the transition from capitalist to socialist economy, but they seem to have had an independent character as well. For this reason they are more simple, and at the same time, more complex than the question of Cuban socialism itself. On one level of analysis, it is obvious that the United States' refusal to trade with Cuba drove the island to the Soviet Union. Looking deeper, one is compelled to inquire into the nature of the relationship between the United States and Cuba for clues to its deterioration. Clearly, the rapid socialization of the Cuban economy contributed to the severance of ties between the two governments.

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blanketed Cuba's social economy and blocked the fulfillment of the island's true economic potential by wasting land, labor, and capital, and other economic resources.

(2) Throughout the political revolution which triumphed in January 1959, a small group of men acquired and retained the initiative. These men were non-Communists, and, while forming an alliance with the Cuban Communist party in late 1958 or early 1959, consistently kept the initiative during the social revolution of 1959–61. What is more, this social revolution was rapid, relatively peaceful, and defended by the vast majority of the Cuban people. These observations suggest that a social revolution of a specifically socialist character was not merely an ideological product, but a realistic and authentic response to social reality.

(3) The political revolution was not marked by sharp class conflicts, and revolutionary programs drawn up before 1959 had appeal for nearly every Cuban social and economic class. Class conflicts developed out of the economic and political measures of the Revolutionary government which destroyed revolutionary unity by systematically discriminating against some classes and in favor of others and by polarizing political attitudes on the questions of elections, political parties, and relations with the United States. It is said that these measures provide prima-facie evidence that Fidel Castro betrayed the original spirit and aims of the revolution (the betterment of the economic, social, and political condition of the Cuban people) when in fact they may have been the logical outcome of an attempt to realize these very aims.

I

From a very early date Cuba exhibited the main features of modern capitalist economy. Unlike most Latin American economies, Cuba lacked an important subsistence sector and nearly all segments of the population were integrated into the market economy. As early as 1899 over two thirds of the rural labor force were engaged in the cultivation of cash crops, while subsistence farming employed probably less than one quarter of the work force.

By mid-century the subsistence sector had been nearly totally submerged by specialized agricultural production for export and home consumption. Throughout the country-

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side the propertied rural middle class gave way to foreign capital, which exploited opportunities for large-scale production, and corporate and absentee ownership. Following the sugar crises of the nineteen-twenties a fine web of relationships began to bind together agriculture and high finance; the bankers also had a finger in commerce and, to a lesser degree, manufacturing.

The great part of the island's agricultural production was organized along monopolistic lines. Output restrictions, pegged prices, and other forms of monopolistic control blanketed sugar, tobacco, rice, potato, and coffee farming. In the key sugar sector, mill owners, growers, and wage workers all had powerful organizations. Outputs, wages, prices, and the distribution of sugar earnings were determined by the mill owners or growers cartels, or by a three-cornered bargaining relationship on the level of national politics.

In industry there were 150 employers' associations of one kind or another, many of them with wide powers over their members. Compulsory "producers' associations" dominated sugar and tobacco manufacture, and the great public utilities each had clear monopolies in their fields. As for the labor movement, it was, compared with the island's labor force, one of the largest in the world, and the central federation enjoyed unusual power over its affiliates. There was, besides, an extremely well developed "labor aristocracy" which had sealed off a number of important labor markets from outside competition, and which was mainly responsible for the extraordinarily low relationship between labor productivity and wages.

In short, the economic institutions which we are accustomed to associate with the high income capitalist nations overlaid the island's market system. It should be stressed that monopoly practices in Cuba's product and labor markets sprang up in the soil of a market economy. Restrictions in the rural economy were not of the type ordinarily associated with a system of traditional agriculture, and controls in the labor market were not those customary in mercantile or neomercantile systems. Cuba's economic institutions were capitalist institutions, historically specific to Cuba. These institutions had, by and large, a monopolistic character, as well. For this reason, they placed limits on the pace of

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Cuba's economic development by inhibiting the improvement of agricultural yields, wasting land, barring the wide introduction of a mixed, scientific agriculture, placing ceilings on labor productivity, and, in general, on the ability of the economy to mobilize and utilize domestic and foreign capital efficiently.

In an economy which had been stagnating since World War II (ignoring temporary ups and downs in the sugar market), it should be unnecessary to emphasize the implications of these limits on economic growth for the nature and scope of the Cuban Revolution.

II

Against this background, the character of the political and social revolutions in Cuba is more comprehensible. In the *political* struggle against President Fulgencio Batista the decisive influence was apparently the dedication of a small band of young men. From the attack by Fidel Castro on the Moncada Barracks in July 1953, throughout the guerrilla war of 1957–58, until late 1959, when the Castro group firmly consolidated political power, not a single peasant revolt ignited the Cuban countryside. Passive resistance, surreptitious aid to Castro's forces, there were, to be sure; unlike a dozen other political revolutions, however, the peasant classes failed to grasp the initiative at any point in the struggle. Early in 1959 Comandante Ernesto (Che) Guevara, Castro's closest associate, appropriately described the Cuban peasants as the revolution's "invisible collaborators." The labor movement, in which over one half of Cuba's labor force was enrolled, figured even less prominently in the rebellion. It was in January 1959, after the regular army had received Castro's final blows, that the working classes shut down Havana's industry and commerce. Earlier, a general strike in April 1959 had been a total failure. The new Revolutionary government consistently retained the political initiative; the general strike in late January in the port city of Manzanillo protesting the leniency shown by the revolutionary tribunals toward war criminals was apparently the only major reversal of roles.

In the *social* revolution of 1959–61, the liquidation of Cuba's private property system was invariably initiated by

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the ruling group. The peasantry did not spontaneously seize and cultivate idle lands; with a handful of exceptions, they failed to claim even the small fields in which they labored until the new government formally turned these tracts over to them. To be sure, a decree published in February denied rights to land under the coming Agrarian Reform Law to any peasant who without authorization occupied properties belonging to someone else. More significant than the existence of the law is the fact that it did not have to be enforced. Nor did the urban workers and sugar mill laborers independently occupy the factories (this was a sharp departure from the abortive social revolution of 1933); rebel army or militia units at the direction of the central government took possession of Cuba's farm land and industry.

These two sets of events—the exclusive and individualistic flavor of the political revolution and the almost bloodless social revolution—are intimately connected. The social revolution was more or less orderly because the political revolution transferred power from one relatively small group of men to another, and because the masses of Cubans at the very least passively supported the social revolution.

In this context, it is significant that Cuba's is the only specifically socialist social revolution in history which was not authored by local Communist parties with or without the backing of the Red Army. Not until 1959, when the actual fighting had ceased, did Castro's 26th of July Movement win the open backing of the Cuban party (the Partido Socialista Popular, or PSP), although this is not true of some individual Communists who sided with Castro somewhat earlier, and, as might be expected, survived the 1962 spring and summer purges of old-line Communists almost to a man. The political careers of many of the old-line Communists were painfully brief. Subject to bitter public and private attacks by the 26th of July Movement's organ, *Revolución*, during most of 1959, the party members gained footholds in the new revolutionary organizations in 1960 *after* the major expropriations (with a few exceptions, most notably the trade unions in which they had always figured strongly and in two or three important offices in the National Agrarian Reform Institute [INRA]), helped shape the mass organizations and the new party, the ORI (Integrated Revolutionary Organizations),

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into their image of revolutionary associations in 1961 and early 1962, only to be deprived of many of their positions in the spring and summer of that year and replaced by non-Communist revolutionary personnel.[2]

In connection with the question of the source of political initiative, it is important to point out that in the history of modern revolutions the Cuban experience was unique in another respect, and departed especially sharply from the October Revolution. Irresistibly drawn to the peasantry in order to consolidate power, Lenin paved the way for the seizure of the estates. By this very measure, though, the central authority deprived itself of effective control of the land. Fifteen years passed before the rural economy was collectivized and integrated into the structure of the planned economy. The Cuban Revolution spared Fidel Castro an analogous problem, since the seeds of a planned rural economy were planted *simultaneously* with the transformation of land ownership. The fact that the Cuban farm worker and peasant never had the political initiative made possible the immediate collectivization of the cattle, rice, and sugar sectors of the rural economy. The fact that the better part of these sectors was already organized into large-scale producing units which had long utilized land, labor, and capital inefficiently made collectivization practical, feasible, and rational.

This development distinguishes the Cuban Revolution not only from the Russian Revolution, but sets it apart from the Chinese, the Mexican, and even the Bolivian experiences, as well. In Mexico the peasants at times had absolute initia-

2 For the events in 1959 see the study by Maurice Zeitlin and Robert Scheer, *Cuba, Tragedy of the Hemisphere* (New York, 1963). The role of the party in 1960 and 1961 is described in Theodore Draper's *Castro's Revolution: Myths and Realities* (New York, 1962). In this collection of articles is also "L'Affaire Escalante," which tries to interpret the purges at the top to North Americans. Monitoring of Cuban radio broadcasts and perusal of Cuban periodicals reveal that the purge had reached into the lowest levels of the ORI by mid-summer, 1962. This was confirmed by the author in August 1963, by another American, Maurice Zeitlin ("Castro and Cuba's Communists," *The Nation,* November 3, 1962), and by an anti-Castro writer in "Pero sigue la Purga," *Cuba Nueva,* May 15, 1962). That the PSP never had absolute initiative is unwittingly suggested by the leading exponent of the "revolution betrayed" thesis when he wrote that "if all had been going well in Cuba for the past year, the PSP's control might well have gone unchallenged. . . ." Draper, *Castro's Revolution,* 209.

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tive; until 1952 the Chinese leadership by force of circumstances emphasized individual ownership of the land; so did the Bolivian revolutionary group, and so it does today. The anti-feudal character of all these upheavals, though, was mirrored very faintly in Cuba, for reasons we have already discussed.

A summary of our argument to this point discloses that: non-Communist revolutionaries made a socialist revolution on an island where feudalism (or the neo-feudalism of pre-revolutionary Soviet Union, China, Mexico, and Bolivia) was largely absent, but where capitalistic, monopolistic controls were prominently featured. The PSP never had the political initiative either before or during the key stages of the social revolution; the party, in fact, at first even opposed those sections of the May 1959 Agrarian Reform Law which encouraged collective production of agricultural commodities. The aim of the revolutionary leadership was to get the stagnating Cuban economy off dead center to improve the social and material conditions of the Cuban people. When they turned to socialist forms of economic organizations to realize this aim, they were supported by the majority of Cubans. From all of this evidence, one can clearly make a case that socialist economic planning in Cuba was less an ideological product than an expression of hard economic necessity.

III

Socialism—public ownership of the means of production—sometimes emerges from class conflict, and is invariably accompanied by more or less severe political warfare between classes. Cuba was no exception. The political revolution had a distinct classless character (at least no single class had the initiative during this phase of the struggle), but sharp class conflicts developed in the course of the social revolution. The emergence of these conflicts was accompanied by dramatic changes in the Revolutionary government's political line.

Beginning in mid-1959, after the Agrarian Reform Law put Cuba and the world on notice that a thoroughgoing social revolution was in the making, the Revolutionary government began to mark off sharply the "revolution" from the

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"counterrevolution." Departing from his previous position, Castro was the first to insist on the black and white nature of the struggle, an attitude that was quickly adopted by other government officials. Divisions and differences of opinion over revolutionary policy existed within the governing group—the struggle between the Castro group and the "old" communists is one instance—but the main lines of both domestic and foreign policy were (and are) seldom questioned, or in doubt. The extreme polarization of Cuban politics after mid-1959 is well exemplified in speech after speech delivered by Cuban government leaders. In this theme, the revolution and the Cuban nation are made one and the same, as indicated by Castro in early 1960: "To be a traitor to the Revolution is to be a traitor to the country. The destiny of our sovereignty is at stake. . . . We have decided that either we are or we are not a free country. And we are and want to be a free country." [3]

From mid-1959 to the present, however, *genuine* cleavages in Cuban politics have been sharp and opposing opinions have been fiercely held, defining a political mood which corresponds in many ways to social and economic reality. From January 1959 on, a series of profound economic and social changes accompanied these inimical attitudes, and to a large degree were responsible for them. There were no less than *fifteen hundred* decrees, laws, and resolutions during the first nine months of 1959.[4] Unquestionably, nearly every new measure—especially those affecting the property system—drew some Cubans closer to the Revolutionary government and repelled others, leaving few indifferent. At the very least, each major law (the rent reduction and price control laws, agrarian reform, and the "intervention" of the utilities are some examples) compelled the ordinary Cuban to question his own political orientation; the most sweeping of these occasioned cabinet crises, resignations, flights abroad, and their cumulative effect led to the short war at Playa Giron in April 1961. The basis for the demand to choose sides—for or against the Revolutionary government—was therefore laid by the government's early economic and political measures.

[3] Radio interview with Fidel Castro reported in Havana *Post*, January 19, 1960, 10.

[4] Author's estimate based on *Primer Indice Anual de la Legislación Revolucionaria*, 1ro. de Enero a 31 de Diciembre de 1959 (Havana, 1960).

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To make such a demand required some confidence that a sizeable body of opinion would confirm the government's position. This suggests that the original revolutionary legislation might be likened to a whirlpool expelling odd debris, yet sucking in the hull of the ship. Be that as it may, it is certainly likely that the slogan itself, together with the heady spirit in which it was launched, contributed to a political atmosphere in which a middle position became increasingly unrealistic and untenable. Castro's personality, after all, confers on the revolution a very special flavor. When he told an audience in the summer of 1960, at the time the United States acted to bar Cuban sugar from the mainland market, "In each cooperative we are going to build a town . . . with or without the quota. Each little town will have a school for the children of the members of the cooperative, with or without the quota . . . ," [5] he conveyed a sense of boundless optimism apparent as early as the famous "History Will Absolve Me" speech in 1953 and by which his associates were invariably impressed. Reading through his speeches and declarations one is struck by the fact that the image of defeat, or even retreat, rarely, and then only reluctantly, appears. This nearly limitless confidence undoubtedly has affected Cuban politics and the island's economic development.

IV

That the new government chose to polarize opinion around the fundamental issue of its own support cannot be fully explained by Castro's optimism, however. It had the alternative—in place of isolating, indeed outlawing, any opposition, the logical climax of the government's actual policy—that of allowing his opposition to form into functioning interest groups. From there, employing the tactics of divide and conquer, he might have thwarted any potential majority coalition. These groups or parties would probably have ranged from the "left-opposition" of the small Cuban Trotskyite movement all the way to the moderate right of the large sugar and commercial interests (supposing that they had purged their numbers of pro-Batista elements). The leadership of the revolution, by playing one group against

[5] *Trabajo Cuba* (published by the Cuban Ministry of Labor), No. 3 (July 1960), 3.

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another, ceaselessly probing the weaknesses of each, might have retained power indefinitely.

Yet this policy seemed to have little relevance to the Cuban scene of 1959–60. Its usefulness is evident if in a crisis the ruling group cannot count on clear majority support; an example that springs to mind is British rule in India. Had the British rulers been foolish enough to imitate Castro's policy, they would have driven the opposition together, in the process probably creating a majority capable of threatening their own rule. Only a ruling group which anticipates majority support can for very long afford to alienate opposition elements so thoroughly that they are compelled to form strong working alliances. The Castro government appeared to be well along this path in the summer and fall of 1960 at the height of the first crisis with the United States.

Finally, the only dialogue between the "revolutionary party" and the "counterrevolutionary party" was literally at gun point. The social revolution had been consummated. Relations with the United States had totally deteriorated. And Castro, together with thousands of 26th of July Movement "liberals" and "reformers" had been radicalized and labelled "betrayers." Why did events follow this course?

V

Early in 1959, Castro was in every sense a popular hero whom many did not hesitate to compare with Martí. Among the island's nearly seven million people, few concealed their esteem, fewer still their respect. Even for the business community the future seemed promising. A leading business and financial organ reported that "American concerns with Cuban interests generally did not expect the change in Cuba's government to hamper their operations." [6] In Cuba itself, the United States embassy took an optimistic view of the long-term investment possibilities. Some firms pre-paid taxes to help Castro consolidate his new government and others planned to accelerate investment programs temporarily postponed during the fighting.[7] Business leaders in

[6] In a seminar at Princeton University held on April 21, 1959, Castro himself attributed this near-unanimous support to his failure to carry out a specifically *class* war in 1957 and 1958, and to the universal fear and hatred among the Cuban people of Batista's police. Havana *Post*, April 22, 1959, 1.

[7] Textilera Ariguanabo and the Cuban Telephone Company, for example,

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Cuba who "as recently as one month ago were gravely concerned about the revolution" apparently had undergone a radical shift in temper.[8] Their doubts would soon return, however, for a rather elementary reason.

On the one hand, a wide range of pressing social, economic, and political problems, some of which had lingered on for years and others of which were fresh, containing unknown implications, confronted the triumphant rebels. In a hundred arenas, the new government struggled to make, implement, and enforce measures demanded by these problems. On the other hand, before assuming power, the Castro group had published or broadcast certain policy statements and decreed certain laws, enforced in those territories seized and occupied by the Rebel Army. Castro, the guerrilla leader, however, had embraced policies of a vague and ambiguous character; ideas were endorsed which Castro, the national politician, would later discard. The original (October 10, 1958) decree taking up the agrarian problem will do as an illustration.[9] Article 2 promised all farm operators cultivating fewer than 27.2 hectares a plot of land of at least that size free of charge. This provision was directly incorporated into the major May 1959 Agrarian Reform Law.[10] Where contiguous land was available this policy was carried out in practice. Article 6 of the October decree, which provided expropriated landowners with compensation, was also contained in the law of May 1959, although, with a handful of exceptions, it was not complied with. However, nowhere does the early law touch on the related problems of foreign properties or the *latifundium,* obviously political questions of a profound character. The vague reference to these problems in the introduction of the October decree could only raise more questions than it could answer.[11] This is but one

made advance payments on their profits taxes totalling $640,000. Havana *Post,* January 22, 1959, 1.

8 *Wall Street Journal,* January 2, 1959.

9 *Ley No. 3 de 10 oct. 1958,* Departamento Legal, Sección Asesoría de las Delegaciones de Zonas Reforma Agraria (Havana, 1959).

10 Law of Agrarian Reform, Article 18 in *Gaceta Oficial de la República de Cuba,* Edición extraordinaria especial, June 3, 1959.

11 *Ley No. 3,* Por Cuanto (No. 13): "It will be the task of the future government of the Republic to dictate an additional law to fulfill Article 90 (treating the *latifundium*) of the 1940 Constitution." While the Cuban Con-

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instance of the vagueness which seems to have characterized Castro's early outlook, and not a very conspicuous one at that. One authority has compiled a whole catalogue of other of the revolutionary's "broken promises." [12]

A great many people were therefore understandably uncertain about the concrete steps the new government would take in the areas of economic development and domestic politics. The regime began to show its hand almost at once (by "intervening" the Cuban Electric Company, for instance), but the anti-Batista moderates whom Castro placed in the first cabinet made it a point to reassure the business community. President Urrutia himself proclaimed that Cuba needed and wanted foreign investments.

V

With the benefit of hindsight it is tempting to conclude that Castro's group deliberately concealed their true designs from the Cuban population and opinion abroad as a tactical move to win all the support they could possibly get. It is not intended definitively to defend or refute this view here. It will be useful, though, to suggest that this hypothesis fails to exhaust the possibilities. Castro, for example, might very well have been confused or uncertain over the concrete problems—the agrarian problem, the question of economic development, and pressing political problems such as widespread government corruption, the fragile Cuban party system, and elections—which for years had been prominent features of the Cuban scene. The rebel leader, after all, surrounded himself with as varied a group of advisers as any national politican in memory: centrist careerist politicians, Keynesian economists, ex-and-would-be-bureaucrats, sincere liberals, professional revolutionaries, and amateur Marxist tacticians —there was very little advice Castro could not get if he

stitution of 1940 established a legal basis for limiting the amount of land which an individual owned, Article 90 is similarly vague, and consequently any reference to it would be devoid of any real content. Article 90 merely "permitted the fixing by law of the maximum amount of land to be held by a person or entity," and stated that means shall be taken to "restrictively limit the acquisition and possession of land by foreign persons and companies and . . . to revert the land to Cubans." "Agrarian Revolution in Cuba," *Foreign Agriculture*, Foreign Agricultural Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, XXIV (March, 1960), 5.

12 Draper, *Castro's Revolution*, 15–20.

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wanted it. No less important, his own knowledge of Cuban economic and social life was apparently confined to three or four major areas. About the large class of small tenants and squatters in Oriente Province, the sugar industry, and the condition of the very poor throughout the island, he certainly knew a great deal. He had never been, however, in close touch with the problems of the tobacco farmers and other more or less well-to-do Cuban rural workers (apart from the sugar growers). And on the subjects of urban industry and trade and the city working class, he had much—as it turned out—to learn. In this connection, it is interesting to point out that in his first essay on the Cuban Revolution, Theodore Draper, who was later to develop the "revolution betrayed" thesis, wrote: "When Fidel Castro entered Havana . . . no one knew what he was going to do. It is doubtful whether he himself knew, except in the most general terms." [13] As a matter of fact, this actively squares with Castro's own self-evaluation, expressed on numerous occasions, but never so frankly as in the famous "Marxist-Leninist" speech of December 1, 1961. Two months later he characterized the revolutionary leadership in these terms: "We were like a man with a vocation for music. But a man's vocation for music does not grant him a right to call himself a musician if he has not studied musical theory. When we started our revolutionary struggle, we already had some knowledge of Marxism-Leninism and we were in sympathy with it. But, by virtue of this, we could not call ourselves Marxists-Leninists. . . . We were apprentice revolutionaries." [14]

There is also the possibility that both opinions, the one favorable to Castro, the other, because he is made out to be a deliberate liar, very unflattering, are partially true. In this event, the "conspirator" theory loses much of its bite; it is not hard to understand why a politician would hesitate to reveal plans which he knows may be unrealistic and never be put into action.

VI

Whatever the case, the fact is that his early support was ex-

[13] Theodore Draper, "The Runaway Revolution," *The Reporter*, XXII, May 12, 1960, 14–20.

[14] Radio interview, Moscow Domestic Service, January 29, 1962.

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tremely heterogeneous, and, for this reason, any policy would be bound to appear as a kind of betrayal to someone. No policy, though, would likely be considered a betrayal by everyone. To put it differently, few measures, and no really important ones, could possibly be universally popular; at the same time, every measure would heighten the loyalties of some of his followers. It was certain, therefore, that his universal popularity in January 1959 would be transitory. The struggle between the Association of Sugar Cane Planters and the Sugar Workers Federation over the issue of cane cutters' wages is a good example of the many class conflicts which would eventually spoil revolutionary harmony. On April 15, 1959, the new government decreed a fifteen per cent rise in the wage rates of the cane cutters. The cane planters (*colonos*) were ordered to pay the wage increases in full; they were to be reimbursed, however, by the mill owners, to the extent of one third of the extra wage costs.[15] The *colonos* quickly voted among themselves to repeal the decree, arguing that the wage advance would make their farms "non-operational." Their protest was without effect. It goes without saying that the disputes which raged over the May Agrarian Reform Law and the Urban Reform Law a little later were argued strictly in class terms. And over the issues of elections and reconstruction of the Cuban political party system, and relations with the United States, it was the professional and middle classes which turned against the Revolutionary government. In the ranks of the poorer rural and urban workers and the marginal peasants there was little or no agitation for the reintroduction of the political forms and institutions dominating the Cuban scene prior to Batista's coup in 1952, nor was there great fear of the island's powerful northern neighbor.

While the economic and social measures divided the island along class lines to produce a kind of "reactive" class conflict, there was no mass agitation for the reorganization of the Cuban economy. The interventions and expropriations of 1959–60 clearly had the *support* of the majority of Cubans

[15] Havana *Post*, April 17, 1959, 1, April 28, 1959, 1. In January, the Association had asked the government for an advance to meet wage payments. They had not anticipated that the wage hike of the year before would be retained in 1959; Havana *Post*, January 28, 1959, 4, citing *Diario de la Marina*.

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(even the relatively conservative sugar growers supported the seizure of the estates); but the poorer, underprivileged classes failed to *initiate* these actions. For this reason, an explanation of Cuban socialism which runs along the lines of pure "class struggle" doctrine is obviously forced and overly abstract.

This admission, however, does not rule out the possibility that Castroism and Cuban socialism were built on economic —not ideological—foundations. First, one cannot characterize the Cuban Revolution as primarily anti-feudal; quite the contrary, the Cuban economy exhibited all the main features of well developed (one is tempted to say, over developed) capitalism. What is more, Cuban capitalism was monopoly capitalism; *for this reason, the Cuban economy failed to grow as rapidly as existing technology, savings, and the supplies of labor and land permitted.* What inhibited the island's economic growth was not the absolute supplies of factors of production, but the way in which they were *organized.* Viewed in this context, it is highly suggestive that the "ideologists" apparently failed to have the political initiative at any time; we know that the Cuban Communist party did not make the revolution, and it remains to be proved that Fidel Castro was inevitably to term himself a "Marxist-Leninist." Finally, we know that it was possible more or less peacefully to forge socialism in Cuba, implying that most Cubans were ready (or at least willing) to accept a socialist economy, in marked contrast to the Russian experience.

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FEDERAL-STATE COLLABORATION IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES *

FEDERALISM: COOPERATIVE OR DUAL

THE operation of the American federal system in the nineteenth century has been the subject of much discussion and some examination since the New Deal and the so-called "rise of cooperative federalism." It has generally been assumed that federalism in practice, like federalism in theory in the nineteenth century (which is here taken to include the entire period between 1790 and 1913) has been dual federalism, in which the federal and state governments pursued virtually independent courses of action during a period when government activity was, in any case, minimal.[1]

Dual federalism has been defined by Clark, among many others, as "two separate federal and state streams flowing in distinct but closely parallel channels." Perhaps the best definition of the term was that given by Chief Justice Roger B. Taney in the name of the United States Supreme Court, in *Ableman* v. *Booth* (21 Howard 506), at the height of the era

* This essay is based on a study of intergovernmental collaboration in the nineteenth-century United States, conducted under the auspices of the Workshop in American Federalism, University of Chicago, and financed by the Ford Foundation. The major product of the study is the writer's book, *The American Partnership* (Chicago, 1962) which presents the data summarized below in greater depth and detail. Particular acknowledgment is due the Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of Illinois, which provided me the time and facilities with which to prepare this essay.

[1] This thesis has been most persuasively stated by George C. S. Benson in *The New Centralization* (New York, 1941) and Jane Perry Clark in *The Rise of a New Federalism* (New York, 1938), and has been repeated by such eminent authorities as Arthur N. Holcombe in *Our More Perfect Union* (Cambridge, Mass., 1950). A variant thesis, which argues that federal-state administrative cooperation existed in the early days of the Republic and was then replaced by strict dual federalism, has been advanced by Edward S. Corwin (inventor of the term "dual federalism") in *The Twilight of the Supreme Court* (New Haven, 1934) and in other books and by Leonard D. White in his great four-volume study of American administrative history, *The Federalists* (New York, 1948), *The Jeffersonians* (New York, 1951), *The Jacksonians* (New York, 1954) and *The Republican Era* (New York, 1958).

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of dual federalism, in 1858: "The powers of the general government, and of the state, although both exist and are exercised within the same territorial limits, are yet separate and distinct sovereignties, acting separately and independently of each other, within their respective spheres." Dual federalism as a doctrine has been expounded at various times by presidents of the United States (particularly while vetoing federal aid measures); [2] by the United States Supreme Court (particularly in opinions restricting the powers of government—federal or state—to act); [3] by spokesmen for the South (particularly when justifying slavery, segregation, or secession); [4] and by conservative business interests (particularly when seeking to avoid government regulation). The doctrine has been expounded as representing classic American federalism so long and so forcefully that it has been accepted, by students of American institutions and others, as fact.

The central hypothesis of this study is that the traditional picture of nineteenth-century American federalism is unreal, that federalism in the United States, in practice if not in theory, has traditionally been cooperative, so that virtually all the activities of government in the nineteenth century were shared activities, involving federal, state, and local governments in their planning, financing, and execution. The pattern of sharing in American federalism was established, in its essentials, in the first decades after the adoption of the Constitution. This study seeks to explain how that pattern has continued to evolve since then. Its central conclusions are that the theory of dual federalism was not viable when applied to concrete governmental problems in specific situations even in the early days of the Republic; that dual federalism when interpreted to mean demarcation of responsibilities and functions has never worked in practice; and that,

[2] See James D. Richardson (ed.), *Messages and Papers of the Presidents* (Washington, D. C., 1908), for exemplary statements by Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, James Monroe, Andrew Jackson, Franklin Pierce, James Buchanan, and Grover Cleveland, among others.

[3] See, for example, *Collector* v. *Day* (11 Wallace 113), the Slaughterhouse Cases (16 Wallace 36), *Munn* v. *Illinois* (94 U.S. 113), *Hammer* v. *Dagenhart* (247 U.S. 251), and *Ponzi* v. *Fessendan, et al.* (258 U.S. 254).

[4] The classic statement of the Southern viewpoint is that of Alexander H. Stephens, *A Constitutional View of the War Between the States* (Philadelphia, 1868).

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while the amount of governmental activity on all planes in relation to the total activity of American society (the "velocity of government") has increased, the governmental activity that existed in the nineteenth century was shared in much the same manner as governmental activity in the twentieth century. All this is true despite formal pronouncements to the contrary, made by the political leadership of the day who spoke in terms of demarcation but practiced cooperation.

THE ELEMENTS OF COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM

The roots of cooperative federalism are entwined with the roots of federalism itself. It was during the colonial period that the four elements which later coalesced to form the pattern of intergovernmental cooperation first appeared on the American scene. Among these elements were a federalist theory of government,[5] a dual governmental structure, some specific cooperative programs, and some administrative techniques for intergovernmental collaboration.[6]

These four elements of theory, structure, program, and technique can be traced through the subsequent evolution of the American governmental partnership. They were first combined under a general American government by the Second Continental Congress after the declaration of American independence in 1776. Consequently, the patterns of intergovernmental cooperation that developed informally during the Revolutionary War antedate even the Articles of Confederation. That document, the first written constitution of the United States, implicitly provided for collaboration in a manner highly reminiscent of the then recently sundered relationship between colonies and crown, as it had been viewed in American political theory and as it was embodied in the structure of colonial government institutions.

[5] For a discussion of this theory of federalism, see Carl Becker, *The Declaration of Independence* (New York, 1958), Chap. III. Part of the theoretical debate over the nature of the British Empire prior to 1776 centered on specific cases of parliamentary agents engaging in unconstitutional unilateral action within the colonies rather than conforming to the constitutional patterns of crown-colonial cooperation as they were conceived by the colonists, though the discussions were not phrased in those terms.

[6] For a discussion of land grants in the colonial period, see Mathias N. Orfield, *Federal Land Grants to the States, With Special Reference to Minnesota* (Minneapolis, 1915), Part I, 5–30.

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Even the programs requiring collaboration (defense, taxation) were much the same. With the development of a national policy of grants-in-aid based on the Western lands in the Northwest Ordinances of 1785 and 1787, the creation of the Confederation-sponsored Bank of North America in 1784, and the general reliance of the Confederation Congress on state officials to execute its actions, the colonial techniques of collaboration were also embraced by the Confederation.

It is unquestionably true that collaboration under the Articles was over-dependent on the actions of the states and often failed in practice. This was, of course, purposely changed with the adoption of the Constitution in 1789 and in the course of its translation into action during Washington's first administration. While the "intentions of the framers" are always subject to dispute, it seems safe to say that the Constitution is oriented to neither cooperative nor dual federalism per se. It provides for dual institutions, some cooperative programs, and a wide range of concurrent powers which can either be divided between the federal government and the states or shared by them in various cooperative programs. By and large, the decision of the American people has not been to separate functions by government but to maintain dual institutions which share responsibility for the implementation of specific functions. This "decision" has not been made through a prior conscious design but through a continuous series of specific decisions involving concrete programs. The continuing evolution of the theories, structures, programs, and techniques of the federalism that emerged from this process is what we today term cooperative federalism.

THE ARCHITECTS OF COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM

Just as the founding fathers did not perceive the future role of political parties in the United States, it seems that they did not plan on the development of cooperative federalism as we know it. The majority of the theoretically-oriented founding fathers either viewed the federal system as dual and separate with the states having the dominant role and the powers of the federal government confined to those objects specifically enumerated in the Constitution or as one in which the national government would have the dominant

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role while the states were to become relatively weak repositories of residual local powers.

The men who became the architects of American federalism did not view the federal system as one in which there was to be either a perpetual struggle between the federal and state governments for dominance or an irrevocable separation of their respective functions for the sake of amity between them. Avoiding the premises of legalistic thought, they did not view the two planes as rivals, but as partners in government who were to share responsibility for a wide range of activities for the mutual benefit of the nation as a whole and for its constituent states.

These architects did not leave a formally organized and recognized body of theory behind them because they wrote of their theories almost exclusively in response to specific practical problems. Nevertheless, examination of their official reports and other documents which they produced during their public careers does reveal some coherent patterns of thought on the proper nature and goals of American federalism.[7]

Foremost among the men who led the movement toward intergovernmental cooperation to meet the problems of a dynamic society were Albert Gallatin and John C. Calhoun, who pioneered the formulation and implementation of cooperative programs during the first four decades of the Republic. Aside from these two principal architects of American federalism, many people made major contributions to the development of the federal system as we know it. Other top-ranking officials in the federal executive branch, particularly in the Treasury, War, and Interior Departments, led the federal government into the field of specific cooperative activities when cooperation, as such, was not popular as a doctrine. The professionals in the federal and state govern-

[7] Some of the most important of these documents setting forth the cooperative approach are: Albert Gallatin, "Report on Roads and Canals," *American State Papers: Miscellaneous,* I, 724–921 (April 4, 1808); John C. Calhoun, "Report on Roads and Canals, Communicated to the House of Representatives, January 14, 1819," in Calhoun, *Works* (New York, 1855), V, 40–54; Calhoun, "Report on the Condition of the Military Establishment and Fortifications, Communicated to Congress by the President, December 7, 1824," *ibid.,* 141; Mahlon Dickerson, *Report on the President's Message as Respects the Distribution of the United States Surplus,* 21st Congress, 1st Session, December 1830.

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ments, who were interested in promoting specific programs for the benefit of the whole nation and its constituent parts, provided cadres for the initiation and implementation of cooperative programs in undramatic ways while the rest of the country virtually ignored them and the governments they served. The advocates of specific programs, who were not in or of government at any level but who wanted to see the development of certain public activities at all levels (or regardless of level), provided a basis for the mobilization of popular support in those cases where government did take part. Finally, much of the development of the system was stimulated by the members of the Congress of the United States and the several state legislatures who, because of their interest in the general welfare or as an outgrowth of their local concerns, supported intergovernmental cooperation in those fields of endeavor which seemed most necessary to them despite an overall theoretical disposition to limit government in general and to separate by level those few activities that were considered to be of legitimate governmental concern.

COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM BETWEEN 1789 AND 1848

American federalism has evolved over three historical periods, all bound together by the thread of intergovernmental collaboration. A strong case can be made to demonstrate that the three periods of federalism correspond to the three major periods in post-colonial American history generally. The particular characteristics of federalism in these three periods can be identified by the forms of intergovernmental collaboration that predominated in each, though in every period the other forms of cooperation existed alongside the predominant ones. The difference between the three periods is not a difference in the nature of intergovernmental cooperation but in the predominant forms by which such cooperation was effected.

The first period encompassed the formative years of the American nation and its federal system, including the Revolutionary and Federalist eras, the flourishing and subsequent decline of the Jeffersonians, and the rise of "Jacksonian Democracy." When it came to a close in the mid-eighteen-forties, the United States had fought its second war of independence, turned its back on Europe to concentrate on west-

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ward expansion, and was just completing the continental expansion of the nation's boundaries.

This was also the period in which the mercantilist orientation of the American economy which openly allotted to government a major share in the economic development of the nation persisted and finally declined, to be replaced by the laissez-faire persuasion which, at least in theory, denied government any but a minimal role.[8] In fact, the last decade of this period was marked by the fluidity and confusion characteristic of a change in eras, both in the economic and governmental realms, since the changes in the forms of federalism coincided with the changes in economic organization.

This first period contributed refined versions of the vital ideas of natural law and constitutionalism to the American mystique, as expressed in the basic documents that emerged from the Revolutionary era. As part of this set of ideas, the concepts of federalism were defined and refined as well. Dominant in this formative period were the activities of the major architects of pre-twentieth-century cooperative federalism, Gallatin near the beginning and Calhoun near the end.

The major vehicles of intergovernmental cooperation in this period were the joint stock company (in which federal, state, and local governments, as well as private parties, joined to invest in corporations established to undertake specific projects, usually in the realm of internal improvements and banking) for long-term cooperative projects, and the cooperative survey (in which the federal government would send or lend Army Engineers to the states to survey and plan internal improvement projects) coupled with the widespread use of federal technicians by the states as a means of providing federal services-in-aid to the latter. During this period the majority of the states then in the Union did not have extensive federal lands within their boundaries, so the tone of cooperation was set by programs designed for the states without public lands. Cooperation in the field of banking was the most formally structured on a nationwide basis. Internal improvement programs usually involved formal arrangements, but were almost always tailored to specific situations

[8] For a discussion of the mercantilist approach in American political economy during this period, see Curtis P. Nettels, "British Mercantilism and the Economic Development of the Thirteen Colonies," *The Journal of Economic History*, XII (1952), 105–14.

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in each state and even for each project. Federal aid to education was vital, but generally consisted of "back-door financing" through federal "reimbursement" of certain state-incurred expenditures with the implicit understanding that the funds would be used for education. The major continuing programmatic concerns of American government had already emerged during the first period. They were the extension of internal improvements, the maintenance of a sound nationwide fiscal system, the establishment of appropriate educational facilities, and, to a more limited extent, the provision of necessary public welfare aids.

In the field of internal improvements, the first period was given over, in the main, to water transportation, primarily through canals, and, to a lesser extent, to overland transportation via wagon roads. One of the best examples of federal-state collaboration in canal construction was the opening of the Dismal Swamp Canal, connecting Norfolk, Virginia, with Albemarle Sound in North Carolina. In 1816, after several abortive local attempts to construct a canal through the Great Dismal Swamp of Virginia, the State of Virginia joined the State of North Carolina, the City of Norfolk, and private investors in the creation of a joint stock company to implement a canal plan prepared by the Army Engineers in 1808 as part of a national blueprint for internal improvement.

Informal cooperation between state and federal officials was developed to advance construction. This included federal assistance in securing a supervising engineer for the state (1816), as well as a second survey by qualified federal engineers (1817). This cooperation involved the highest administrative levels of both the federal government and the state, including the President of the United States; the Secretaries of State, Treasury, and War; the diplomatic corps; government bureaus such as the Army Engineers, the governor of Virginia, his agents, and the Virginia Board of Public Works. Some of this cooperation came about through direct interlevel contracts made through the normal administrative channels. Part of it came about through the state officials' use of the services of their senators and representatives in Washington.

Ten years later, despite the company's efforts and further informal federal-state collaboration, the canal had still to be

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completed. Despite periodic state subsidies, the company still lacked the requisite funds. In 1826, the Virginians, with the active assistance of the War Department, were able to persuade Congress to invest $150,000 in the project and, in that way, to acquire 600 (out of a total of 1,240) shares in the company. Once the federal government became a partner in the enterprise, it provided the additional professional and administrative services, as well as the needed funds, for the completion of the project. Despite the oratorical denunciations of "states'-rights" Virginians, this federal "intervention" succeeded in bringing the canal to a state of readiness by 1828. For the next three decades the federal government and the State of Virginia continued their cooperative efforts to maintain and improve the canal. Though the formally cooperative aspects of the program came to an end with the coming of the Civil War, the canal is still in use as an important part of the intracoastal waterway system.

Closer examination of the details of this program reveals the three major areas of federal-state cooperation characteristic in projects of this nature: construction of the canal, maintenance and improvement of its facilities, and control over the administration of its operations. The first two areas involved both fiscal aid and the services of governmental personnel. The third involved cooperation between federal and state officials. While the federal government did not become a full partner in this enterprise until it was already under construction, once it did enter the partnership its role became a crucial and even dominant one. Yet this did not come about through the lessening of the state's power but through a coincidence of interest (often made explicit in the correspondence between state and federal officials at the time) between the state and federal governments. To ensure this coincidence of interest the state as a whole and the locality involved both had means of influencing federal policy and actions through their senators and representatives.

Administration of the canal was a joint federal-state venture. The federal executive delegated the power of proxy (to represent the federal interest in the project's administration) to the Collector of the Port of Norfolk and detailed other federal personnel to aid in the construction of the canal. The state executive, pursuant to earlier acts of the

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Legislature, provided for the State Board of Public Works to act as proxies and supervisors for the state which, through its greater direct role in the company (which was a quasi-official state agency) became primarily responsible for actual construction. Cooperative procedures were then developed by the two sets of officials involved. Construction and, later, maintenance proceeded under the direction of the company, supervised by the State Board of Public Works and utilizing federal engineers and equipment. The company reported to the state and to the federal government and the State Board also reported to the Treasury and War Departments. Company policy was decided by its board of directors dominated by the United States and the State of Virginia, whose representatives operated in concert within a community of interest. The few attempts to change company policy that were made were in every case directed against both governments by the non-governmental shareholders rather than by one against the other.

The case of the Dismal Swamp Canal is typical. By the third decade of the nineteenth century, the pattern of intergovernmental cooperation was already clear in projects such as this one, of which there were many. Changes were indeed made in subsequent years but they were changes designed to improve the mechanisms rather than to modify the basic relationships. While federal control over standards tended to grow, state control over processes grew as a counterbalance.

Collaboration under the Constitution in the fiscal field may be said to have begun with federal assumption of the states' Revolutionary War debts in 1790. During the seventeen-nineties, federal reimbursement of state debts already paid, coupled with the sale of state lands, furnished sufficient income for most of the states to maintain themselves without resorting to taxation.[9] Though the level of state governmental activities was low prior to 1816, the states began to develop a tradition of spending money with relatively little responsibility for raising revenues. This was coupled with a developing, albeit unrecognized, reliance on the federal government for funds to initiate and support the major pro-

[9] William J. Shultz and M. R. Caine, *Financial Development of the United States* (New York, 1937), 117–18.

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grams of each era. While it may be argued that the reimbursement funds "rightfully" belonged to the states in the first place, in the last analysis they came from the federal treasury and were used for projects which the states would not have been able to finance alone because of local opposition to increased taxation.

Two other major cooperative fiscal programs were established by the first Congress. The first involved the levying of a direct tax among the states, which were given quotas based on the constitutional formula and required to raise and deliver the taxes to the federal government. Direct taxes were levied in the above manner intermittently over the next century. The second program involved the inauguration of a central banking system for the United States through the chartering of the first Bank of the United States as a federal-controlled agency.

Federal involvement in the banking system is almost as old as banking as an institution in this country. When the first Bank of the United States was established in 1791, only four other banks existed in the entire United States and one of these four, the Bank of North America, had been chartered by the Confederation Congress as a quasi-national bank.[10]

In the early period, the great majority of banks were either state-owned, joint stock companies in which the state was a major shareholder, or controlled by the state through special charter provisions. The Bank of the United States, a government-controlled bank under federal auspices, served as the fiscal and banking arm of the federal government and manager of the federal deposits. In this capacity it dominated the American financial scene prior to 1800. According to Shultz and Caine, "Through its branch organization it cooperated with and to some extent controlled the newly-created state banks throughout the country." [11]

Under this first and subsequent national banking programs, a significant amount of intergovernmental cooperation developed. Some of this cooperation was formally written into law by both nation and state, while some of it evolved informally in response to obvious situations and

[10] Bray Hammond, *Banks and Politics in America, from the Revolution to the Civil War* (Princeton, 1957), 144.

[11] Shultz and Caine, 125.

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needs. The directors of the Bank, which was located in Philadelphia, did not originally intend to establish branches in other parts of the country, but pressures from stockholders in other cities soon forced them into widespread branch banking, primarily because so few banks existed outside of the Northeast. Four branches were opened in the spring of 1792 after some attempts were made to absorb the four existing state banks. This latter move was resisted by many of the same people who had previously supported creation of the national bank against those who felt it to be a threat to states' rights as well as a corrupting influence in an agrarian society. Just as they recognized the need for some centralized banking institution, they also feared too much centralization and resisted any attempts to eliminate the system of dual institutions which makes cooperative federalism possible.

The United States Bank soon began to function as a clearing house and source of capital for the various state banks, as well as serving as fiscal arm of the federal government. As such it was accepted as an asset by the more conservative banks and as an undesired threat by the more reckless and speculative ones. Hammond describes its operation in these words:

> Being the main government depository and having offices in the principal commercial cities, the Bank was the general creditor of the other banks. It had the account of the largest single transactor in the economy—the federal government—and the receipts of the government being mostly in the notes of state banks and these notes being deposited in the Bank, it could not help being their creditor. By pressing them for payment of the notes and checks received against them, the Bank automatically exercised a general restraint on the banking system. . . . This restraint upon bank lending came later to be designated central bank control of credit.[12]

Congress allowed the Bank's charter to expire in 1811, despite administration support for its renewal, as a result of the opposition generated by a coalition of extreme states'-rights conservatives and spokesmen for Eastern businessmen interested in speculation on the frontier, where less control over fiscal matters would aid their highly speculative ventures. As in the debate of 1791 and in many subsequent debates

[12] Hammond, 198–99.

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over similar subjects, the arguments this coalition used against the Bank were those of constitutionality, but the motivations were those of business. On the other hand, the new agrarians, primarily Westerners, wanted to maintain the National Bank precisely because the state banks had already proved their inability to meet what were, in essence, national needs, in particular those related to westward expansion.

The nation soon discovered how useful the central bank had been. The War of 1812 brought with it serious fiscal problems for the federal government and the states, many of which could have been avoided had a central bank been in existence. In 1816 Congress reversed itself and voted the establishment of the second Bank of the United States. The reversal was made possible by a parting of the speculator–states'-rights coalition. While the speculators continued to oppose central banking as interfering with their opportunity to manipulate the nation's fiscal affairs, a number of states'-rights advocates supported the new federal bank as an aid to the states in their struggle, often against the speculation interests, for fiscal solvency. They were led to take this position as a result of the contrast between their experiences with the intergovernmental collaboration that had developed between the states and the first Bank and their experiences with "free" banking between 1811 and 1816. Indeed, their major demand in preparing the charter for the second Bank was that its collaborative aspects be strengthened. Cooperative federalism in the banking field was already being used to develop a system in which the duty and ability of the states to take action was both stimulated and guaranteed by the federal government.

The most forceful argument for federal responsibility in monetary matters, from the constitutional point of view, came from John C. Calhoun, who had assumed Gallatin's role as leading architect of cooperative federalism in his generation. His statement, in this case as in so many others, has a most modern ring. It was Calhoun's view that when any private enterprise (in this case the financial interests) grows strong enough to exercise a power granted to the federal government under the Constitution (in this case, control over the soundness of the currency) it must be subject to regulation in the public interest. This regulation is best

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achieved by reassumption of the power by the federal government, in the interests of the public and of the states.[13]

The charter that was finally enacted made it quite clear that the second Bank was a continuation of the first. Thus it may be said that the same national banking system served the country for forty of the forty-five years between 1791 and 1836. The new charter gave the federal government the power to require the Bank to establish at least one branch in each state, under certain conditions. In addition, the bank was specifically designated as the principal depository of the United States Treasury, though the state banks, which had inherited the federal deposits after the demise of the first Bank, under a different cooperative program were allowed to keep some deposits because they were so dependent on them to stay solvent.

Even without the National Bank, cooperative relationships had developed between the U. S. Treasury and the state banks. The latter served as federal depositories and disbursing agents during periods when the National Bank did not exist and also parallel to it when it did. As long as the mercantilist view of the role of government in the economy prevailed for a majority of the nation, this cooperation continued. It was only when this view was abandoned due to changing times that the forms of cooperation created under it became inadequate.

After 1828 the operations of the U. S. Bank centered around forcing the state banks to adopt more conservative banking practices. This attempt came just as the more radical and speculative business elements were attaining political power under the Jacksonian Democracy. As a result, their cries that the Bank was strangling business expansion in the interests of a few wealthy Eastern capitalists fell on willing ears and doomed the second Bank in much the same manner as the first had been. Even so, the political struggle that led to Jackson's veto of the recharter bill in 1832 sealed the fate of the Bank more because of conflicts between persons in the political arena than for reasons of principle, and certainly did not imply a rejection of federal-state collaboration.

Beginning in 1833 the $6,500,000 in federal deposits were gradually withdrawn as the funds were spent (gradually, to

[13] Calhoun, *Works*, II, *passim*.

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prevent a sudden collapse of the nation's finances, a tribute to the role played by the Bank as the central force in the national monetary system). Newly received funds were deposited in the state banks once again, as they had been after the demise of the first Bank, where they remained until the establishment of independent federal depositories in the eighteen-forties.

The first century of the American Republic witnessed a struggle between advocates of a national banking system designed to bring some measure of national order to the fiscal scene and advocates of maximum local control over the money system. For forty years prior to the administration of Andrew Jackson, the nationalists were successful in perpetuating a centralized, cooperative, banking system. In the eighteen-thirties the tide turned and the localists were able to decentralize the system. During the Civil War, the passage of the National Banking Act of 1863 signified another turn in the direction of order through the creation of a uniform national currency and nationally applied bank standards which in themselves gave rise to a new cooperative regulatory program in which the federal and state governments shared in the regulation of the newly created national banks. Finally, the creation of the Federal Reserve System in 1913 brought both the national and local approaches together in a workable compromise.

Collaboration in the field of education in the states without public lands was less direct in the early period. Before 1837, one major means by which federal assistance for the establishment of public schools was made available was through the reimbursement process. It has already been indicated that federal assumption of the states' Revolutionary War debts and the general government's reimbursement of those debts already paid by the states provided the bulk of the states' revenues prior to the War of 1812. During that conflict, and subsequent ones through the Spanish-American War, the federal government again had to rely upon the states for a major share of the immediate financing of the nation's war effort. Whenever necessary, the states raised, equipped, and supplied their troops with the promise of federal reimbursement after the cessation of hostilities. While the War of 1812 marked the high point in the role of the

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states in financing a war effort, reimbursable state defense expenditures continued to be made for Indian conflicts, international border disputes, and even for major national wars, throughout the nineteenth century.

Federal reimbursement of war expenditures provided the states with larger amounts of revenue for use in providing domestic services than would otherwise have been possible for the states to raise through universally unpopular taxation. Furthermore, in the negotiations for reimbursement, the states' Washington agents and congressional delegations were often able to have expenditures of less than strict legitimacy included in the final accounting. This was possible because it soon became widely understood and accepted that federal reimbursement funds would be used by the states wholly or partly to finance the establishment of free public educational systems. Here, as in the case of internal improvement and fiscal organization, the problem of education was simultaneously of both local and nationwide concern and, consequently, was attacked by all planes of government. In the public land states, the federal-state-local partnership could operate through the medium of the land grant by which the federal government provided potentially handsome endowments for public education from elementary school through the university. Constitutional scruples on the part of a strong and determined minority prevented the direct, overt extension of federal aid to those states without public lands. However, since the felt need for federal assistance and stimulation in the field of education remained, the reimbursement system was seized upon to provide an acceptable alternative to formal grants-in-aid.

Thus it was that the states would file claims for reimbursement with the War Department, with the necessary substantiating documents, and then would secure congressional approval for any out-of-the-ordinary claims by letting it be understood that the funds involved would be used to promote education, often through the creation of a permanent fund that would provide annual benefits. In some states, such as Virginia, the interest on the invested reimbursement funds provided the state's sole contribution to public education for decades. Even in New England they were influential and important, particularly in stimulating the states to

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enforce their own compulsory school laws which were often ignored when left entirely to the local communities.

In 1837, the United States Treasury surplus was distributed among the states by a formula based on each state's population. While the strict constructionists prevented formal earmarking, a provision was inserted in the act of Congress making the distribution a loan and providing for recall of the funds should the federal government deem it advisable (that is, if the funds were used by the states for purposes other than the two implicit options of education or internal improvement). Though the Panic of 1837 ended the surplus distribution in less than a year, and the one attempt to revive it in 1841 also failed in a year's time, the amount of funds accruing to the more populous Eastern states did much to offset the national imbalance that resulted from federal grant-in-land assistance to the Western states. Furthermore, by federal and state law as well as through local custom, the surplus distribution monies, like the proceeds of the land grants (and, in most cases, the reimbursements), were placed in earmarked permanent investment funds whose incomes were used for the support of education year after year. In a majority of the states, these permanent funds have remained in existence, albeit with the original federal funds diluted by other increments. During the nineteenth century they became administrative devices which stretched the impact of federal aid to education over the years, renewed its impact annually, and gave the states a lever by which to gain control over school systems and educational endeavors in order to raise educational standards.

While social welfare programs were fewer in the early period, significant advances in that field were also made through federal-state-local collaboration. A few examples will suffice. Government support for education for the handicapped had its origins in the Hartford Asylum for the Deaf and Dumb founded in 1817 under private, church-supported, auspices and transformed into a public institution in 1819 through a federal land grant and cooperative arrangements with the six New England states. The successful federal-state partnership in this pilot project stimulated the creation of schools for the deaf and dumb in other sections of the nation. The drive for better treatment for the insane led to

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the development of state insane asylums in the mid-nineteenth century, many of which were initially constructed through the use of federal land grants, reimbursement funds, or the surplus distribution. Veterans of the nation's wars were awarded lands, the pre-Civil War equivalent of pensions, through federal-state cooperative projects. Less formally, a network of marine hospitals for the nation's seamen was constructed and maintained along the sea coasts and inland waterways by joint federal-state action. Each of these early welfare programs involved not only a sharing of fiscal responsibility, but the development of routinized administrative collaboration to bring the programs to fruition. It was this routinized administrative collaboration which set the tone and the pace for cooperative federalism in the period.

COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM BETWEEN 1848 AND 1913

The landmark that comes closest to marking the end of the formative period and the beginning of the second era in American federalism was the Mexican War. After the war the questions of manifest destiny, commercial expansion, and political democracy that had provided the impetus for government activities during the first period gave way to concern over slavery, industrialization, and the settlement of the newly acquired Far West, opening up a new set of problems for government.

While the great land grant programs which dominated the second period were created during the formative period, and even antedated the other forms of cooperation, they were almost entirely confined to the public land states, which did not become major factors on the American political scene until the Age of Jackson and did not begin to set the national pace until the middle of the nineteenth century. The second period can be considered to begin from the time when land grant programs became the predominant form of intergovernmental cooperation, that is, when their impact on government became greater than any other form of cooperative federalism and other forms of cooperation began to be measured in relation to the level of collaboration in the public land states. The transition from the formative period began during the Jackson administration, with the demise of

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the U. S. Bank, the greatest of all the joint stock companies, and the distribution of the surplus revenue in 1837 which was partly designed to balance the land grants to the Western states. By mid-century, the states admitted to the Union after ratification of the Constitution outnumbered the original thirteen. Though not all of the former were public land states, the majority shared in the problems of the West. They provided the support necessary for the establishment of the land grant as a major means of implementing national policy. The Land Grant College Act of 1862 marks the triumph of this policy, in that it was applied without distinction to all the states, east and west.

The second period lasted for the remainder of the nineteenth century. During this period the patterns of American democracy evolved after 1775 were subjected to their greatest domestic tests. In the political realm, there was the challenge of classical states'-rights, secession, disunion, and reconstruction. In the economic realm the complex of radical individualist and anti-government doctrines known as laissez-faire was the order of the day. The slavery issue and its outgrowth, segregation of the Negroes, tore at the fabric of American democratic ideals. Politically, this was the Republican era. The Democratic party, in power as the nation's majority party at mid-century, was already declining. During the first decade of the second period, the Republican party wooed and won more or less of a majority of the voters who turned to it as the best vehicle available to respond to the era's major issues. Though challenged by Populists from its own ranks and by a Democracy led by the resurgent South, the Republican party managed to maintain its position throughout the period.

Between 1848 and 1913 the hope of the American people lay in the West as never before or since. The West, whatever it may have been in reality, became the shining haven of the American dream. It was this period that added the refined idea of the frontier to the American mystique and, in reality, it was in the West that cooperative federalism flourished and matured. The great land grant programs set the tone for intergovernmental cooperation in the older states because of their expansion in the new ones. Uniformly structured land grants for internal improvements and

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education dominated the stage, supplemented by various types of federal subsidies, new cooperative developments in the regulatory field, and by an increasing amount of informal cooperation among professionals on all levels of government. Through the land grant the impact of the federal government was felt in almost every field of activity throughout the West and in most of the East.

During the second period, as in the first, problems of internal improvement, fiscal organization, education, and public welfare were the dominant continuing concerns of government on all planes. However, during this period, there was a paradoxical intensification of support for the theory of dual federalism simultaneous with a sharpening of the structures and techniques of cooperative federalism and an expansion of collaborative programs into new fields.

The actual transfer of federal lands to the states under the terms of a grant-in-land was begun in 1802, with Ohio's achievement of statehood. Under the terms of the Northwest Ordinance of 1785, Ohio received a grant of one section of land per township, designed to go directly for the establishment and support of public schools. This school grant was subsequently extended, with some modifications, to every new public land state. Experience soon demonstrated that the purposes of the grant would be better achieved if it were administered by the states rather than by local government and if a minimum price for the lands were established in the federal grant. The grant was also expanded to include up to four sections per township by the end of the century. Later conditions imposed by Congress included the requirement that any lands sold be disposed of at advertised public sales only.

This first land grant program contained within it the seeds of many of the principles and procedures that were evolved in later federal grants-in-aid, both land and cash. The grant was a general one, applicable to all states carved out of the public domain as a matter of course, though, because it was applied to new states only as they were organized, specific legislation was necessary to apply the grant in each case. The amount of the grant was set down in the general law and was uniform for all the states organized while the general law was in effect. Finally, the grant was

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not a gift. It came with specific conditions attached, including an obligation on the part of the state to create township or state-administered permanent trust funds based on the proceeds of the sale or leasing of the granted lands to be used exclusively for the promotion of public elementary education and an obligation on the part of the federal government to provide indemnity lands where the designated school sections were otherwise pre-empted. It is true that the conditions attached to this first grant were rudimentary; however, these rudimentary conditions were expanded and tightened as experience proved necessary.

Ohio also received the first land grants for higher education and for internal improvements. As the first state to be carved out of the federal public domain, it was the testing ground for many of the early land grant programs. Yet Ohio was only the first of the thirty public land states to receive grants-in-land for programs falling within the scope of all four continuing concerns of government. Of the other twenty states, all, with the possible exception of Hawaii, have received land grants for programs in two or more categories. It would not be amiss to say that virtually every major governmental function in the public land states benefited from federal land grants directly or indirectly. The grants directly stimulated, financed, or helped to finance vital governmental operations. Indirectly, the pervasiveness of the public domain, and the need for its proper disposition to enable a state to grow, served to involve the state government either formally or informally through the political process in all federal land activities that took place within its boundaries. In this manner the public domain came to serve as the integrating factor in the development of cooperative action between the federal government and the states.

Federal land distribution programs fell into three basic categories. First was the system of land grants made by the federal government to the various states to aid them in developing education, internal improvement, and welfare programs. Over the years grants were made to the states for elementary education, higher education, general internal improvements, land reclamation, river and harbor improvements, public buildings, public institutions, and veterans' benefits. These grants were designed to make basic contri-

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butions to the growth of vital public services in the various states in a manner closely resembling the monetary grants-in-aid of the twentieth century.

There was also a system of federal land grants for education and internal improvements made through the states to private companies, primarily for roads, canals, and railroads, but also for academies and colleges. Under such arrangements, the states became the implementing agencies for the federal government administering the distribution and proper use of the grants.

Finally there were the federal programs designed to dispose of the public domain without formally including the states. These programs in the main consisted of the various homestead, mineral, and tree culture acts; grants to certain Western railroads primarily situated outside of state boundaries at the time of the grants; and some townsite and local improvement grants that generally were made to embryonic towns prior to statehood. Even those programs did not function outside of the sphere of federal-state cooperation, since the states either developed concurrent "matching" programs of their own which were then coordinated with the federal grants or were able to gain a say in the formulation and execution of the federal programs through their influence in Congress.

The real import of cooperative federalism in the second period can best be understood when the full impact of federal-aided programs in a single state is assessed as a unified whole. Minnesota is a case-in-point. Federal land grant programs encompassed almost every field of governmental activity in Minnesota. There were grant programs for education (common school, university, agricultural, and mechanical college grants); internal improvements (general internal improvements, railroad construction, river and harbor improvements, and public buildings grants); welfare (salt spring and public institutions grants); reclamation (swamp and overflowed land grants); and conservation (Itasca State Park grant). In addition, funds from the unearmarked federal land grants were instrumental in the founding and maintenance of almost every public institution in the state.

Though few cash grants were in existence, Minnesota did receive money for internal improvements (from the Five Per

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Cent Fund); [14] welfare (grants for the support of the Minnesota Soldiers Home); defense (militia grants); and education (the Hatch Act and the second Morrill Act). Goods and materials were granted to the state for programs in science (weights and measures, specimens from U. S. scientific expeditions); agriculture and conservation (seed distributions, fish stocking); education and welfare (distribution and exchange of documents for libraries, schools, and public institutions). Cooperative activities involving coordination of services included the fields of education (exchange of information); science (meteorological reports, geological surveys); law enforcement (cooperation in hunting law violators, jailing of federal offenders); conservation (protection of forests); land settlement (homestead and tree culture programs); and agriculture (cooperation in grasshopper eradication, exchange of experiment station research reports, exchange of information).

The financial impact of these programs on the State of Minnesota was generally greater than that of the mid-twentieth-century grants-in-aid. In the latter third of the nineteenth century, a greater portion of the state's revenues came from federal sources than in any subsequent period. At times, revenues from federal sources, including direct federal payments to the state and income from federal grants, represented over forty per cent of the total annual revenue of Minnesota, and after 1865, never fell below twenty per cent.[15] The analogous percentage in 1959 was 25.3, actually somewhat lower than the apparent annual average in the late nineteenth century.

In the nineteenth, as in the twentieth century, federal aid stimulated matching state contributions. In some cases there were formal matching requirements attached to the federal grants. For example, the first Morrill Act required the states to appropriate funds for construction of buildings for their agricultural colleges in order to retain the principal of the federal grant intact for the support of actual instructional

[14] The Five Per Cent Fund was an annual federal grant of five per cent of the proceeds from the sale of federal lands within the state to the state for internal improvements. This grant was originated in 1802.

[15] The percentage of income from federal sources between 1865 and 1900 at selected intervals was: 1866, 37.6; 1875, 38.0; 1880, 38.6; 1885, 41.8; 1890, 22.2; 1895, 30.6; 1900, 30.6.

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activities. In this way, federal-originated funds involved state funds in the development of joint collaborative programs. Between 1862 and 1900, identifiable cooperative programs claimed an apparent average of fifty per cent of the state's total expenditure, excluding amounts spent by the state in informal collaborative arrangements and for the general expenses of executives, such as the governor, who were directly and continuously involved *ex officio* in the administration of cooperative programs.[16]

The impact of federal aid was state-wide and federal funds penetrated into every county. The state's major activities were clearly dependent on federal aid. Minnesota's military establishment, important in defending the state's settlers against marauding Indians, relied heavily on federal funds. State and local internal improvements were almost entirely federal-supported. Minnesota's railroads were almost entirely the products of formal federal-state collaboration and even the Northern Pacific Railroad, recipient of a direct federal land grant that ostensibly by-passed the state, was brought into the sharing arrangement in several ways.

At the instigation of the territorial legislature, Minnesota's major roads were constructed by the Army Engineers even prior to statehood and were then transferred to state control, while the federal Five Per Cent Fund furnished most of the money for county roads and bridges before the advent of the automobile. In 1875, for example, the Five Per Cent Fund paid for twenty-seven internal improvement projects in twenty counties. Ten years later, the annual distribution of the Fund was used for fifty-one projects in thirty-eight counties. At the same time, the land grant endowed internal improvement permanent fund was also being used for local roads, bridges, and like improvements.

Minnesota's school system benefited greatly from the semi-annual subsidy distributed from the earnings of the common school land grant. In 1866 schools in forty-two counties with a total enrollment of 50,564 met the state educational requirements and received grants from the permanent school fund. Subsequently, schools in every county in the state

[16] The percentage of total state "matching" expenditures between 1862 and 1900 at selected intervals was: 1862, 47.6; 1866, 49.1; 1875, 44.7; 1880, 52.4; 1885, 51.3; 1890, 50.1; 1895, 44.3; 1900, 48.3.

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shared in the annual distributions from the funds. By 1895, some 276,000 students were benefiting from the federal grant. In addition, the Permanent School Fund was used as a revolving fund to provide capital loans for the construction of elementary and high school buildings in every school district and town in the state. In 1895, loans totaling $224,906 were made to 249 school districts in seventy-two counties. The State University's operating costs were almost entirely borne by the earnings of the University land grants and direct federal appropriations, including the budgets of the Agriculture Experiment Station and the State Geological Survey. A major proportion of the operating costs of the Minnesota Soldiers' Home also came from direct federal matching grants. Intermittent but vital aid was also given to the state normal schools and public institutions from the various permanent funds and land grants.

Perhaps the major cooperative effort in nineteenth-century Minnesota, as in all the public land states created after 1816, revolved around the construction of railroads, designed to open up the interior of the state for settlement and to connect the state with the outside world. Between 1857, when the first federal grants were made, and 1907, when the last link in the state's internal railroad network was completed, supervision of the railroad land grants was a major activity of the state government, one which involved almost daily contacts with the appropriate federal officials and departments. On the basis of federal and state legislative authorizations, federal and state administrators shared responsibility for approving the railroads' construction plans; supervising the selection of railroad lands along the federally prescribed rights-of-way; securing federal patents for the selected lands; transferring the lands to the railroads as they met the conditions laid down in the federal and state legislation; harmonizing the interests of the railroads and beneficiaries of other land grant programs when they came into conflict; and supervising the relinquishment and replacement of improperly transferred lands. In each case, the Commissioner of the General Land Office and his deputies in Washington and in the field were required to oversee the actions of the governor and his agents to insure compliance with the conditions set down in the land grant legislation by Congress.

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All six major railroads operating in present day Minnesota were beneficiaries of federal-state land grants, receiving, all told, 11,173,920 acres valued at approximately $48,812,000. Even the Northern Pacific Railway, which received 1,905,897 acres in Minnesota from a direct federal land grant, was the recipient of 2,167,918 acres through the federal-state program as it absorbed smaller land grant railroads. In addition, the federal grants were matched with bonds valued at $5,875,000 issued by the state and its local governments. Some idea of the magnitude of the cooperative railroad construction program may be gathered from the percentage of the state's total revenue paid by the railroads in taxes between 1875 (over ten per cent) and 1900 (over fifteen per cent).[17]

The types of cooperative activities and the means of their administration in Minnesota were familiar in the other states as well. All the land grant programs except those designed to aid in the reclamation of arid lands were in operation. Direct federal aids to individuals and groups were subject to state influences much as elsewhere. Cooperative exchanges of goods and services in Minnesota were recognizable as parts of the national pattern. So were the paraphernalia of administration—in land grant matters an *ex officio* State Land Board and its agents; the General Land Office and its local land officers; local school and county officials. Indeed, it seems that very few federal and state offices in Minnesota were not involved in the cooperative programs.

Since the scope of cooperative programs and the administration of sharing were no different from the standard nationwide pattern, it is reasonable to project the Minnesota pattern of fiscal sharing onto other states as well. This does not mean that all states benefited equally from federal financial support. As in the twentieth-century grant-in-aid programs, federal aid provided a proportionately larger share of the budgets of the smaller states, the newer states, and the poorer states, though the differences between states may actually have been less pronounced than in the twentieth

[17] The land grant railroads' share of the state's total revenue for selected years between 1875 and 1900 was:

	1875	*1880*	*1885*	*1890*	*1895*	*1900*
Total state revenue (thousands)	$981	$1,417	$2,078	$3,296	$5,427	$6,903
Land grant railroad tax (thousands)	107	209	673	621	729	1,106

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century because of greater state reluctance in the nineteenth century to finance local programs with tax money obtained locally.

The central fact that emerges from an analysis of the development of sharing in a single state over several decades is the sheer weight of political time devoted to intergovernmental cooperation. Not only were the administrators heavily involved in cooperative activities, but the programs that were most highly developed as shared programs also preempted the bulk of the policy-makers' time. Minnesota governors and legislatures together were preoccupied with the cooperative programs throughout this entire period. The already enumerated programs should indicate why this was so, since no aspect of internal improvements, education, or general disposition of the public domain in the state escaped involvement in the sharing process. Furthermore, even defense against the Indians and the recruitment of an army for the defense of the Union during the Civil War became shared functions. By the end of the second decade of statehood, the regulatory functions of government were also being shared, partly because the fields of regulation were tied to already cooperative programs (as in the case of railroad regulation) and partly because it was simply more convenient to cooperate (as in the case of regulating state and federal-chartered banking institutions). A survey of the governors' messages, the legislative journals, the statute books, and the attorney generals' opinions reveals the extent of this concern with programs that were cooperative in character, a concern not over the general theory of collaboration but over the procedural aspects of the various programs. Federal-state cooperation was a fact of life, hence the policy-makers rarely referred to it directly in their deliberations. The system of sharing is all the more impressive because of its implicit acceptance as part of the process of government.

COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM SINCE 1913

The last major land grant program was inaugurated in 1894. Selection of lands under the land grant acts has persisted through the mid-twentieth century and the extension of the traditional grants to Alaska upon its admission as a state in 1958 has revived the land grant era in one state.

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Nevertheless, since 1913 the cash grant, coupled with the rising impact of cooperation among professionals at all levels of government, has become the dominant form of intergovernmental cooperation. The modern cash grants had their origins in the later years of the land grant period. They rose to predominance with the adoption of the specific programs embodied in Woodrow Wilson's New Freedom and were notably extended with the rise of the New Deal. The third period of American federalism does not fall under the purview of this study. Beginning in 1913, it is generally considered to be the era of cooperative federalism. In this period, formally structured grant-in-aid programs of internal improvement have had to share the center of the stage with the "new federalism" of welfare. The less visible areas of intergovernmental collaboration expanded apace. As government has become more pervasive, so has intergovernmental cooperation, to the point where the twentieth century has been labeled the century of cooperative federalism, while the intergovernmental cooperation of the nineteenth century has faded into obscurity.

THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

As long as the land frontier lasted, the public domain served as the greatest single source of national wealth, the foundation of the American economy. Even the development of major industries of the nineteenth century, agricultural implements, railroads and telegraphs, machines for processing the produce of the land, and the like, was directly tied to the development of the public domain. It is not surprising, then, that the land, owned, as most of it was, by the federal government, should have served as the foundation for intergovernmental cooperation in the expanding nation.

The public land states differed from their non-public land counterparts in the nature of their cooperative relationships with the federal government only insofar as the existence of the public domain within their boundaries made it less difficult to justify major cooperative programs under the strict constructionist terms then dominant in constitutional interpretation. Certainly the states without public lands were at no time excluded from the operations of cooperative fed-

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eralism. Considering only formal grants-in-aid, it is possible that the public land states did receive more benefits than the others, and so it was argued on the floors of Congress when the states possessing no public lands wanted to gain additional benefits from the federal government for themselves. Yet, when the benefits derived from the other forms of intergovernmental cooperation and direct federal aid to localities are included, the balance seems to have been rather adequately redressed and the amount of cooperation generally equalized. To take but one example, the protective tariff was unquestionably a great aid to Eastern manufacturing interests, often to the detriment of the West and the South. It was as much a subsidy as a government defense contract is in 1964, and was so considered by both its proponents and opponents.[18] The Eastern railroad companies coupled benefits gained from the protective tariff (or exemptions from the tariff, as was sometimes the case) with federal mail subsidies (whose cooperative impacts were great, particularly in those Eastern states, north and south, which participated in the construction of their railroads as owners or investors, during the era of railroad building) and more direct state and local subsidies to construct the network of railroads east of the Great Lakes. They began to take advantage of these benefits even before the major railroad land grants were made and continued to do so subsequently as well.

Frederick Jackson Turner, in stating his renowned frontier hypothesis, made a major point of the influence of the West, the states carved out of the public domain, in the development of nationalism and governmental centralization. He maintained that the growth of the federal government was greatly fostered by the demands of the Western settlers and their early experiences with federal officials, who preceded state governments in almost every new territory.[19] Turner's point is generally valid, but it is considerably more accurate to say that not only did westward expansion increase central government activity in Washington, but that it did so primarily by increasing intergovernmental coopera-

[18] For a discussion of this aspect of the protective tariff, by one of the men who best understood its nature, see Charles Wiltse, *John C. Calhoun* (New York, 1944, 1949), Vols. I and II.

[19] Frederick Jackson Turner, *The Frontier in American History* (New York, 1920).

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tion, formal and informal, thus also increasing the central governmental activities of the states. The public domain served as a vehicle for the development of the role of the federal government in promoting national expansion while at the same time providing a means for the states and localities to share in this task. The pattern of relationships that emerged from the cooperative manipulation of the public domain was carried over into the twentieth-century cooperative programs. It was the prior existence of this pattern that made it possible to integrate the increased velocity of government into the federal-state framework without major alterations in the operation of the federal system.

Indeed, the newer states developed a tradition of intergovernmental cooperation that antedated their admission to the Union. If the federal government did not always precede the first settlers into new territory, it almost invariably preceded the state government. From this arrangement emerged an implicit conception of the rightness of the role of the federal government as a major participant in the development of new territories and new frontiers. This conception was carried over within each state after statehood was achieved and, ultimately, became dominant in a majority of the states in the Union. The movements to attain statehood reflected the impact of the land grant and the general tradition of intergovernmental cooperation upon the newly settled territories of the West. On one hand they were certainly attempts to gain more power for local self-government. Even more important, the desire for statehood was linked to the perceived greater ability of states than territories to gain more benefits from Washington. In almost all cases, land grants were not available until statehood was achieved. Lack of voting power in the national elections and full representation in the Congress meant that a territory would be dependent on favors from Washington over which its citizens had only a minimum of influence and control. Statehood came to mean the right to participate in national policy formation as much as the right to manage one's local affairs.

CONTROL OVER THE GRANT PROGRAMS

The organization of control over the grant programs was

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another matter that tended to obscure the nature of the cooperative relationships in the nineteenth century. The evolution of formal federal controls did not signify changes in the fundamental policy of congressional supervision of the programs, but did indicate that the Congress and the states represented in it learned from experience. The principle of federal control existed from the days of the earliest grants. At first it was assumed that mere incorporation of certain principles into the state constitutions in order to secure congressional approval prior to achieving statehood would be sufficient to ensure compliance with the spirit of the program in question. To some extent, this method was successful and has continued to be so. If for no other reason than the continued increase in the scope of government activity, this method came to be too cumbersome. As it was seen that more specific controls were necessary, they were added by the representatives of the very states that would receive the grants. In addition, as administrative complexities increased and new methods of enforcement outside the courts had to be found, they too were added, not as changes in policy but as improvements in method.

The question still arises as to the degree of enforcement of these provisions. There is no doubt that grants were not often revoked, or lands often withheld, though enough cases of revocation and withholding lands can be found to indicate that federal control could be carried to its ultimate implications in this manner. The absence of large-scale revocation programs is due less to the failure of the federal government to enforce the terms administratively than to the political power of the states in the halls of Congress. This is no less true in 1964 than in 1864. Students of government have noted that since the rise of the great cash grant programs following the New Deal, little money has been withheld from any of the states for maladministration or violation of the terms of the program in question. Attempts have been initiated by the federal executive to withhold funds from individual states for a number of reasons. In almost every case these attempts have been overruled in the Congress or suitable compromises have been negotiated with congressional help. When state violations of federal regulations do occur, they are dealt with in less drastic ways

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because the Congress will not often allow the drastic solution and the federal bureaucrats know this.

Only once in American history was massive revocation of federal grants because of misuse even considered. Between 1870 and 1900 the question of revoking some of the unfulfilled transportation land grants became a matter of some political importance. Congressional investigations into the uses of land grants by railroad companies were widespread during this period. Ultimately, federal-state land grants to eight railroad companies were revoked in whole or in part and steps were taken to withhold lands from the great transcontinental railroads as well.[20]

While other federal grants to the states were not often revoked, specific lands within the different land programs were frequently withheld by the federal government. Not infrequently, the states were even forced to re-cede lands already patented to them because of conflicts with other federal grant programs or land policies. As the available public domain diminished and the number of land grant programs increased, the amount of control and intensity of supervision grew also, leading to greater exercises of federal authority, subject always to the formal and informal limitations attached by Congress. Ultimately these controls were transferred, modified, and expanded to provide adequate supervision for cash grants-in-aid as they began to emerge.

COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM: THE ALTERNATE HYPOTHESIS

Cooperative, or collaborative, federalism can be defined as the sharing of responsibilities for given functions by the federal and state governments. In this sense it is conceived to be the opposite of dual federalism which implies a division of functions between governments as well as a division of governmental structures. While the theory of cooperative federalism assumes a division of structures, it also implies a system of sharing that ranges from formal federal-state agreements covering specific programs to informal contacts on a regular basis for the sake of sharing information and experience.

Even during the nineteenth century, when the ethos of

[20] Federal Coordinator of Transportation, *Public Aids to Transportation* (Washington, D. C., U.S. Gov't. Printing Office, 1938), Vol. II, Part I, Sect. A.

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the times called forth a theory of dualism that was based on a functional demarcation between governments, the actual exigencies of the operation of the system of necessity demanded cooperation. Consequently, federal-state cooperation was developed in a wide variety of cases. Though it was usually opposed in theory, it persevered in many forms and under different guises. Its procedures were refined through trial and error, often subtly since it was, in the main, unrecognized. Officially recognized or not, a system of intergovernmental collaboration was evolved to serve the dual purpose of maintaining the federal balance while providing needed governmental services. Where cooperation did not develop and should have, both the system and the programs in question suffered. In a sense, a substantial share of the history of American government has been the search for methods to provide for the necessary collaboration of the various parts of the federal system while at the same time preserving and strengthening those parts as separate bases for such collaboration. Much of what historians have mistaken for rejection of intergovernmental cooperation in the nineteenth century was, in reality, the rejection of certain methods of interaction as failing to meet one or both of these criteria.

On the basis of this evidence, it would seem necessary to develop a new theory to explain the nature of the American federal system and its character over time, a theory which takes into account the continuous existence of an amount of intergovernmental collaboration equal to, and in fact greater than, the amount of separation (as traditionally defined) in the federal system. Within the large area of concurrent powers provided, explicitly or implicitly, by the federal constitution, the federal and state governments have been able either to divide responsibility among their separate jurisdictions, with each responsible only for its own share of the divided responsibility ("dual federalism"), or to divide the works of government cooperatively, sharing responsibility in specific programs, with all units directed toward common goals that extend along the entire chain of concurrent powers ("cooperative federalism") and generally overflow into the ostensibly "exclusive" preserves.

The actual division of responsibility under the concur-

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rent powers is primarily determined anew for each case through the political process, rather than through legal decisions. That is, the decisions as to the distribution of the areas of concurrent powers are made either on the political level or by constitutional interpretations based on political realities. Such decisions are recognized in constitutional law either after a political decision has been made or as a result of a constitutional interpretation that, sooner or later, must follow the polls.

In understanding our federal system, there is a basic conflict between simple rationalities and the logic of political experience. Simple rationalities demand a federal structure with a clear-cut division of powers that can easily be measured, while political experience, dealing with reality, demands a concurrent approach to problem solving. While the conflict between rhetoric and practice has to a certain degree obscured the image of federalism, the result has nevertheless been the development of that complex mechanism of intergovernmental relations, characteristic of the American federal-state-local partnership, known today as cooperative federalism.

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REVIEWS

United Europe: Challenge and Opportunity. By WALTER HALLSTEIN. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1962.—x, 109 pp. $2.75.

The United States and the Common Market: A Background Study. By DON D. HUMPHREY. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1962.—xvi, 176 pp. $4.50.

These two slim books belong at the head of any reading list on European economic integration and U.S. policy. The economics and diplomacy have changed in the months since their publication; deGaulle has rewritten many of the rules. But events have not undermined the economic logic of the Common Market nor made its original aim less dramatic or desirable. Nor have those events altered the basic economic problems posed for the United States.

Walter Hallstein, president of the EEC Commission, deals with the economic logic and ultimate political objectives of European unification. His book comprises three Clayton lectures delivered at the Fletcher School in April 1962. The book is addressed to Americans, but deserves a wide audience on both sides of the Atlantic, especially at this juncture in the short history of the European movement.

Hallstein's first lecture traces Europe's progress toward economic union since the Second World War. It mentions the chief steps and missteps, and binds them together by seeking to show that Europe has learned from its past errors. Those who do not know this history will find this chapter a superb introduction. Those who do will still find it a valuable commentary. Hallstein's remarks on the powers of the several European Commissions (pp. 20–22) are particularly interesting. He denies that the Rome Treaty was a step backward in the development of supranational bodies. The limitations on the powers of the EEC Commission, as contrasted with those of the ECSC High Authority, reflect the more dramatic and ambitious aims of the EEC. The EEC Commission, over which Hallstein presides, could not be given executive powers, for the Rome Treaty did not lay down precise rules governing the operations of the EEC, leaving them to subsequent negotiation.

Hallstein's second chapter deals with the economics of European integration. He restates the traditional case for a customs union (but without the many qualifications economists think

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necessary), then argues that a customs union must lead to full economic integration if it is to succeed. Unfortunately, he is wedded to the obscure terminology of the European bureaucracy; the argument bogs down in distinctions between "harmonization," "coordination," and "cooperation." It also mixes two distinct issues—the case for economic union as an aid to free trade and the quite different case for union as conferring separate benefits.

Finally, Hallstein makes a forceful case for political integration and offers an interesting European view of Atlantic partnership. But recent events challenge the premises of this chapter. Hallstein reviews the first round of negotiations between the EEC and Great Britain—the abortive British effort to create a free trade association including the Common Market. He argues that the Common Market was right to reject the British proposals, listing half a dozen liberal reasons. Looking back at the second round of negotiations, however, one wonders if these were the real reasons. With benefit of hindsight, the first round now appears as a tragic overture to the January drama.

Don Humphrey's book looks at Europe from this side of the Atlantic. It was written as a preface to the American trade debate of 1962. Humphrey reviews the implications of European integration for the American economy, then surveys United States commercial policy under the old Trade Agreements Acts. His second task takes much more space; there is, in fact, very little on the Common Market after the first twenty pages. Some of the discussion, moreover, tends to technicalities and detail, while other parts are rather superficial.

Humphrey's chapters on tariff reduction, trade expansion, and adjustment to import competition are superb summaries of complex problems; this will not surprise anyone familiar with his earlier treatise, *American Imports,* which is still the definitive work. The chapter on agricultural policy (contributed by William B. Kelly, Jr.) is equally good; it is, indeed, the layman's best brief guide. But sandwiched between these excellent chapters is a long discussion of "neglected" issues that is too complex for the layman and too elliptical for the specialist. And the chapter on the balance of payments commits a different sin—being much too simple. Thus, Humphrey attributes the recent short-term capital outflow to interest-rate differences (p. 101), without ever warning his reader that this conclusion is subject to bitter dispute.

Yet Humphrey makes a vital contribution. There has been a great deal of research on tariff policy during the last five years or so; Salant, Vaccara, Krause, Balassa, and others have

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begun to give us a firm factual basis for statements about the tariff and related issues. Humphrey summarizes much of their work and some of his own, then brings all of it to bear on the big policy problems.

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Politics and World Oil Economics. By J. E. HARTSHORN. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1962.—364 pp. $8.50.

Not long ago, a popular magazine describing the oil industry in Texas compared it with a game of chance. The reader of this book would most likely agree with the reviewer that this term is also quite appropriate in describing the activity of the international oil industry. The players of the game consist, first, of the seven international major oil companies; second, the governments of oil-exporting countries; third, the governments of major importing countries; and fourth, the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom. In addition to these major players there are some players of lesser stature, as well as some outsiders who are not participating directly in the game. These outsiders are countries which have their own nationalized oil industries and are involved only in very few commercial transactions with the other players. However, one of the outsiders, namely the Soviet Union, is important enough in terms of its resources to be a major player but has chosen to remain outside.

A game must have a set of rules and the first part of the book is devoted to the description of these basic rules. The author assumes that it is proper and fitting that economic factors of the oil industry should provide the rationale on which to base these rules. However, it soon becomes apparent that the "normal" rules of the game, that is, the competitive rules so much in favor with most economists, cannot be applied without difficulty in this case. First of all, some factors, such as cost of production, the value of assets, exploration expenditures to be capitalized, are not easily ascertainable and the competitive game is therefore under a severe handicap. Second, most of the players are not really interested in playing the game according to competitive rules and use their powers to influence the outcome of the game in their favor. Third, the players have sufficient freedom of action to adjust their own conduct to the opponents' strategy. Actual rules of the game thus resemble an oligopolistic situation subject to regulations by the governments mentioned above.

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Despite some minor errors in this part of the book, the author manages to give a lucid account of competitive struggle. The chapters on pricing ought to be especially enlightening to the reader uninitiated in the mysteries of the oil industry. The remainder of the book gives an account of the actions and strategies employed by the individual players in advancing their own interests. Most of the governments are of the opinion that the oil business is too important to be left to the oil companies. Since oil is a natural resource with a relatively low ratio of underground reserves to current production, it is felt that oil should be carefully conserved. All oil-producing countries have adopted some sort of oil conservation laws which make certain that this valuable natural resource is not wasted. At the same time, the governments have discovered that oil is a commodity which is especially suitable to taxation. Substantial quantities of oil are shipped from country to country and enter the jurisdiction of various governments which have the powers of taxation. Therefore, one is not surprised to find that the taxes imposed on oil are numerous and complicated. Nevertheless, the oil industry has received many tax concessions, principally to encourage the exploration for oil.

All this makes for very complex relationships between the various participants in the international oil game. The major companies, with their headquarters in the United Kingdom and the United States, produce most of their oil outside their own countries, refine and sell this oil in still other countries. Many facets of their operations have to be settled in negotiations with all the governments concerned. In summary, the complexities of the oil industry must make it an accountant's nightmare and a lawyer's delight. A reader who would like to learn the rudiments of the international oil game can very profitably read this book.

ALGIMANTAS PETRENAS

NEW YORK CITY

The Nature and Limits of Political Science. By MAURICE COWLING. New York and Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1963.—vii, 213 pp. $4.75.

Social Science and Political Theory. By W. G. RUNCIMAN. New York and Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1963. —vii, 200 pp. $3.95.

Two slender volumes concerning the proper role of political philosophy come to us from Cambridge political philosophers.

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They have little else in common. The reviewer found Mr. Runciman's volume wise and helpful, while Mr. Cowling's rather bitter essay was less congenial to his taste.

In *Social Science and Political Theory,* Mr. Runciman deals (but not exclusively) with the subject matter of the American debate between political "scientists" and political "philosophers," without becoming embroiled in it. He takes a position and defends it, but he avoids extreme statements and succeeds admirably in showing how scientist and philosopher stand in need of each other.

In the introductory chapter on the nature of social science, Mr. Runciman points out that political sociology (which he equates with political science) can indeed be scientific, that it is not necessarily more scientific when it is most quantitative (*pace* Darwin), but that it is limited (as well as aided) by the notorious fact that its subjects are self-conscious and willing beings, who may alter their conduct as a result of the scientists' efforts at understanding. Both "internal" comprehension and "external" confirmation are required for the establishment of its propositions; and the resulting science must confine itself to diagnosis and not aspire to prediction.

Runciman's theme about the mutual need of political sociology and political theory is interestingly and instructively developed in successive chapters on Marx and Weber, on the theorists of the elites (Mosca, Pareto, Michels, and Sorel), on the students of voting behavior, on "Methods, Models, and Theories" (ranging from a discussion of functionalism as the only conscious alternative to Marxism to a brief account of the values and limitations of game theory and correlation technique), and on "Class, Status, and Political Conflict." The final chapter of this series of essays (originally lectures) takes issue with Weber's belief that the political philosopher's role of making recommendations based upon certain value premises is hopelessly arbitrary. He argues persuasively that analysis and discussion can advance agreement, relying in part upon "those principles without which social life would not be possible at all" (p. 169). Both political science and political philosophy suffer from an irremediable tentativeness; they are and must remain interminable rather than definitive; but their accomplishments can be substantial, especially if they collaborate.

Mr. Cowling's essay is more difficult to characterize. One may gain some idea of its nature by imagining a cross between the works of the late T. D. Weldon and those of Eric Voegelin. Unlike Mr. Runciman, he is certain that an absolute morality exists; and, also like his fellow Cantabrigian, he thinks it no part

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of the proper work of a political philosopher to try to find out what it is. Political studies should confine themselves to explanation, abjuring all hint of policy recommendation. (It might be added that he scarcely bothers to hide his own anti-liberal prejudices.) Explanation of current events and contemporary institutions is a hopeless and dangerous enterprise. Too much is unknown, especially about the motivations and intentions of the major actors upon the political scene. It is impossible, he declares, for us to know what were Lord Woolton's electoral tactics in 1950 or 1951, and in the absence of such knowledge no *academic* purpose is served by "continuing the sort of study in which Mr. Butler, and others, are engaged" (p. 23). With dubious consistency, he later declares that those who managed the Conservative party between 1945 and 1950 thought that their great outpouring of propaganda was essential to electoral victory (p. 80). It would be tiresome here to elaborate the variety of techniques by which it is possible, today, to gain considerable knowledge about what goes on in the higher political councils, as anyone familiar, for instance, with Stephen Bailey's *Congress Makes a Law* knows; but no more tiresome, it may be added, than are the hundred pages Cowling devotes to showing up the confusions and fallacies of over a score of contemporary British (except for Duncan MacRae) students of politics and political philosophy, from Bernard Crick and Sir Ivor Jennings to Benn and Peters and Cowling's own mentor (whose influence on him is nonetheless quite marked), Michael Oakeshott.

J. ROLAND PENNOCK

SWARTHMORE COLLEGE

The Geography of Intellect. By NATHANIEL WEYL and STEFAN T. POSSONY. Chicago, Henry Regnery, 1963.—xiii, 299 pp. $7.95.

The subject of this compilation is human inequality, how it is distributed and caused, its role in the rise and fall of civilizations, and what if anything is to be done about it. The chief claim made is that the major differences in intellectual ability are genetically determined. Races adapted to cold and temperate climates have adequate mental endowments, those adapted to the tropics are inadequate. The way to advance civilization is by way of intellectual elites, which although aided by amelioration of living conditions and of opportunity are nevertheless largely genetically determined. To increase the proportion of such individuals it will not be sufficient to sterilize the mentally inferior;

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more positive eugenic measures must be adopted, including artificial insemination with the sperm of men of genius.

All of this has a familiar sound; much of it has been heard before from Galton, Ellsworth Huntington, Gobineau, in C. D. Darlington's *Facts of Life,* and most recently from modern eugenicists like H. J. Muller and Julian Huxley. The arguments for eugenics have been restated and brought up to date by a general sweep of the literature of history, anthropology, sociology, social psychology, and biology. Since the material cited derives largely from the work of other authors, there is obviously a wide latitude for selection. In the opinion of this reviewer there has been, in the sections which he is competent to judge, undue and uncritical reliance on authors whose conclusions are questionable and in dispute. Thus in Chapter II, "The emergence and significance of race," and elsewhere in the book a chief authority cited is the recent book of Carleton S. Coon, *The Story of Man.* Coon's claim that the races of man became differentiated before the species *Homo sapiens* appeared shows a profound misunderstanding of the genetical mechanisms involved, as Dobzhansky pointed out. Anthropologists and biologists may be stimulated to test the truth of some of Coon's ideas, but until this is done they should not be used uncritically as the basis for social and political argument, as occurs both in this book and in other recent works purporting to provide a scientific justification for policies of racial segregation. In a similar way the opinions on race of Robert Gayre are cited from a private letter, and much use is made of material published in *Mankind Quarterly* edited by Gayre and representing the radical right on race questions to such a degree that it can hardly serve as an objective or scientific source.

There are other evidences of lack of respect for sources, and of carelessness. The relation claimed between month of birth and probability of hospitalization is cited from the Miami *Herald,* and there are references to individuals whose identity cannot be revealed. It will surely surprise biologists that *August* de Vries discovered mutation, and that Thomas Hunt Morgan, who was born in the year in which Mendel's paper was published, discovered the gene.

As is characteristic of the general method of the authors, one study of national intelligence is cited, that of the Scottish Council for Research in Education. This showed that contrary to predictions, the intelligence scores of Scottish eleven-year-old school children not only did not decline between 1932 and 1947 but actually rose. The serious students who have examined these

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data have in general considered that the causes of this improvement are not clear, and that both genetic and non-genetic factors may be involved. But the scholars who are interested in analyzing the facts (Maxwell, Penrose, Anastasi, among others) are not mentioned. Instead there appears a statement which could not possibly be derived from or supported by the facts cited: "The progressive intellectual impoverishment of nations because of excessive reproduction by the dull, and deficient reproduction by the bright is not merely a British problem but one that concerns the Western world as a whole" (p. 169). To me this means that the authors are intent on special pleading and not in critical evaluation of evidence.

Not all of the book is citation, however. One section contains original contributions by Mr. Weyl, originally published in *Mankind Quarterly,* on "Ethnic and National Characteristics of the U. S. Elite," "Dynamics of the American Elite," and "Class Origins of Surnames and Achievement." These were based on statistical study of the frequency of common surnames as they appear in "leadership rosters" and on the social security rolls. The ratio of these gives an "index of leadership." Conclusions are that in the United States Jews excel Protestants, and Protestants, Catholics; Negroes are far behind (as identified by such names as Washington, Howard, Davis, Jefferson, Jackson, and Johnson), as of course are Puerto Ricans and Italians; while English names of clerical origin (Clark, Clarke, and Palmer) "constitute a group which is consistently and markedly superior to the English average in all leadership areas studied. This superiority suggests that a process of eugenic mating on the part of the scholarly and clerical element has occurred over the seven or eight centuries during which surnames were the rule in the English-speaking world." Of course it suggests a lot of other hypotheses as well to biologists who realize that in general only the Y-chromosome accompanies the father's name in descent, with to be sure some of his money, social status, and reputation. The mechanism of heredity in outbreeding animals such as man tends to distribute in new combinations rather than to preserve the arrangement of the genetic elements. But as in the case of most of their explanations, the authors do not suggest alternatives, let alone evaluate them.

In spite of many blemishes and the confusions which arise from eagerness to generalize from evidence which by its nature cannot be decisive, there is still something to be learned from the literature survey. The discussion of the Jews as a continuous cultural and intellectual community is interesting and well documented.

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Because of its maintenance by sanctions against outmarriage, Jewry is more likely than other Western groups to constitute a biological community, although it would be difficult to separate the parts played in its achievement by genetic endowment and by tradition. Evidences of Jewish superiority cited throughout the book remove it of course from the category of anti-Semitic tract, but it adopts a racist attitude in dealing with African and Islamic peoples. There is a suggestion of pro-Semitism in the explanation offered for the intellectual superiority of the Egyptian Copts—they began as converted Jews. But this is another conjecture introduced by the statement that "a quick glance at Egypt at the time of Christ" will make clear the origin of the Copts.

I think this reveals an essential trouble with this book. In fields attempting to relate biological with social or political phenomena, even long hard looks run risks of increasing confusion; how much more so with a "quick glance" technique.

L. C. DUNN

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The Tolerant Populists: Kansas Populism and Nativism. By WALTER T. K. NUGENT. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1963.—x, 256 pp. $6.00.

Populism and other agrarian movements have long been favorite subjects for doctoral dissertations and seminar papers and so much has been published concerning them that it might be thought they no longer offered opportunity for further investigation. Then came three eastern historians, at Columbia, Harvard, and Princeton, who, in their re-examinations of the America of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries thought they found certain anti-Semitic, xenophobic, and even proto-fascistic views in Populism which, carried over into the twentieth century, found their rebirth in McCarthyism. The Hofstadter-Handlin-Goldman theme was not based on intensive investigation in freshly discovered or previously used sources, but was more the result of the application of social psychological concepts and borrowings from social scientists.

Reverence for the great masters of a discipline, which once insured Turner and Beard freedom from effective attack on their major interpretations until after their death, no longer exists. Instead, today, young scholars are ready to examine every idea, every line, every footnote of their elders with the most meticulous and devastating criticism, and are prompt to rush into print with

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their findings. And a good thing this is, particularly as regards the revisionist interpretation of Populism. It does not stand up well under the sustained attack of three able young historians like Martin Ridge, Norman Pollack, and Walter T. K. Nugent. All three of these scholars have made substantial contributions to an understanding of the role of the Populist; all three find no justification for attributing anti-Semitism to these agrarians.

In his *Tolerant Populists* Walter Nugent shows himself to be familiar with modern social psychology and the aids it may provide the historian, but he is not led to stray from the path of the methodical historian who follows out every possible lead, searches for information in most out of the way places as well as in the obvious, and weighs his evidence with the greatest of care. He is most concerned to judge the accuracy of the charge that the Populists were anti-Semitic and anti-alien. Census data and examination of 183 Kansas newspapers together with use of numerous master's and doctoral dissertations have enabled him to dig deeply into political motivation and the voting of ethnic groups constituting the foreign population of Kansas. He finds that these ethnic groups were drawn to the Populist party for social and economic as well as political reasons and that the party and its leaders were friendly to them and repudiated attacks upon aliens by the APA and other groups that favored exclusion from America of the newer immigrants. Despite mention of Shylocks and slurring references to August Belmont and the House of Rothschild in the populist literature, Nugent finds evidence to disprove the notion that the Populists were anti-Semitic. In fact, the anti-alienism, anti-Semitism, xenophobic nationalism is shown to be centered in the Republican party.

Nugent is bothered by the Populist attack upon British capitalists who were engrossing great tracts of land in the seventies and eighties in Kansas and other western states because he fears it may improperly be regarded as evidence of Anglophobia. Many discerning people who were not Populists were worried about the growth of landlordism and the rapid increase in tenant operated farms. They felt this development was a measure of the malfunctioning of the economic system, which was making farm ownership unattainable for many. Nugent is aware that much of the attack was directed against William Scully who owned more tenant operated farms in the United States than any other person, but he does not bring out clearly enough that the feeling against British landlords existed not because they were alien but because Scully, the chief of them, was charged with introducing a system of rack-renting that was un-American and led to the development of rural slums. More intensive investiga-

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tion of newspapers of Marion and Marshall Counties, Kansas, and of the *Chicago Tribune* would have shown that Populists, Democrats, and Republicans were in agreement in denouncing the Scully system of tenure with its more than 1,100 tenants, its use of crop liens, its poor housing, its insistence that tenants should pay all taxes, its cash rent, and the harshness with which the tenants who did not satisfy the landlord were treated.

Nugent's examination of Populism follows clearly established lines of treatment. Its greatest value lies in his demolition of the charge that Populists, at least those in Kansas, were anti-Semitic, anti-alien, and xenophobic.

PAUL W. GATES

CORNELL UNIVERSITY

Political Parties in a New Nation: The American Experience, 1776–1809. By WILLIAM NISBET CHAMBERS. New York, Oxford University Press, 1963.—231 pp. $4.50.

Americans in the early days of the Republic were confident that their unfolding democracy would be both spur and model for redemption of the whole world. To this end, the signs and portents were at least mildly encouraging until Versailles and the new authoritarians modelled us into tough guardians of the *status quo*. In turn, men oppressed by the bleakness of apparently endless conflict have begun to spin off new strands of cautious optimism. Pluralism and modernization are "in" these days, offering a soft, smothery garb in which America can hopefully re-enter the world of change and hope. The American past is being stripped of harshness, dogma, and uniqueness and then dressed again in looser-fitting clothes, ones that can cover other naked bodies and be more easily copied by unskilled hands.

The present book is of this genre. Professor William Nisbet Chambers writes in his foreword:

> This essay tells the story of the genesis of the first modern political parties in the United States as the first modern nation. . . . It is addressed not only to American readers . . . but also to men of democratic aspirations in nations that are new today. . . . With this in mind it undertakes to compare various aspects of the American development with the experience of contemporary emerging nations. . . . Our first national parties represented the conflicting forces of pluralism in American politics, while at the same time they worked to harness them.

A different stamp is superimposed upon this same book: that of an exercise in applied political science. The masters' theories (Weber and Key lead the way) are affectionately fitted to

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the actors and events of the early national period. A diagram or two authoritatively link primary and secondary interactions. Cadres and actives spring up in the land. Effective choices are offered to the voters. Four-point definitions of political parties are devised to detect the emergence from the state of faction politics—an inferior state. Brokerage is performed or not performed, and pay-offs are rendered or withheld.

Because schema and models have been traditionally frowned upon in his profession, the historian must be forgiven a blink or two upon seeing some of his favorite minor politicians transformed into cadremen or actives (though he asks no mercy when Alexander Hamilton is made to fall on "the dreary New Jersey flats"). What is solid and rewarding here is the insistent focus upon political parties as institutions, as centers of organization, and as vehicles for getting society's business done. The historian has become too leery of such talk, and this reviewer would underscore with approval Professor Chambers' strong dissent from the view that "economic development and perhaps social progress are sufficient to establish national well-being and stability." Indeed, one might go further to say that economic and social change are most often directly contingent upon effective political organization. Puerto Rico is almost a classic example of this observation.

These matters, however, are of the realm of faith and morals. What new direction does Professor Chambers point us toward in ordering the materials for party growth in the seventeen-nineties? The answer has to be: "Very few." He relies, apparently entirely (there is no documentation), upon historical monographs and articles and a few printed letter collections and diaries. The product is modern eclectic. Yes, there were interest group conflicts; yes, there were at least the rudiments of competing ideologies, but they were not very serious and the liberal ethos, *à la* Louis Hartz, kept everything under control. Elitists and "true" democrats, merchants and artisans, commercial farmers and little farmers are made to fit together in different combinations to suit immediate needs. The result is not entirely persuasive, but the historians are more to blame than Professor Chambers.

SHAW LIVERMORE JR.

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

The Progressives and the Slums: Tenement House Reform in New York City, 1890–1917. By ROY LUBOVE. Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1962.—xviii, 284 pp. $6.00.

Roy Lubove, historian with the Harvard-M.I.T. Joint Center

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for Urban Studies, has given social scientists, policy-makers, and citizens alike an excellent study in *The Progressives and the Slums.* This prologue to the present deals with the critical period from 1890 to 1917 when the power of local government was called upon to regulate the development of our cities. The author describes the incubation of this reform movement beginning with the 1834 report by the New York City Health Officer of "intemperance, and the crowded and filthy" living conditions and the efforts of such public-spirited groups as the Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor.

The place was New York, a city notorious for its tenements and all the social ills associated with its deliberately built slums, and also a city that served as an advanced model for efforts to deal with the problems of urban development and redevelopment. The principal actors are the housing reformers in the Progressive era. The slums captured the attention of many, including public health officers, settlement and social workers, religious leaders, journalists, planners, and philanthropists.

This story has been told and retold many times, notably by James Ford in his two-volume study, *Slums and Housing.* Professor Lubove, however, gives new meaning to the tale as he analyzes the behavior, thoughts, and underlying values of the major participants of this period. Dealing with a city characterized by "physical proximity and social distance, divided by class, race and nationality," the reformer felt that the social and political stability of the entire community was threatened. Some reformers considered the slums the result of sin and bad character, while others argued environmental determinism by which the slums caused the sin and bad character of their inhabitants.

The reformers approached the slum in many ways and proposed as many solutions to its problems. They fought vigorously for sanitary conditions as well as minimal housing standards, and they won. They advanced the concepts of neighborhood consciousness, city planning and zoning, the garden city, and decongestion of the dense areas in New York. Lubove credits Progressive housing reform with: (1) the ideal of neighborhood reconstruction identified with Jacob Riis and the social settlement, (2) Lawrence Veiller's emphasis upon effective restrictive legislation on housing standards, and (3) affiliation with the early planning movement.

Common to the efforts of all reformers is the proposition that housing reform can be used as a technique for social control. It is the exploration of this proposition that makes Lubove's book so valuable for students of contemporary efforts to solve the problems of the slums, the low-income families, and the renewal of

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our urban centers. The Progressives set the stage for much of our current effort. Lubove has set forth brilliantly the systems of beliefs they held. We must continue to probe this most important basis for action.

BERT E. SWANSON

SARAH LAWRENCE COLLEGE

Socialized Medicine in England and Wales: The National Health Service, 1948–1961. By ALMONT LINDSEY. Chapel Hill, No. Carolina, The University of North Carolina Press, 1962.—xii, 561 pp. $8.50.

Professor Lindsey's book is far and away the best study of the first thirteen years of the British Health Service that has yet appeared. It is a careful and scholarly account of the operation of the program, based upon a field visit and an exhaustive study of the voluminous reports of official and unofficial working parties, investigating committees, Royal Commissions, and special studies by foundations, professional associations, and other bodies which have poured forth in Britain since 1946. He has also drawn heavily on Hansard and the professional and public press. Indeed, the first reaction of even the technical reader is likely to be amazement at the extent of self-study and investigation into every aspect of the Health Service and not the least valuable of Dr. Lindsey's contributions are the bibiliography and footnotes.

This reviewer concurs in the judgment of *The Lancet,* one of Britain's leading medical journals, that Dr. Lindsey has written a book that "will be an outstanding work of reference" on the National Health Service, but would add that, unlike many reference works, it is far from dull. For the story that emerges is an exciting one and it is told in a lively manner. If Dr. Lindsey concludes by giving the Service very high marks, his account of what has been happening amply justifies his rating. It is evident that since the Service went into effect in 1948 the British have been engaged in nothing less than the transformation of a nineteenth-century health service into one more appropriate to the twentieth century. And this venture has intensively involved not merely civil servants and legislators, but also the medical and related professions and the lay public who, through their membership of hospital boards, executive councils, and other bodies have played so vital a role in policy and administration.

The first part of Dr. Lindsey's study which covers the situation in England and Wales before 1946 and the controversies, notably between the medical profession and the government between

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1946 and 1948, is perhaps the least satisfactory in that he does not always explain the many sharp changes in the position of the medical profession. Nor does he seem to give sufficient weight to the wartime experience which, as is clear from Titmuss' *Problems of Public Policy,* to which, surprisingly, no reference is made, paved the way for drastic change and made nationalization of the hospitals almost inevitable. The body of the book takes up every branch of the Health Service, presenting an admirable account of each and showing what the situation was in 1948 and what has or has not been achieved. The chapters dealing with General Medical Practice and the Hospital Service are particularly illuminating, revealing as they do the intricate character of the many problems that have to be faced by a government which accepts responsibility for assuring adequate health services to all the population.

Like Dr. Eckstein, in his *English Health Service,* but in more detail, Professor Lindsey stresses the fact that the new Service inherited a system that was badly in need of modernization. He documents the deplorable state of all too many hospitals, the geographical maldistribution of general practitioners and specialists, the lowly economic, social, and professional status of the general practitioners, the inadequacy of numbers and the shocking working conditions of the nursing profession, the backward state of the mental health services, and the uneven development of the preventive and other services under the control of the local authorities. In each of these areas great progress has been made in the first thirteen years, although, as Dr. Lindsey points out, much remains to be done, notably in regard to the Hospital Service and the coordination of the three major branches into which the Service is administratively divided (the Hospital Service, general practice—including dentistry—and the preventive and domiciliary services administered by the local authorities).

It is, indeed, the special merit of Dr. Lindsey's account that he distinguishes clearly between those inadequacies or shortcomings which were inherited from the past and which will take many years (and considerable expenditures) to remedy, those which are due to the new arrangements adopted in the 1946 Act (such as the tripartite administrative organization or the arrangements for the remuneration of various categories of professional personnel) and those which are inherent in any medical service, however organized and financed (such as the rising costs of medical care, the problem of over-use of supplies or facilities, or the perennial question of the rights and responsibilities of a profession vis-à-vis the rest of society).

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For the longer run, it may well appear that the greatest achievement of the Health Service will prove to be not so much the removal of the financial barrier to receipt of adequate medical care, as its embodiment of the principle enunciated in the 1944 White Paper on *A National Health Service,* namely, that there should be some one authority responsible for seeing that adequate medical care is available to the entire population. In the United States, there is nobody to complain to, or hold responsible for, the inadequacy of medical facilities or personnel in certain geographical or functional areas, for the long waiting periods in clinics or offices of private physicians, for the lack of continuity of care and the "splitting up of the patient" among a variety of specialists, technicians and agencies, for noise or dreary diets in hospitals, for costly uneconomic management of hospitals, for the high cost of drugs or the lack of preventive care. In Great Britain, thanks to the National Health Service, the Minister of Health can be held responsible and all these problems become visible and matters of public policy.

EVELINE M. BURNS

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The Canadian General Election of 1957. By JOHN MEISEL. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1962.—xiv, 313 pp. $6.50.

John Meisel has written the first book-length account of a Canadian general election, employing the Nuffield College surveys of the last five British elections as his model. Like the authors of those useful volumes, he has eschewed broad interpretation and confined himself rigorously to a straightforward descriptive summary of the course of the campaign, the most widely discussed issues, the nature of the party organizations, the characteristics of the candidates, and, finally, the electoral outcome itself. His statistics on the breakdown of the party vote by provinces and on variations in turnout and margins of victory are of a fairly standard nature for election studies, but such information has never before been assembled so carefully and conscientiously for a Canadian general election.

Data on the social correlates of voting—economic, ethnic, religious, and rural-urban—are only scantily presented and most of the author's observations on the political sociology, as distinct from the ecology, of the election are elementary or impressionistic. This is hardly Professor Meisel's fault, however, for sample survey studies of the Canadian voter going beyond regular Gal-

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lup polls on party preference are virtually non-existent. Nor, in contrast to the authors of the Nuffield studies, was Professor Meisel able to draw on detailed case studies of the campaign in particular constituencies, forcing him to rely on newspaper accounts in order to capture the flavor of local battles.

Professor Meisel's book is likely to contain few surprises for journalists and scholars who followed the 1957 campaign and offered interpretations of the outcome based on the bare official election returns. But this was scarcely his intention. As he indicates in the preface, his aim was the modest one of providing a record of contemporary history and of presenting in detail the profile of a particular election that would permit comparison with similar studies of future elections which he hopes will be undertaken. Perhaps he is overly sanguine on the latter score, for he is virtually alone among Canadian political scientists and sociologists in devoting himself to this kind of patient, unglamorous research on election statistics and party organization. And—as he hardly could have anticipated when he commenced the present study—there have been no less than three more general elections since 1957, differing markedly in their outcomes and in the underlying group cleavages they suggest.

Yet, as Professor Meisel observes, the 1957 election is of special interest in that the close defeat of the Liberals after their twenty-two-year tenure in office marked the end of an era. Although the Liberals were returned to office in 1963 after enduring the Conservative landslide victory of 1958 and the hairline Conservative win of 1962, even a cursory survey of the 1963 returns suggests a pattern of regional and provincial party allegiances sharply different from that of 1957. Reading Professor Meisel's analysis of the 1957 results six years and three elections after the event, the magnitude of the changes in the Canadian electorate that have taken place since is starkly apparent. Let us hope that in the future others will join Professor Meisel in careful analysis of these changes.

DENNIS H. WRONG

NEW SCHOOL FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH

The French Radical Party: From Herriot to Mendès-France. By FRANCIS DE TARR. New York, Oxford University Press, 1961.—xx, 264 pp. $5.60.

The publisher's claim that this is "a well-informed, well written and thoughtful book" is justified, as also is the author's statement that its scope is limited and the problems it deals with

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vast. Mr. de Tarr's aim is to study the state of mind, or more accurately the states of mind, that have been and are characteristic of the Radical party, and to look at the men and their ideas in the light of their roles in French political life during the fourteen-year period from 1944 to 1958.

Limited though this scope is, a study of the evolution of Radicalism during these years is certainly needed and could be very useful. Mr. de Tarr has given us, however, a less interesting and less useful study than the reader is entitled to expect. To begin with, the sub-title, "From Herriot to Mendès-France," is misleading. By 1944, M. Herriot's great period in the Radical party was over. The thirty pages devoted to him as "the symbol of Radicalism" are, therefore, too many or too few. There is far too much biographical detail, of little relevance to Herriot's role in politics, and far too little on the events of the period, including M. Herriot's part in them. Yet a study of Radicalism in its period of disintegration and decline—which is what this book is—needs some introduction showing us what it has declined from. Mr. de Tarr does give us several introductory chapters—four, including the "Author's Introduction." One is devoted to the general concepts of Radicalism, one to the concepts of traditional Radicalism, and one to M. Herriot's career. The author thus concentrates on ideas, which he illustrates, it is true, from events. But we get no clear idea of the sequence of events.

The trouble is that Mr. de Tarr is not really sure what audience he is writing for, and so has produced a book too detailed for the general public, yet too superficial for an informed public. Since he is concentrating on men and ideas, he gives us a great deal of quotation, much of it from conference oratory, a number of anecdotes—some funny, some revealing, others too often no more than the *"petite histoire"* to which French journalistic sources are addicted—and also long accounts of party and personal negotiations. To students of French politics, for whom this is presumably intended, there is little or nothing new, but to the general reader, who will appreciate much of the narrative and the anecdotes, the method of presentation will cause a good deal of confusion. Mr. de Tarr classifies Radical ideas as forming six tendencies, which he analyzes in turn. He has ingeniously arranged them in what looks superficially like chronological sequence. But as he himself points out, there is often no hard and fast distinction between the tendencies. And, what is more important, since they often coexist, the reader has no opportunity of following the evolution of the Radical party over time, and watching it split again and again into three or more tendencies with practically every vote in Parliament. The

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final impression is of ideas looked at to some extent *in vacuo*, and so inevitably oversimplified. Yet when Mr. de Tarr does relate the quarrels to events, these are seen from too close up—that is, mainly from the angle of the particular tendency that he is analyzing. The light that ought to be thrown on Radicalism disintegrates into isolated beams.

In spite of these weaknesses, there is ample evidence that much hard work has gone into this book, and it would be a pity for Mr. de Tarr not to give us a more comprehensive study of Radicalism. What is needed is to do for English-speaking readers what the late M. Jacques Kayser, one of France's most distinguished Radicals, had begun to do for France, but was unable to complete. If Mr. de Tarr does go on from this point to look at Radicalism in the context in which it was most at ease and most influential, namely, that of the Third Republic, it is to be hoped that he will include, along with a study of the events in which Radicals played an essential part, some analysis of the party's structures, and also of its regional and local activities.

DOROTHY PICKLES

LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS
AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

Le chancelier fédéral dans le régime constitutionnel de la République fédérale d'Allemagne. By JEAN AMPHOUX. Paris, Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1962.—561 pp. 60 NF.

During the past fourteen years the office of the Federal Chancellor has been the *pièce de résistance* of the German federal establishment. Both interpretations of constitutional law and analysis of political developments necessarily center around his office. Jean Amphoux's book, therefore, covers a vast territory; yet, it does so in a thorough, erudite, and circumspect fashion. His analysis of the constitutional texts uses all the available sources from the remarks of the members of the Parliamentary Council and the ample writings of the constitutional and administrative lawyers to the decisions of the various constitutional courts. But, he knows that most of these questions are of a political nature and must be discussed in the light of the prevailing political situation and the likely political consequences of the respective interpretations.

He proceeds from the discussion of the Weimar antecedents to the exegesis of the nomination and appointment modalities

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and the legal position of the chancellor. The second and largest part of the book deals with the central position of the chancellor within the executive establishment. Of particular interest are the author's opinions on the relations between president and chancellor. In view of the personalities of the previous and present incumbent in the office of the presidency, no major clash has so far darkened the serene horizons of the Bonn establishment. But, with a change in the occupants of both jobs the interpretation of the mechanisms may become more important. Amphoux rightly notes that the Basic Law, written with the nefarious Weimar practices in mind—at least facilitated by what the author calls "la théorie organiciste de la double représentation populaire"—wanted to establish the primordial position of the chancellor. Invested by the confidence of the parliament, the decision in regard to appointments should be concentrated with him. Interpretations to the contrary, though logically possible, scarcely fit into the scheme of the Basic Law.

The third part deals with the relations between chancellor, majority and opposition parties, parliament at large, the complicated ways of withdrawing confidence, relations with the Federal Council, and with a subject which—again an echo of Weimar days—has recently become the object of bitter and persistent, though presently purely theoretical and anticipatory fights: the federal government's attempt to enlarge the so far strictly limited form of emergency legislation by constitutionalizing the possibility of a veritable emergency regime.

In the chancellor's relation with parliament there is one important and far-reaching novelty, the prerequisites for a vote of non-confidence, the so-called "konstruktive Misstrauensvotum" of Article 67. The author stresses rightly its limited effectiveness for stabilizing a governmental structure against the onslaught of a hostile majority. In one way or another a chancellor who has lost majority support but who, in the absence of a new majority, cannot be constitutionally overthrown plays about the same role as his Weimar predecessor presiding over a government simply expediting the current affairs. He might hang on, though with diminished authority. The many inconveniences of a "klebende" chancellor are convincingly analyzed by the author. The 1962–63 experience has also demonstrated that the safeguards against instability of Article 67 may be skillfully exploited by a "klebende" chancellor for magnifying his own party's difficulties in the timely choice of a successor.

To what extent is the strong position of the chancellor connected with the decline of parliament, thus, so to speak, pulling the rug out from under the parliamentary regime which the

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Basic Law has so earnestly striven to establish? To what extent do we face possibly parallel but independent developments? To what extent does personalization, inevitable companion of mass democracy, enter the picture? Excellent in most other respects, the book does not extend its analysis to such problems and probably pays too little attention to the changes which, in recent years, have resulted in the petering out of political opposition. But aside from some question of interpretations and, on a much lower level, the author's battle with the intricacies of German spelling and first names, he offers a welcome systematic guide through a host of usages and problems of the German federal establishment.

OTTO KIRCHHEIMER

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

A History of the Weimar Republic. Volume I: From the Collapse of the Empire to Hindenburg's Election. By ERICH EYCK. Tranlated by Harlan P. Hanson and Robert G. L. Waite. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1962.—xii, 373 pp. $10.00.

The prospective reader of this volume should be warned at the outset not to expect too much from it, for this is a history of the Weimar Republic only in the narrowest of senses. One will not find in it, for instance, the careful description of social forces that distinguishes Karl Bracher's account of the dissolution of the Republican regime. It does not include any very systematic investigation of wealth and poverty, industrial development and change, the evolution of trade unionism and the conflicts within it, the economics of the inflation and the passive resistance, and other important matters of that nature. Mr. Eyck has provided no extended discussion of religious tendencies in this period, or of education, the youth movement or varieties of *Voelkisch* thought. Finally, although this was, intellectually, one of the liveliest periods in German history, and one in which German cultural movements had repercussions all over the world, there is nothing about expressionism, or the *neue Sachlichkeit,* or the German film. This is a book about the domestic and foreign politics of the Weimar Republic, and an old-fashioned one at that, and there is nothing in it to justify the publishers' claim that it is "a European classic."

Within its limitations, this is an intelligent and readable introduction to the politics of the Republic. The gifts that Mr. Eyck displayed in his Bismarck biography and his book on the reign of William II—his ability to clarify and dramatize compli-

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cated political situations without undue simplification, his skill in bringing historical figures to life, his fairness to persons whose political philosophy was in sharp contrast to his own democratic liberalism, and his willingness to admit the faults of those he admires—are all in evidence here. Among many admirable decriptive passages are his accounts of the meetings of the National Assembly, of the inquiry into the causes of the collapse of the empire (during which Hindenburg launched the stab-in-the-back legend), of the muddled Kapp Putsch, and of the murder of Walther Rathenau and the Reichstag debate that followed it. Among shrewd appraisals of Weimar politicians, those of Hugo Preuss, Josef Wirth, and Karl Helfferich are particularly noteworthy, and the eloquent tribute to Fritz Ebert that closes this volume may help correct the Western view of this generally under-appreciated figure.

In this first volume, Mr. Eyck does not commit himself explicitly to any general explanation of the eventual collapse of the Republic. One senses, however, that he leans toward Theodor Eschenburg's view that this was an improvised democracy that was doomed to defeat because the German people were not experienced enough in politics to support it. He cites with obvious approval words uttered during the constitutional assembly by Hugo Preuss, who said he could not avoid seeing "how foreign a parliamentary system seems even to the most enlightened Germans. . . . Germans cannot shake off their old political timidity and their deference to the authoritarian state."

The translation is based on the revised edition of the German text, and it faithfully reflects the grace and flexibility of Mr. Eyck's style.

GORDON A. CRAIG

STANFORD UNIVERSITY

The Fall of the Dynasties: The Collapse of the Old Order, 1905–1922. By EDMOND TAYLOR. Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday & Company, 1963.—x, 421 pp. $6.50.

The reader need not be a great scholar who will be startled to learn that the French, in 1830, got rid of King Charles V (p. 83), or that Poincaré *followed* Millerand in the presidency of the Third Republic (p. 192). Also, that the Galatea bridge graces Constantinople; that the 1914 German Chancellor was Bethmann-Hollíveg; and that Count Witts operated in Russia. The font used by the printer was apparently innocent of umlaut, and accents are used, misused, or not used in seemingly capricious fashion. The kindest explanation is appallingly careless proof-

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reading. But there are also loose statements that arouse suspicion. Why the Franco-Russian alliance should have been "unholy collusion" (p. 375) is not clear, and to assimilate the inherited tradition of nineteenth-century diplomacy with that of the *comedia* [*sic*] *dell'arte,* so that "making a deal with a potential enemy behind the backs of one's friends or allies had an almost irresistible attraction" (p. 37) is little more than cheap flippancy.

These shortcomings are all the more regrettable, for they detract from a book which, if it neither is nor pretends to be a work of serious scholarship, is nonetheless generally sound and attractively done. It is important to realize that less than half a century ago, not only was monarchy the predominant and normal form of government in Europe, but that in many cases much of the divine right attribute still clung to that institution. This was the case in the four countries in which the war resulted in the demise of ancient dynasties. The factor of defeat in war was no doubt crucial, but kings had been defeated before without the structure of the state being altered. Had it not been for this impact of defeat, what in the twentieth cenury were superseded political forms might have survived in adaptation. Before 1914 Germany was after all in some respects a more progressive state than some more democratic ones, and modernity had begun to make an appreciable dent in Russia; the multi-national state that was the Dual Monarchy contained the possibility of an alternative to the extremes of self-determination, and even the sleepy Turk had given signs of stirring.

But defeat broke the dam through which the nineteenth-century mainstream irresistibly poured; democracy and nationalism were the forms through which the mass sought to come into its own. After depicting the nature of the four states under consideration during the decade before 1914, Taylor describes the stresses to which the war subjected them, stresses that in each case produced extensive revolution. Thus the war is rightly seen as the great break with the past that it was: the magnitude of change was so large that to devise a peace that would absorb it was impossible, and the process had to be continued through a second, physically more destructive and broader, conflict.

RENÉ ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ

BARNARD COLLEGE

India and Pakistan: A Political Analysis. By HUGH TINKER. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1962.—228 pp. $4.50; paperback, $1.75.

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The Evolution of India and Pakistan, 1858–1947. Edited by C. H. PHILIPS with the cooperation of H. L. Singh and B. N. Pandy. London, Oxford University Press, 1962.—xxi, 786 pp. $14.40.

Hugh Tinker's *India and Pakistan: A Political Analysis* provides a good factual analysis of political organization and the politics of language and caste which satisfactorily intertwines political relationships and attitudes. In addition, the book provides unusually good coverage of the military and public services in both India and Pakistan. Tinker stresses the important role played by the civilian bureaucracy, the army, and especially the judiciary in preserving order and maintaining a measure of national unity. He is less optimistic about the functioning of representative institutions in India and, like others who have written on this subject, he alternates between expressions of hope and phrases of caution. It is particularly refreshing, however, to see an Englishman observe that caste and ethnic loyalties need not be destructive of political democracy, and that the British-created administrative structure in the two countries "is better organized to conserve existing institutions than to foster new developments."

As in any general work, one is bound to find some important omissions. The volume has no systematic discussion of the politics of economic planning, nor is there more than a passing concern for state-center relations. The discussion of the problem of Nehru's succession contains some interesting speculation as to who the successor might be, but it omits a consideration of the very important question of *how* succession will be determined. In a concluding discussion of the problem of political participation, he notes that "when the peasants and the labourers step forward in their own right, South Asia will see a transformation, compared to which the transfer of power in 1947 will appear to comprise only a prelude or overture," implying thereby a future crisis rather than the continuous process which has in fact been underway since the latter part of the nineteenth century. Finally, though Tinker frequently contrasts Indian and Pakistan political developments, he rarely ventures into any explanations.

The second book under review also deals with modern India and is by an Englishman. Under the editorship of its director, C. H. Philips, The School of Oriental and African Studies is publishing four volumes of documents in Indian history. The last volume in the series, *The Evolution of India and Pakistan, 1858–1947,* has been published first. Professor Philips and his colleagues have extracted from official records and correspond-

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ence those documents covering the movements and developments of the period which in their judgment are important. Documents are included on the British system of government in India, the rise of nationalism, British constitutional policy, and selected problems and policies of the Indo-British empire. Since these materials are not readily available in more than a handful of libraries in this country, this compendious volume is to be welcomed.

The reader should, however, be aware of several limitations in this collection. There is a preponderant reliance upon official documents and on correspondence, with only a cursory coverage from Indian public writings, particularly newspaper and ephemeral political tracts. Moreover, the documents focus on national developments almost exclusively; few focus on regional and local changes. Finally, and most important, the volume is concerned with movements which succeeded—constitutionalism, nationalism, Muslim communalism—and not with those which ultimately failed, even though they were at times of great importance. Thus, there are few or no documents of the Muslim nationalist movement or such anti-nationalist collaborationist movements as the Justice party in Madras.

The political world described by Hugh Tinker seems far removed from the political world which emerges from the documents in the Philips collection. The dynamic elements of political change in contemporary India and Pakistan—linguistic provincialism, caste conflict, socialist and Gandhian ideology, agrarian conflict, political unionism, the growth of the press—all predate independence. Perhaps Professor Philips and his colleagues will assemble for us another collection of documents on pre-independence India which will bridge the gap between British India and independent India.

MYRON WEINER

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939. By ALBERT HOURANI. London, New York, and Toronto, Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1962. —ix, 403 pp. $6.75.

The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas. By ŞERIF MARDIN. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1962.—viii, 456 pp. $10.00.

Recent years have seen a sudden proliferation of good books on modern Middle Eastern intellectual history, which has

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changed the subject from one of the least understood aspects of the Middle East to one of the best. Beginning with H. A. R. Gibb's *Modern Trends in Islam,* the trend continued with such books as W. C. Smith, *Islam in Modern History,* N. Safran, *Egypt in Search of a Political Community,* S. Haim, *Arab Nationalism,* G. E. von Grunebaum, *Modern Islam,* and the works of Uriel Heyd and others on Turkey. The two books now under review join their distinguished predecessors and add new dimensions to the subject. Written respectively by a historian and a political scientist, the books have the advantage of reflecting a background of study of the West and its ideas, which both adds to their merit and makes them more accessible to the non-specialist.

Hourani's *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age* is a formidable work which covers a century and a half of Arab thinkers, Muslim and Christian, including even certain North Africans, who are usually ignored in works of this type. Its completeness alone makes it most valuable, as does the accuracy of its summaries of a huge body of Arabic writing. In addition, the author discusses relevant political events which shaped each thinker and gives brief biographies and analyses of the significance of the major figures. The reader is also treated to an unusually perceptive summary of the traditional Islamic theories of the state in the first chapter.

Hourani appreciates the formidable problems created by the need to adjust Islamic thought to the dynamic, scientific views of modern society, and he analyzes the mechanisms used by Islamic modernists like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad 'Abduh, and Rashid Rida to accomplish this. Especially new is his discussion of secularist trends, represented largely by Christians, whose influence is too often ignored by those with a purely Islamic orientation to the Near East. To some extent the Islamic and secularist trends have merged in that modern nationalism which regards Islam as a cause of past Arab greatness without expecting it to determine the legal or political future.

Hourani's book is a mine of information, and can be used with confidence for reference or for a summary of the thought of modern Arab intellectuals. The author has perhaps not chosen to give enough time to analyzing why these men wrote as they did. While avoiding the pitfall of distortion, through the most complete and careful reading and summary of his sources, Hourani sometimes renounces the acute criticism and historical analysis of which he is capable. Where he does analyze he is consistently enlightening. My one real dissent concerns Afghani. While Hourani breaks important new ground in demonstrating

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Afghani's ties to the Islamic philosophical tradition, he appears to believe that both this tradition and Afghani were more in accord with Islamic orthodoxy than this reviewer would grant. On the whole, however, Mr. Hourani has given us a work of solid and extensive scholarship which brings order and clarity into a vast and intractable subject.

Mardin's *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought* similarly analyzes the writings of several intellectuals, but limits itself to a single related group. After an unsatisfactory first chapter summarizing the fortunes of the Young Ottomans, the book hits its stride with outstanding and original chapters on the Islamic intellectual heritage, the attitude of the Young Ottomans to the Ottoman past, and especially Chapter IV, "Turkish Political Elites in the Nineteenth Century." This chapter shows the increase in power of the upper bureaucracy, which occurred partly because of the impetus to centralization given by the Western impact. The *Tanzimat* reforms concentrated power in the hands of the reforming ministers, while weakening the lower bureaucracy, the ulema, and other groups. The young Ottomans, active in the third quarter of the nineteenth century, were the first Ottoman Turks to propagate constitutionalism and patriotism. They opposed the *Tanzimat* statesmen not only on constitutional grounds but also, Mardin believes, because of their social origin in groups threatened by the *Tanzimat*. Mardin also suggests that there was an incipient Turkish bourgeoisie which was stifled by Western capitulatory privileges, and that the role played by the bourgeoisie in European reform and revolution was taken up largely by men from the lower bureaucracy.

Elsewhere Mardin shows that, in contrast to the *Tanzimat* statesmen, the Young Ottomans tried to appear as defenders of the Ottoman and Islamic past. This was necessitated by their peculiar task of advocating reform against reformers, who were resented not only for their autocracy, but for their favoritism toward Christians. Later chapters summarize the thoughts of Şinasi, Mustafa Fazil Paşa, Namik Kemal, Ziya Paşa, Ali Suavi, and Hayreddin Paşa. Though accurate and valuable, they do not have quite the level of bold and acute analysis of the earlier chapters.

Like Hourani, Mardin shows us the processes and difficulties involved in the adaptation of modern Western notions to a very different tradition. His book is an important contribution to the understanding of modern Ottoman thought and society which also contains suggestive ideas for those in other fields.

NIKKI R. KEDDIE

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Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1937–1945. By CHALMERS A. JOHNSON. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1962.—xii, 256 pp. $5.75.

Japan's contribution to the rise of modern Chinese nationalism and to the expansion of communism in China has often been assumed but rarely made explicit in a monographic study. Political and psychological blocks have deterred Chinese and Japanese scholars from working seriously on the 1937–45 war period, while few Western academicians have possessed the linguistic skill or the sustained will to confront the reality that, in the twentieth-century sector of their histories, neither China nor Japan may realistically be studied in isolation from the other. Professor Johnson's book is thus a trail-blazing effort. Its central argument is that the Communist party's rise to power in China flowed directly from the chaos created by the Japanese invasion and from the efficiency with which the Communists responded to that national emergency. With discipline, flexibility, and pragmatism, the Communists succeeded in introducing administrative authority into major enclaves behind the Japanese lines and in establishing themselves as the responsible leaders of Chinese nationalist sentiment; the Kuomintang, confronting the same challenge, evaded the basic issue and rather sought salvation, in the traditional manner, by seeking to utilize allies outside China to bolster political power at home.

Simple though the major thesis of *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power* is, its implications compel attention. Intellectually, the author employs the functional approach to nationalism expounded by Karl W. Deutsch in *Nationalism and Social Communication* (1953) and refined in Deutsch's paper on social mobilization and political development (1961). As source materials, the valuable archives of the Japanese Army and the Kōain (Asia Development Board) have been explored, with independent control supplied by relevant Chinese and Western language materials. After an introductory appraisal of peasant nationalism in China, the author describes the role inadvertently played by the Japanese military in arousing previously unpoliticized peasants, and the response shown by the Chinese Communists in mobilizing resistance and establishing a network of territorial bases. With good biographical and geographical detail, he discusses the methods used by the Communists in effecting political alliances with the mobilized peasantry; the extent and nature of the Communist bases in the traditionally conservative north China countryside; and the New Fourth Army and the

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northern Kiangsu base in the lower Yangtze region. Chinese communism developed during the 1937–45 period as a virulent species of anti-imperialist nationalism, a party-led mass movement which successfully linked organization and ideology in the pursuit of national objectives. Mao Tse-tung's major political achievement during the Japanese invasion was the rapid expansion of competing administrative system behind the Japanese lines which showed itself more effective than that of the legitimate Nationalist government, isolated in the provinces of west China. Before Japan's surrender in 1945, Communist-organized base areas held a population of some ninety million. As competition tightened in the subsequent civil war, administrative paralysis increasingly gripped the *status quo* Nationalist structure; and a chain reaction process was sparked which ultimately proved irreversible. By 1949, Mao Tse-tung controlled Peking and the nation.

Solidly researched and soundly written, the book is marred in places by doctoral dissertation didacticism and by some debatable political generalizations. In an important review article (*The Journal of Asian Studies,* XXII, February 2, 1964, 269–89), Professor Donald G. Gillin of Duke University argues that the major thesis of the Johnson book is not borne out by events in the province of Shansi between 1935 and 1939. On balance, however, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power* is a noteworthy volume for reasons symbolic as well as scholarly. Its publication, taken together with that of the recent study on leadership in Communist China by Professor John W. Lewis of Cornell, marks the emergence of a younger group of political scientists who should have a therapeutic influence on Western study of Chinese political patterns. During the later nineteen-sixties, the work of this new generation may help to bury past intramural polemics and, hopefully, to restore China to the field of comparative government and politics where it has so long been either neglected or totally ignored.

HOWARD L. BOORMAN

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

M. N. Roy's Mission to China. By ROBERT C. NORTH and XENIA J. EUDIN. Berkeley, Calif., University of California Press, 1963.—vi, 399 pp. $7.50.

A unique value of this book is its documentation, for the first time in English, of the Fifth Congress of the C. P. China, during the historic Kuomintang-Communist split of 1927, and of M. N. Roy's writings of that period. Roy's mission representing the

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Comintern is not clarified, but that is not a fault of the authors; the Comintern and Roy himself are responsible, and in retrospect we can see from the documents that at the time no one involved was clear on this question. Apparently Roy was displacing M. Borodin, Russian adviser to the KMT since 1923, yet Borodin remained and the two openly disagreed on the most important questions in dispute. While Roy's words were sometimes approved by the C. P. China, he complains they were never carried into action, and that Borodin retained practical command of Communist funds. Even in after years Roy was unable to clarify what he tried to accomplish, except in the vaguest theoretical terms. Our authors are fully justified in saying (p. 7), "The appended documents suggest that the 1927 Communist debacle was not the outcome of 'simple repetition of the [misguided] formula laid down in Moscow'—but the upshot of a proliferation of formulas, the consequence of a bewildering babble of proposals and counter-proposals." Probably the clearest proposals would not, however, have changed the overall outcome. Roy's political confusion and obvious practical ineptness only rendered worse a hopeless situation; equally, while Borodin showed greater stature, it is pure speculation to say his undisputed command could have retrieved the situation. The documents are preceded by an excellent (though perhaps too tight) running account of events in the final weeks of the Wuhan government, the last remnant of the KMT-Communist united front.

The book lists me (p. 6) as among the numerous Comintern representatives in China at the time. This is a misunderstanding, due to the fact that I traveled to China in Roy's party, with the other members of a Workers' Delegation responding to an invitation from Chiang Kai-shek, as well as forty or fifty Comintern delegates returning from the Seventh Enlarged Plenum, and returning students from France. I had close relations only with the trade unions, whose leaders were later responsible for placing me in the Pan Pacific T. U. Secretariat as executive for two years. I was not close to the inner controversies dealt with in this book, as my contemporary writings will show (*Civil War in Nationalist China* [Chicago, 1927]). The book adequately reflects the decisive role played in the rise of the KMT to power by the trade unions and peasant unions, which might lead to an overestimation of what was possible to combat the split; both trade unions and peasant unions were raw and inexperienced, and the former included a minute fraction of the population.

After the split, Chiang secured iron control over the KMT with the aid of American money and German military advisers,

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and it looked like the defeat of the Communists was final. But in the early nineteen-forties, Washington found it advisable to treat with the Communists, and advise reform and democratization of the Chiang regime. But it was too late; after the split of 1927, dry rot permeated the KMT more and more, so that by 1949 it was to collapse like a house eaten by termites. Power was automatically inherited by the only organized group that had been able to survive the Chiang regime, Mao Tse-tung and his companions. Finally the Communists came to power after twenty years in the wilderness. Yet there was never lacking non-Communist voices to issue cries of alarm about that dry rot in the KMT. In my memory the earliest was George Sokolsky, then on the *North China Daily News* in Shanghai, who wrote early in 1928 warning Chiang that continuation of his fanatical anti-communism which hit everyone not a member of Chiang's clique, would in the long run bring the Communists into power. That prophecy came true twenty years later. When I reminded Sokolsky of his prophetic powers, during the early nineteen-fifties, he had completely forgotten it, and would have denied it if I had not preserved clippings from the old days. That was the weakness with all Americans who were troubled by the dry rot in the KMT, their memories were too short. This book is a needed reminder.

EARL BROWDER

YONKERS, N. Y.

Zambia Shall be Free. By KENNETH DAVID KAUNDA. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1963.—202 pp. $4.50.

Africa Unbound: Reflections of an African Statesman. By ALEX QUAISON-SACKEY. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1963. —xiii, 174 pp. $4.95.

Why have African leaders rejected colonialism and missionary Christianity and so overwhelmingly espoused the causes of national independence and pan-Africanism? In *Zambia Shall be Free,* the man who expects to be the first prime minister of an independent Northern Rhodesia (the future Republic of Zambia) provides answers to some of these questions. *Zambia Shall be Free* is the autobiography of Kenneth Kaunda, now Minister of Local Government and Social Welfare in Northern Rhodesia, and the leader of the dominant United National Independence party (UNIP). It is an account of his early life on a remote Presbyterian mission station, of his subsequent experience with discrimination as a mission teacher and an urban welfare offi-

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cer, and of his decision fourteen years ago to join the young Rhodesian nationalist movement.

The next years were ones of importance both for Northern Rhodesia and for Kaunda. The British government superimposed a federal government upon the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland, and thereby gave a large measure of new control to settlers in all three territories. Africans naturally resented this attempt to entrench the forces of white domination; Kaunda became the secretary-general of the Northern Rhodesia African National Congress (ANC) and, with Harry Nkumbula, its president, actively led an increasingly militant movement of Africans opposed to the federal government. Throughout the early nineteen-fifties, Kaunda helped to organize a number of protests against settler rule. At the same time, he became convinced that Gandhian non-violence was the only approach to the struggle for political freedom. He foreswore smoking, drinking, and the eating of meat. He gathered around himself a small group of similarly dedicated disciples who eventually decided that the older Nkumbula was no longer capable of leading Northern Rhodesia to independence. In 1958, they formed a new nationalist party that was banned in 1959; at the time, the then governor of Northern Rhodesia called Kaunda a "thug" and a "murderer," and compared his movement to New York's infamous "Murder Inc."

Kaunda spent a year in detention. He emerged as the unquestioned leader of the African population of Northern Rhodesia, and as a figure of continental importance. The long months in prison had also reinforced his faith in the principles of non-violence; throughout 1960 and 1961, he managed, with great difficulty, to contain much of the impatience and the latent violence of his fellow UNIP politicians and the African masses. In late 1962, he even attempted to transform UNIP into a truly multi-racial party in order both to prevent a final schism between white and black, and to attempt to win Northern Rhodesia's first major election.

Zambia Shall be Free was written during the last months of the 1962 campaign, published in England, and sequestered by federal customs authorities before it was finally sold in Northern Rhodesia. Unfortunately, copies of Kaunda's book arrived too late to influence the white electorate in UNIP's favor. Moreover, its subject matter was limited to much that was non-controversial, and it failed to provide readers with a life-size portrait of the UNIP leader. Even the historian or the political scientist will find little in it that is more than an outline for a fuller biography of one of Africa's most likeable and persuasive

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politicians. Kaunda refuses to engage his readers more than momentarily. The important incidents in his life—the role that he played as secretary-general of the ANC, his leadership of the anti-discrimination boycotts during the nineteen-fifties, the reasons for his break with Nkumbula—are not discussed in any detail. Even the reasons for his attachment to non-violence remain vague. The pages of his book simply mirror Kaunda's humble and modest style of life. It is therefore not surprising that they fail adequately to capture the political drama in which he is so intimately involved.

Alex Quaison-Sackey is Ghana's Ambassador to the United Nations. His book—a thinly connected group of essays on such contemporary subjects of interest as "the African personality," "positive neutralism and nonalignment," and "African unity"—thus faithfully reflects the diplomatic philosophy of President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. These essays contain little that is new, or that has not been stated more eloquently by Nkrumah himself. Indeed, the innocent reader of *Africa Unbound* might well wonder if Ghanaian or African foreign policy was ever initiated by anyone other than Nkrumah. Nonetheless, Quaison-Sackey has provided an elementary primer to the important world issues in which Ghana has involved herself; his book contains mild, reasonable arguments for neutralism in the African context, a Ghanaian explanation of the distinction between "Negritude" and "the African personality," a tendentious discussion of recent events in the Congo, and a useful statement of Ghana's aims at and for the United Nations. In the last connection, Quaison-Sackey deviates from the most recent Afro-Asian line only once, when (p. 173) he advocates the continued participation of South Africa and Portugal in the activities of the United Nations. In sum, this is less of a contribution to our knowledge of Africa than it could be, primarily because Quaison-Sackey has avoided any sustained expression of his own political and personal views on the world scene. Furthermore, his publisher has sadly failed to provide readers with an index or with any maps.

ROBERT I. ROTBERG

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Entrepreneurship in Argentine Culture. By THOMAS C. COCHRAN and RUBEN E. REINA. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1962.—xi, 338 pp. $7.50.

Most of the outstanding entrepreneurs of Latin America have

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been immigrants or the sons of immigrants, with Italians conspicuous among them. Students of Latin American economic history have long been familiar with the achievements of Francisco Matarazzo, who arrived in Brazil in 1881 and was considered the leading manufacturer in South America at the time of his death in 1937. Cochran and Reina have now described in detail the career of another Italian immigrant, an orphan boy who arrived in Argentina at the age of three years, began his business career at nineteen, and at his death in 1948 was described as South America's foremost industrial magnate. Even after the deaths of these two Italians, the economic enterprises that they founded continued to prosper and still stand as monuments to the men's efficiency and vision.

The volume under review contains eight chapters, the first of them entitled "Argentina: The Country and the People" and the last presenting some conclusions regarding "Entrepreneurship, Industrialization, and National Culture." Like nearly all books dealing with Latin America these days, the authors try to unlock the secrets of economic development in retarded countries. Designed for the specialist in economics, this volume should also appeal to those interested in history and biography. Torcuato Di Tella was a man who won the admiration of all men of good will who knew him in Argentina and elsewhere. He was closely associated with entrepreneurs in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, the United States, and Italy. He was a humanitarian as well as an industrialist and a millionaire, and one may hope that many others with talents for economic development will profit by his image and example. A decade after Di Tella's death *Sociedad Industrial Americana de Maquinaries Di Tella Limitada* controlled twenty-one subsidiaries, operating mainly in Argentina but also in Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and even outside Latin America. The paid-up capital of these enterprises exceeded 422,000,000 pesos. During his lifetime or later at his behest three philanthropic foundations were established.

In the opinion of this reviewer, readers should not neglect the lengthy appendices included in this monograph. They contain important statistics, numerous letters, and many carefully recorded interviews.

J. Fred Rippy

Durham, North Carolina

Latin America Between the Eagle and the Bear. By Salvador de Madariaga. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1962.—xiv, 192 pp. $4.50.

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The Second Revolution in Cuba. By J. P. MORRAY. New York, Monthly Review Press, 1962.—vii, 173 pp. $3.25.

The Coming Explosion in Latin America. By GERALD CLARK. New York, David McKay Co., 1963.—xi, 436 pp. $6.75.

It is said that it is an ill wind that blows no one good. This has certainly been true of the Castro revolution in Cuba. If it has accomplished nothing else, it has certainly stimulated unprecedented interest among North Americans in Latin America and its problems, and, of course, particularly in Cuba. These three books prove the point.

Salvador de Madariaga is an old hand at writing about Latin America. However, in this volume he presents a "popular" book, and what he says in it has been much influenced by the advent of Castro. The other two authors are relative newcomers to the Latin American field. J. P. Morray spent some time as an assistant U.S. naval attaché in Paraguay, but his main concern with Latin America came with his spending twenty-one months in Castro's Cuba, most of the time as a visiting professor of political science. Gerald Clark is a Canadian newspaperman who in the last few years has traveled widely in Latin America, and reports in this book upon his findings there.

These three books are of uneven quality. Although Madariaga speaks from long experience, this little volume is replete with minor and major errors of fact. The Morray book is one of the most profuse, enthusiastic, and inaccurate apologias for the Castro regime so far to appear. The best of the three is the book by Gerald Clark, which on balance gives the reader a good picture of the principal and most urgent problems facing the Latin Americans today.

As the name of his book indicates, Salvador de Madariaga is concerned with the struggle between the United States and the international Communist movement for influence in Latin America. He is distinctly favorable to the United States, although he has a number of appropriate criticisms of U.S. policy in the area in recent years. As is usual with Madariaga, when writing about Latin America, he is much concerned with the importance of Spanish influence in the culture of the countries of the area and with the need for debunking the "black legend" prejudicial to Spain which is still current to a large degree. This reviewer finds it necessary to take these arguments with a certain pinch of salt.

However, the most distressing aspect of Madariaga's book is

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its many errors of fact and date. Most of them are not of vital importance, but they are so numerous that they detract immeasurably from the value of the book. Two examples will suffice. On page 148, the author has Getulio Vargas "reelected" to the presidency of Brazil in November 1937, when in fact Getulio executed a coup d'état from the presidential palace to avoid a scheduled election of a successor and to establish a corporative "New State." On page 108, Madariaga states that Juan José Arevalo, president of Guatemala, died in 1950, something which Mr. Arevalo would be surprised to learn in his place of exile in Mexico City in 1963.

J. P. Morray's book on Cuba is one of the least reliable of the many volumes on the subject which have appeared since 1959. Its basic theme is that the Cuban revolution had a life of its own, separate from the men who led it or participated in it, and that it inevitably moved in the "proletarian" direction, "proletarian" being defined in terms of the Communist party of Cuba.

There is no breath of criticism of the revolution or anything which it has done in Morray's book. He accepts with complete equanimity and approval such things as Castro's insisting on the retrial and conviction of aviators who had been acquitted by one revolutionary tribunal; the ending of a free press and of all freedom to criticize the regime; the insistence by Castro on his right to name the leaders of the Cuban labor movement; the jailing, exiling, and killing of many of the early leaders of the 26th of July Movement by the Castro regime.

All of this is supported in the name of the "proletarian" nature of the Castro regime. But obviously Morray's concept of a proletarian regime is a metaphysical one. Thus, on page 19, he says that as of February 1959 "the proletariat was already in power in the person of Fidel Castro (though few could see this in February of 1959)." He is utterly unimpressed by the fact that the elected representatives of the proletariat, virtually all of whom after January 1959 were members of Castro's own 26th of July Movement, were strongly opposed to the revolution's taking the Communist direction which it did. Indeed, he presents a completely erroneous account of what actually occurred in the labor movement during 1959.

Gerald Clark presents a bird's eye view of what is occurring throughout Latin America. Although this reviewer thinks that he rather overstates the influence which Fidel Castro has outside Cuba, this does not detract essentially from the value of the book. Clark is certainly right in underlining the urgency of the situation in the hemisphere, and the need for really revolutionary measures to deal with the problems of Latin America. The

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reader will be intrigued, we are sure, by the measures which he proposes. They are unique, and by themselves make the book well worth reading.

ROBERT J. ALEXANDER

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BOOK NOTES

Professor Peter Gay is a very courageous man. Although he admits (Voltaire: *Philosophical Dictionary,* Translated, with an Introduction and Glossary by Peter Gay, Preface by André Maurois. New York, Basic Books, 1962; Volume I: A–I, xix, 332 pp.; Volume II: J–Z, xi, 661 pp., $12.50.) that Voltaire is little read, except for *Candide,* he has brought out a handsome translation in two volumes of the *Dictionnaire philosophique.* He doubtless feels that if made available and attractive, Voltaire will be more widely read, and since he is a fervent and intelligent Voltairian, he has devoted much time and thought to his translation. It is a service which can be commended wholeheartedly: the translation has preserved much of the verve, the wit and irony, and the flavor of the original. Moreover the selection of the *Dictionnaire* itself was an intelligent one, since it represents in a broad way Voltaire's ideas and contains at the same time not only the intellectual scope but synthesizes his diverse ways of expression with the immense variety of ideas. Only the *Questions sur l'Encyclopédie* could be fuller, and more representative, but simply because it is four or five times longer; in every other respect it is the same thing.

The text is supplemented by a fifty page introduction by Professor Gay and seven page preface by Maurois. Both critics undertake to give within the space allotted a picture of the author of the *Dictionnaire.* The result is an interesting contrast. Maurois in his usual charming way has literally pieced together with much assistance from Faguet a kind of fictional Voltaire, but the portrait is genuine enough for all its fictional values. The portrait of Professor Gay is fuller, richer, in a strange way more journalistic and less academic than Maurois. Professor Gay has spent more time with Voltaire; he has also absorbed much from the brilliant Voltairians of the present time: Pomeau,

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Torrey, Besterman. Much of his portrait has been drawn from his own *Poet as Realist* which he declares to represent for him still the living Voltaire. The earlier work is indeed a lively presentation, but somehow I feel that this fifty page introduction is just as alive and in one or two respects more mature. It is a delight to place side by side the three portraits: Maurois in the preface (a moral Voltaire), Gay in the introduction (in the last analysis an artistic Voltaire, but with a journalistic flavor) and Voltaire's own portrait in the *Dictionnaire philosophique* (with some assistance from Maurois and Gay, a human one). IRA O. WADE, Princeton University.

Problems and Policies of the British in India, 1885–1898 (New York, Asia Publishing House, 1963; xi, 284 pp., $10.75) by Hira Lal Singh is concerned with one of the most significant periods in modern Indian history. After the threat of the military uprising had been met in 1858, control by the crown seemed to give permanence to British rule, but by the eighteen-eighties a new challenge came with the demand on the part of an influential segment of the population for a share in administrative and political power. By 1908 concessions had been made that clearly pointed to a lessening of British power. Professor Singh examines government policy during this brief heyday of imperial control in four vital areas—the civil service, the legislative councils, the army, and organized political activity—and while he refrains from drawing any broad generalizations, he succeeds in defining the dominant attitudes of those responsible for maintaining the fabric of political life. The dilemma of British rule in India—how to enforce political control while providing for genuine civil equality—is made clear, although when the author speaks of the "inadequate and unsatisfactory" responses of the British rulers to Indian opinion he does not indicate what solution, short of abdication of rule, was really available. Furthermore, the problems he identifies as "British" may in fact be inherent in the political structures of any modern government in India, including that of the present time. The account of the development of the provincial legislative councils and the indication of the role played by individual governors is one of the valuable features of the book, since this is a relatively neglected area of study. The final chapter on British responses to Indian nationalism covers well-worn ground, but the discussion of Congress finances is useful, and the comments taken from private letters of officials are illuminating. Both in principles of organi-

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zation and in the use of new material, the author has made an important contribution to the study of modern Indian political organization.

Ceylon: The Path to Independence (New York, Frederick Praeger, 1963; x, 148 pp., $4.50) by Sir Charles Jeffries is not an account of a nationalist struggle against imperialism, but a detailed study of the administrative and political problems involved in the creation of representative institutions out of an autocratic bureaucracy. Jeffries rightly insists that the transformation of the system of government in Ceylon must be differentiated from the process in India, since control of India was different both in theory and practice from that exercised by the Colonial Office over Crown Colonies. While he does not mention it, the historical parallel would seem to be with Canada in the eighteen-thirties and eighteen-forties. Lord Durham's dictum that what was needed in Canada was "no change in the principles of government, no invention of new constitutional theory," but only a consistent application of the British constitution, was followed, not always with happy results, by the Colonial Office in its policy toward Ceylon in the nineteen-twenties. The internal stresses of Ceylon's social structure and the special needs of British defense in the Indian Ocean, as well as the peculiar feeling of responsibility for the non-Western possessions that sometimes clouded political discussions, made the formation of new constitutional arrangements more difficult than in the colonies of settlement. The breakdown of the Crown Colony pattern of government as the official majority lost control of the Legislature, the recommendations of the Donoughmore Commission, and the experiment with state councils, are treated with admirable lucidity. Little attention is given to the nature of the political parties that participated in the constitutional debates, but possibly this is a reflection of the realities of the situation. Individual leaders were probably more important than parties in the attempt to work out solutions that would satisfy both the dominant Sinhalese majority and the Tamil and Muslim minority groups. Sinhalese evaluations of the measures taken would differ from those given by Jeffries, but this book provides the basic framework for further social and political analyses of the emergence of Ceylon as a modern state.—AINSLIE T. EMBREE, Columbia University.

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